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FOREWORD 
Much of the floodplain development taking place today in the rapidly 
growing areas of the United states is at high risk of damage or destruction due 
to the velocity, rapidity, duration, or debris content of flood waters. These 
and other complications create a ·protection gap· in current floodplain manage-
ment guidelines which usually address the depth of flooding but not other 
factors. 
This symposium focused upon techniques for identifying and managing such 
high risk areas. At all levels of government progress in effectively reducing 
flood losses in high risk areas has been slow due to the lack of detailed flood 
data and the lack of development guidelines reflecting the full range of risk 
factors. Yet real progress has been made in a few community and state programs 
and in federal agency research. 
The papers presented in this symposium define high risk area problems and 
document problem-solving approaches. We hope you will find them useful. 
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RESOLUTION 1984-1 
HIGH RISK AREAS 
WHEREAS, the Association of State Floodplain Managers has completed pre-
liminary work to identify high risk areas and analyze the status of floodplain 
management for these areas; and 
WHEREAS, simplifying assumptions for floodplain management made by Federal 
agencies, states, and local governments in the late 1960s have resulted in 
serious understatement of hazards in 20-30% of the nation's floodplains; and 
WHEREAS, these simplifying assumptions include: 1) flood stage is the only 
damage factor; 2) only clear water flooding occurs; and 3) the channel (or 
shore line) configuration is stable; and 
WHEREAS, these simplifying assumptions, while necessary at the time, 
failed to consider: 1) velocity, 2) debris in the water (ice, rocks, trees, 
etc.), 3) rapidity and duration of flooding, and 4) erosion and other changes 
in the flood channel; and 
WHEREAS, as a result of these assumptions, flood mapping, regulatory 
standards, and insurance rating are inadequate for a significant portion of the 
nation's floodplains; and 
WHEREAS, failure to correctly map and regulate high risk areas, without 
consideration of additional risk and loss potential, is causing and will cause 
an escalation of insurance claims and disaster losses; and 
WHEREAS, growth potential is substantial in high risk areas including: 
barrier islands (e.g., much of the developed Gulf and Atlantic coastline); 
areas subject to subsidence (e.g., New Orleans and Houston-Galveston); alluvial 
fans (30% of the arid southwest and Colorado); and areas prone to mudfloods 
(California coast and Wasatch front); and 
WHEREAS, increased market penetration for flood insurance in high risk 
areas will likely lead to massive increases in losses (out of proportion to 
premiums) in high growth areas such as Los Angeles County, Clark County, New 
Orleans, Houston-Galveston, Denver, and Salt Lake City, unless insurance 
premiums and land management standards are adjusted to reflect the special 
risk; and 
WHEREAS, the state of knowledge with regard to mapping and management of 
high risk areas has progressed sufficiently in the last 15 years to permit a 
variety of low-cost actions to reduce losses including mapping as part of the 
remaining map studies and remapping effort, upgraded land management, and 
increased insurance rates; and 
WHEREAS, there are continued methodological problems which need research 
and field testing, 
NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, that this Association recommends: 
1) That FEMA, in cooperation with other Federal agencies and states, develop 
a national policy for addressing areas where special risk factors 
(velocity, debris, unstable channels) pose significant threats to life and 
property. 
2) That such a policy supplement rather than replace existing policies 
pertaining to flood stage. 
, 
3) That an interagency task force be established to develop this policy with 
Association assistance. 
4) That such a policy not only recognize the importance of such areas but set 
forth a process to develop improved maps, land management standards, 
actuarially sound insurance policies, and postdisaster mitigation plans 
and guidelines. 
5) That such a policy be based upon further research and investigation that 
will: 
a. Examine, in depth, disaster payments and insurance claims for high 
risk areas to determine the magnitude of existing losses. 
b. Determine growth potential in these areas (using the Donnelly Study 
and other approaches) and future damage potential, including 
potential losses due to increased flood insurance penetration. 
c. Determine the effectiveness of land management techniques in such 
areas (e.g., elevation on pilings vs. elevation on fill) and needed 
improvement through postdisaster surveys and laboratory modeling. 
d. Through demonstration projects, determine for individual types of 
areas cost-effective combined approaches including mapping, land 
management standards, insurance, etc. These might best be initiated 
in communities and states in need of immediate assistance and willing 
to assist in these efforts. 
Adopted in draft form this 15th day of June, 1984, at the annual meeting 
of Association of State Floodplain Managers in Portland, Maine. 
Robert Hendrix, Chair, ASFPM 
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IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FLOODPLAIN 
MANAGEMENT IN HIGH RISK AREAS 
Jon A. Kusler and Pat Bloomgren 
Introduction 
On the average, 200 lives are lost each year due to flooding. The u.S. 
Water Resources Council has estimated that property losses will exceed $4.3 
billion per year by 2000, despite the mapping and regulation of floodplains in 
17,000 communities during the last 15 years. 
Inadequate maps, regulations, and other management approaches for high 
risk flood hazard areas and substantial new development in these areas are one 
reason for increased rather than decreased losses. High risk areas collective-
ly constitute only 20-25% of the nation's floodplains, but account for much of 
the loss of life. When flooding occurs, structures are severely damaged or 
destroyed. Such high risk areas include barrier islands, bluffs and beaches 
subject to waves and erosion; alluvial fans; areas behind unsafe levees and 
below unsafe dams; and areas subject to mudfloods, inland and coastal subsi-
dence, inland flash floods, ice jams, and fluctuating lake and ground water 
levels. 
High risk areas occur in a broad range of geologic, topographic and hydro-
logic conditions: 
Coastal Erosion/flooding 
At least 2,700 miles of Great Lake, Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf shoreline 
are subject to critical erosion with thousands of miles of other shores subject 
to lesser beach, dune, and bluff erosion. Tens and perhaps hundreds of 
thousands of structures are at risk. Most erosion occurs in major hurricanes 
and winter storms. Sea level rise compounds the problem. Most flood hazard 
mapping and regulation has not considered erosion. However, storm-related 
erosion is compensated by flood insurance despite a lack of mitigation stan-
dards for this special flood hazard. 
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Alluvial Fans 
It has been estimated that alluvial fans constitute 30% of the arid South-
west land including even a greater percentage of the developable land. Fans 
have usually been mapped, regulated, and insured as shallow flooding areas 
despite severe flood hazards due to the velocity of the flooding, debris, and 
erosion. 
Mudflows and Mudfloods 
Mudflows and mudfloods often occur when heavy rains follow forest fires in 
the Southwest. They have accounted for hundreds of millions of dollars in 
flood losses in the last decade not only because of the depth of inundation but 
also because of the velocity of the water and the debris. Mudflows also occur 
in other areas of the nation. 
Areas Below Unsafe Dams 
At least 2,900 dams have been listed as "unsafe" by the Corps of 
Engineers. It has been estimated that more than 2,000 communities would be 
inundated to levels exceeding the 100-year flood by rupture of these dams •. The 
failure of a dam can cause major loss of life and property damage due not only 
to the depth of the water but also its velocity, debris, and the suddenness of 
onset. 
Areas Behind Unsafe Levees 
There are over 25,000 miles of levees in the nation. These levees range 
widely in terms of protection (e.g., 20-year, 30-year, 50-year, 100-year); 
construction materials; and adequacy of design and maintenance. Severe losses 
like the $500 million in flood damage in Jackson, Mississippi, in 1979 occur 
when levees are overtopped or fail due to the depth, velocity, and suddenness 
of the flood. 
Subsidence 
Flooding due to subsidence, which gradually lowers the land surface, is a 
serious problem in Louisiana, Texas, and California with lesser problems in 
other states. Subsidence is caused by extraction of ground or surface waters, 
compaction of organic soils, solution, or tectonic adjustments. Subsidence not 
only increases flood heights but also can cause permanent flooding as in 
Baytown, Texas. 
Kusler/Bloomgren 
Liquefaction 
Liquefaction caused by earthquakes or other factors is a major potential 
cause of flooding in some areas of California and Alaska and along the 
Mississippi River. When earthquakes occur, unconsolidated sands and silts 
temporarily lose their strength and behave as viscous fluids. Levees fail and 
slumping and other ground failures occur. 
Ice Jams 
Flooding as a result of ice jams is a serious problem along rivers and 
streams in 35 of the northern and midwestern states. The jam can increase 
flood stage ~o heights far greater than the calculated 100-year flood eleva-
tion. Ice and high velocity also add to the destructive force of the flood 
waters. 
Fluctuating Lake Levels 
5 
Long-term fluctuations in lake levels is a problem for the Great Lakes, 
many of the glacially created smaller lakes in the northern tier of states, and 
the "playa" or drainage lakes in the West and southwest with no or limited 
outlets. Flood waters may rise for years at a time, rendering structures 
elevated on pilings useless. Common additional special risk factors for lake 
flooding include ice (northern lakes) and erosion (the Great Lakes). 
Inadequacy of Existing Approaches 
Existing maps, regulations, insurance and other management approaches 
adopted for flood hazard areas by FEMA, states, and local communities during 
the late 1960s and 1970s often underestimate the hazards in high risk flood 
hazard areas. Mapping, regulations, and insurance were designed to address a 
"normal" flood hazard situation where clear water flooding and the depth of 
inundation was the primary factor causing damage. Flooding was assumed to be 
temporary and the configuration of the flood channel relatively stable. Such 
areas include: 
• Low velocity flow areas along major rivers and streams (e.g., the 
Mississippi and Missouri); and 
• Relatively flat-lying and stable coastal areas inundated by the storm 
surge where waves and erosion are not major factors. These include large 
areas along the Atlantic and Gulf Coast. 
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Such a focus upon the "typical" or "norm" with little attention to speci 
situations and high risk areas was needed during early phases of federal, 
state, and local floodplain management due to limited budgets and personnel, 
the need for consistency in standards, and lack of satisfactory mapping methc 
and regulatory standards for high risk areas. National criteria based upon 
such a concept of the "norm" have proven satisfactory for much of the country 
(perhaps 70-80% including most urban areas adjacent to major rivers and strea' 
and the Great Lakes).1 
The lack of attention to and the failure to consider other flood damage 
factors in special situations has resulted in serious deficiencies in flood-
plain management for high risk areas: 
• Guidelines for mapping the "norm" and the resulting maps have often unde, 
stated hazards in areas with veloci ty, debris, or other high risk proble: 
and failed to provide the basis for realistic planning, regulation, and 
flood warning systems. For example, flood maps for alluvial fans desig-
nate them as shallow flooding areas, implying low risk. Risks are, in 
fact, serious--largely due to high velocities, debris, and erosion. Sue, 
maps give a false sense of security and may mislead landowners and local 
governments. 
• Regulatory criteria designed for the "norm" underestimate the hazard in 
velocity, erosion, debris, and other high risk areas, often resulting in 
damage or destruction of structures built in compliance with regulatory 
criteria when a major flood occurs (e.g., during Hurricane Frederic, 
structures built in compliance with the 100-year storm surge elevation 
were destroyed by waves which had not been considered). 
• Flood insurance for high risk areas has not reflected actual risk, resul: 
ing in inordinately high losses for such areas and an unjustified incen-
tive for development. 
In some instances, state and local opposition has developed to federal 
maps and regulations due to these deficiencies and the lack of credibility of 
approaches now being applied. 
Such approaches have not, without tailoring to local conditions, 
been satisfactory for smaller rivers and streams and other drainage 
areas, which are typically not mapped or regulated or which, if mappe' 
or regulated, do not consider the impacts of urbanization on flood 
peaks. 
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Inadequate Attention to Risk and Damage Factors 
Depth of inundation is unquestionably the most important cause of flood 
damage in many situations, and an important factor even in high risk areas. 
But other factors become important or dominant in certain contexts: 
velocity 
7 
The damage potential of flood waters increases dramatically and in some 
instances exponentially with velocity. Velocity is determined by slope, rough-
ness, waves (coastal), and several other factors. Unless velocities are con-
sidered in building design, floodproofed structures often collapse from added 
pressures and stresses. water moving at speeds of 10-15 or more feet per 
second will undermine pilings and slab foundations. Water velocity is a major 
damage factor for 
• Coastal wave action areas (velocity zones) and coastal inlets and overwash 
areas during the rise and fall of the storm surge; 
• Inland high gradient flood areas (usually along smaller rivers and 
streams). These are also often "flash flood" areas with additional 
damage due to the rapid rise of the water. Such areas include alluvial 
fans; some riverine floodways; and areas subject to mudfloods, mudflow, 
and high gradient sheet flows. 
• Areas behind levees or dams where the protective structure suddenly fails 
or the design capacity is suddenly exceeded. 
Rocks, Sedi~ent, Ice !...-.2..~er Debris 
The "work potential" and damage potential of flood waters may be increased 
hundreds of times over clear water flooding where rapidly flowing flood waters 
contain substantial amounts of rock, sediment, ice, or other natural or human-
made materials. Clear water standards for floodproofing and elevation are 
inadequate in these contexts: 
• Alluvial fan flooding (rocks, mud); 
• Mudflow and mudflood (sediment, rocks, trees, etc.); 
• Meandering, unstable streams in the Southwest; 
• Ice jam flooding (ice); 
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• High velocity flood areas along rivers and streams (rocks, mud trees, 
lumber, bridges, etc.); 
• Areas subject to darn or levee failure (trees, portions of houses, lumber, 
etc. ); 
• Coastal wave action (rocks, gravel, portions of houses, etc.) 
Rapid Rise of Water 
Areas subject to rapid inundation by flood waters pose special threats to 
property and life because there is insufficient time for evacuation, emergency 
floodproofing, or other protection measures. Rapid inundation is a serious 
problem for: 
• High gradient rivers and streams in mountainous or hilly areas subject to 
sudden rainfall (e.g., Big Thompson Canyon). Such "flash flood" areas are 
most common in the mountainous West but occur in the eastern mountains and 
elsewhere; 
• Areas behind dams or levees subject to failure; 
• Barrier islands and certain other coastal areas principally along the Gulf 
or Atlantic coasts, which may be subject to relatively rapid (2 to 4 
hours) hurricane storm surge; 
• Coastal areas (principally along the west coast) subject to tsunamis. 
~ong-term or Permanent Inundation. 
Unlike the "typical" riverine or coastal flood situation where flood 
waters rise and fall quickly, certain areas are subject to long-term or essen-
tially permanent flooding. Structures elevated on pilings or floodproofed in 
such areas are often permanently unusable and must be abandoned unless special-
ly designed for long-term inundation with adequate access and services. Such 
areas often include: 
• Barrier islands and beaches inundated by rising sea levels; 
• Areas around lakes subject to long-term fluctuation of ground water 
levels; playa lakes and internal drainage lakes such as the Great Salt 
Lake; and lakes with inadequate outlets such as the Great Lakes; 
• Erosion areas, such as bluffs, where the land itself is destroyed in a 
flood event; 
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• Subsidence areas such as Baytown, Texas, caused by ground water or oil 
withdrawals, isostatic adjustments, or gradual solution of the underlying 
strata (karst topography); 
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• Areas subject to high groundwater levels and those behind dikes and levees 
where high water levels may persist for months or years (e.g., lands in 
Arizona adjacent to dikes along the Colorado River). 
Two or more of the special risk factors often occur in combination in high 
risk areas, exacerbating the problem. For example, high velocity, debris, and 
rapid rise of water cause severe damage in alluvial fan, mudflood, high veloci-
ty mountain stream areas, and areas subject to flooding by the failure of dams 
or levees. 
Erosion of the folood channel or blockage of the channel by sediment or 
debris is also common in alluvial fan, mudflood, high velocity stream, and 
coastal velocity areas. 
Progress in Addressing High Risk Areas 
Progress has been made in identifying high risk areas and formulating or 
adopting special management standards for them. 
1) FEMA has identified coastal velocity zones and is adding wave elevations 
to coastal flood hazard maps. FEMA now requires special engineering for 
structures in velocity zones although erosion is not considered. FEMA has 
also undertaken studies to develop mapping methods for areas below unsafe 
dams, mudslides, alluvial fans, and ice jams. However, few maps have been 
actually prepared. 
2) The u.S. Army Corps of Engineers has identified coastal erosion areas 
including those subject to "critical" erosion. The Corps continues to 
plan and construct coastal erosion engineering works and to fund some 
private protection measures. Michigan, North Carolina, washington, 
Massachusetts and several other coastal states have mapped coastal erosion 
areas and adopted setback lines and other regulatory standards. 
3) The National Weather Service has identified, on a preliminary basis, 
communities with flash flood problems and is assisting such communities to 
develop flood warning systems and evacuation plans. 
4) The U.S. Geological Survey has identified mudflood and mudslide areas in 
Utah, the San Francisco Bay Area, and some other areas. The survey has 
also mapped "sinks,· liquefaction areas and certain other geologic hazards 
in a few locations. Colorado has mapped and established regulatory guide-
lines for a wide range of special hazard areas. Los Angeles County and 
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some other local governments have also mapped and regulated alluvial fans 
and mudflood and mudflow areas. 
5) The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and some states have established darn 
inspection programs to identify unsafe structures. Iowa regulates areas 
below unsafe dams. 
6) NOAA, the Corps of Engineers, FEMA, SCS, and the USGS have developed flood 
warning systems and evacuation plans for selected high risk coastal and 
inland areas. 
Despite this progress: 
1) Only a portion of the high risk areas have been mapped at federal, state, 
and local levels on even a preliminary basis. Maps for coastal velocity 
zones (the one type of area mapped) do not, in most instances, adequately 
consider erosion. There is no systematic high risk area mapping program 
in progress on a nationwide basis for even a single type of area. 
2) FEMA, other federal agencies, and the states have, with a few exceptions, 
not adopted regulatory guidelines for high risk areas adequately reflect-
ing the risk (except certain coastal velocity zones) or provided guidance 
to local governments with regard to high risk area management. 
3) Federal and state programs for high risk areas are, in general, uncoordi-
nated and fragmented. For example, many states are mapping coastal 
erosion areas, but such erosion information is not systematically con-
sidered by FEMA in mapping. 
4) Available information concerning mapping methodologies for high risk 
areas, building standards and warning systems and other mitigation 
measures has not been widely disseminated. There are few reports, model 
ordinances or guidebooks. This problem is particularly critical for 
alluvial fans, ice jams, and coastal erosion areas where considerable 
methodological and technical information relevant to management of such 
areas has been developed but has not been supplied to potential users. 
Opportunities 
Having mapped and regulated most of the nation's low risk areas, is it not 
now time to turn federal, state and, local attention to special problems where 
the greatest present and future threats occur? Arguments that mapping and 
regulatory methodologies are not yet adequate and that more research is needed 
are not entirely honest or accurate. Enough is known to improve management 
apRroaches considerably! Arguments that mapping and regulation should wait 
until methodologies are fully perfected or until a nationwide program is 
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possible (from budget and personnel perspectives) fail to consider the enormous 
present growth in high risk areas, many of which will be developed in five to 
ten years (e.g., alluvial fans, coastal erosion areas, lakeshores). 
Available methods for mapping and managing high risk areas could produce 
maps and regulations with accuracies exceeding many of the flood-prone area 
maps and flood hazard boundary maps developed by the USGS and FIA study con-
tractors for 17,000 communities during the late 1960s and early 1970s. These 
maps have served as the basis for flood insurance and state and local regula-
tions despite their many limitations. 
High risk areas have been dismissed individually as regional or local 
problems not deserving national attention. But they are collectively important 
and should be collectively considered in national policy making. 
If more research is needed to perfect map methodologies and land manage-
ment guidelines for such areas, it should be undertaken. Budgets, manpower, 
and expertise are limited at federal, state, and local levels, but much more 
could be done with existing budgets. For example, map contractors could map 
those areas as part of ongoing new flood mapping and restudy efforts already 
scheduled. 
Selective mapping and management of such areas is needed on a priority 
basis, beginning with the areas with the largest potential flood losses, and 
with communities or states most interested in improving management of the 
areas. 
If budgets and staff are insufficient to develop detailed maps and manage-
ment standards for specific areas, a portion of the data gathering and design 
burden may be shifted to those seeking to develop such areas. Such an approach 
has been applied with considerable success by states and communities in dealing 
with more conventional flood hazards. Such an approach involves: 
1) preliminary mapping of areas through use of historical data on hazard 
events, soils, topographic maps, elementary modeling, etc.; 
2) Adoption of regulations for mapped areas requiring that anyone wishing to 
subdivide land or construct buildings within such areas a) carry out a 
more detailed examination of hazards consistent with guidelines in the 
regulation and b) prepare subdivision and building designs sufficient to 
provide protection for intended uses. 
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While not perfect, such an approach would be a major improvement over 
existing mapping and regulatory approaches which ignore risk factors. 
Given limited budgets, a major opportunity for improved management of higt. 
risk areas also lies in better training and education and improved coordinatior. 
and utilization of existing federal, state, and local personnel. High risk 
areas are the logical focus of not only floodplain managers but civil defense 
and emergency managers in their disaster preparedness and response programs and 
coastal zone managers and land use planners in preparation of coastal zone 
management and floodplain management plans. Management of these areas is also 
of great interest to natural resource specialists because high risk areas 
encompass some of the most ecologically sensitive barrier islands, beaches, and 
wetlands in coastal settings and the shore lands of scenic and wild rivers, 
riverine wetlands, and riparian habitat areas (in the West) along inland 
waters. 
Better interagency coordination at federal, state and local levels for 
high risk areas concerning predisaster mitigation planning, regulation, flood 
warning systems, flood insurance, engineering works, training and education, 
and technical assistance efforts might be accomplished through interagency 
memoranda of understanding, executive orders, directives from Congress, or 
other approaches. 
Other recommendations for improved management of high risk areas include: 
• Improved technical assistance and training and education efforts are 
needed for communities. These should be undertaken by FEMA, the Corps of 
Engineers, SCS, NOAA, other federal agencies, the states, universities, 
and interest groups; 
• Lists of communities with particular types of high risk areas should be 
prepared by states to help set priorities for mapping, technical assis-
tance, flood warning systems, and other programs on an interagency basis; 
• Predisaster plans, including master plans, should be prepared by states 
and localities for priority high risk areas (e.g., barrier islands, 
alluvial fans) to mitigate future damage and provide guidance for rebuild-
ing after a disaster. 
Although these measures would reduce losses, the most pressing need is 
coordinated and upgraded mapping and regulations and revised flood insurance 
policies for these areas. Suggestions for each of these include: 
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Mapping 
1) Efforts at the federal, state, or local level to better address high risk 
areas must begin with an identification of communities subject to such 
risks and the actual areas. Once identified, regulations and other 
management measures can be adopted. Maps are essential if high risk areas 
are to be zoned (state zoning statutes require maps). Maps are also 
needed to inform governmental officials and private landowners of the 
locations of high risk areas. In general, the issue is not whether maps 
are needed if regulations are to be adopted for high risk areas but which 
map scales, degrees of accuracy, and other features are needed. 
2) Generalized high risk maps should be developed even if detailed mapping is 
not practical. These might take the form of overlays. If maps are to be 
developed for regulatory and management purposes, it is desirable, but 
perhaps not essential, to distinguish between moderate hazard areas and 
the truly high risk areas, since regulatory procedure can be used in some 
circumstances to make this determination during administrative phases of a 
program (as suggested above). Such a procedure is incorporated in the 
single-district floodplain zoning ordinance proposed in Volumes 1 and 2 of 
Regulation of Flood Hazard Areas. with such an approach the map only 
serves to establish regulatory jurisdiction. The specific hazard at a 
site is determined through a case-by-case hazard analysis procedure as 
individual permit applications are submitted. 
3) If maps are to be prepared for regulation of high risk areas, they must be 
prepared at relatively large scale (e.g., 1 inch = 1000 feet or larger). 
Large scales are particularly needed for urban areas, although smaller 
scales may suffice for rural settings. A quantified evaluation of hazard 
is desirable (e.g., the lOa-year event) but not essential. Mechanisms 
should be available for resolving boundary disputes and carrying out more 
specific hazard and project analysis on a case-by-case basis, perhaps in 
the manner suggested above. 
4) Historical data and other sources of available information should be used 
for identification of high risk areas if other, more detail information is 
not available or cannot be developed. Although high risk factors have not 
been systematically mapped, such factors often occur within areas desig-
nated as subject to flooding on more generalized floodplain maps prepared 
by the u.S. Geological Survey, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the U.S. Soil Conservation 
Service. Historical data (albeit unquantified) also exists for many 
areas that have suffered high risk flooding such as flash floods, mud-
flows, and coastal erosion. This data could serve as the basis for pre-
liminary overlay mapping to supplement existing maps showing flood stage. 
5) Any effort to map such areas by FEMA, by another federal agency, states, 
or local governments should not necessarily mean that these areas will be 
insured under the National Flood Insurance Program. It may be that for 
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some high risk areas, denial of all insurance or at least very high rates 
would be appropriate. 
6) without a massive new mapping effort, FEMA could begin to upgrade its 
ongoing mapping program by adopting clarified high risk area map guide-
lines for use by study contractors and training these contractors in the 
application of such guidelines. Restudy mapping efforts and mapping after 
disasters could also reflect high risk factors. 
7) If FEMA does not wish to map high risk areas due to budgetary and admini-
strative limitations, it may nevertheless wish to encourage state and 
local mapping and regulation. Such efforts could serve FEMA's loss re-
duction objectives, reduce disaster assistance, and reduce flood insurance 
payments. Such mapping and regulation could be encouraged not only 
through cost sharing and technical assistance but favorable community 
rating for flood insurance purposes. For example, a community that maps 
and regulates high hazard areas might be given lower overall flood insur-
ance rates due to the overall lowered potential for loss. 
8) Mapping of high risk areas could, perhaps, begin on a pilot basis. Such 
pilot studies could test mapping methodologies as well as meet management 
needs at particular sites. 
9) High risk area mapping should be a multidisciplinary and, in some in-
stances, a multiagency effort. Mapping of high risk areas often requires 
more than hydrologic information, complicating the mapping process and 
requiring cooperative multidisciplinary mapping. For example, geologic, 
as well as hydrologic, data is needed for the mapping of coastal erosion! 
flood hazard areas, mud flow, subsidence, and certain high risk dam 
failure areas. The separation of hydrologic and geologic study functions 
in federal and state agencies has discouraged such mapping. 
10) Some combination of maps and technical studies on a site-specific basis i3 
needed for project evaluation. Maps in themselves rarely, if ever, pro-
vide-all of the data needed for design of protective works, floodproofing, 
and other adjustments in high risk areas since it is difficult to carto-
graphically represent velocity, debris load, depth of inundation, and 
other relevant factors even if this information is available. There are 
also limits to map scale and accuracy (given limited budgets). Such site-
specific data gathering could be undertaken by consultants, local govern-
ments, states or federal agencies. 
Regulation 
1) perhaps 60% to 70% of the high risk floodplain areas are subject to at 
least minimal floodplain regulations consistent with the standards of the 
National Flood Insurance Program. However, with the exception of some 
coastal velocity and erosion areas subject to state or local setback or 
high velocity zone ordinances, regulatory standards substantially under-
estimate the true hazard and fail to prescribe adequate protection 
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measures. In some instances, such as ice jam flooding, protection eleva-
tions are inadequate. In others, the management approaches are inappro-
priate. For example, elevation of structures on pilings does not provide 
flood protection from long-term lake level fluctuation unless roads and 
utilities are also elevated and the pilings and structures are designed 
for permanent or semipermanent inundation. 
2) The lack of local regulatory guidelines specifically addressing high risk 
problems has been due to lack of maps; lack of model ordinance approaches, 
manuals or other information setting forth management approaches for high 
risk areas; lack of expertise at local or state levels; lack of incentives 
to encourage special regulation; and failure of state or national regula-
tions to require or encourage special regulations. 
3) Despite the relative lack of local regulations on a nationwide basis, 
several hundred communities have, on their own initiative or at the urging 
of states, adopted special hazard regulations for alluvial fan, mudflood, 
coastal erosion, and other types of areas. Regulations are usually part 
of broader zoning, subdivision control, building code, or other regula-
tions. These regulations serve as valuable precedents for other 
programs. 
4) Strengthened regulatory approaches needed for high risk areas may 
include: 
• Complete prohibition of development in certain areas with substantial 
risks to safety, where development will substantially increase flood 
heights or erosion on other lands, or where engineering solutions are 
impractical (e.g., bluff erosion, mudslide below unsafe dams). Such 
prohibitions may be accomplished through setbacks or open space 
zoning. 
• Added elevation requirements through freeboard or increased base load 
elevations to reflect the special risk (e.g. wave heights, ice 
jams). 
• Strengthened performance standards to reflect not only water depth 
but velocity, debris, and other risk factors. Such performance stan-
dards could require that anyone desiring a building permit or sub-
division plot approval first undertake a hydrologic or combined 
hydrologic/geologic investigation to more specifically determine 
hazard at the site and then design the proposed structure to with-
stand the identified hazard. 
5) After flood disasters, upgraded regulations should be adopted for high 
risk areas to prevent rebuilding without consideration of special risks. 
State or local regulations could take the form of interim "freeze" 
ordinances and longer-term enhanced setback of elevations and performance 
standard guidelines. FEMA could encourage such regulation by requiring 
that federal postdisaster teams address special hazards and by incorpora-
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ting special hazard provisions in the section 406 guidelines for state ar. 
local postdisaster mitigation planning. 
6) states could strengthen regulations of high risk areas by mapping and 
directly regulating or requiring local regulation of such areas pursuant 
to existing broader floodplain management legislation now in effect in 
many states; or through new legislation authorizing state mapping and 
regulation or state-supervised local regulation of such areas. 
7) FEMA and other federal agencies could encourage local and s ta te regula tic' 
of high risk areas through manuals, ordinances, technical assistance 
grants-in-aid, training and education programs, and community rating sys-
tems for flood insurance (described below). Existing FIA regulatory 
guidelines for mudslide and erosion areas could be implemented by actual! 
mapping such areas. Broader mapping would also encourage state and local 
programs even if FEMA did not require regulation of such areas. Strong 
fiscal arguments can be made that over time FEMA should require special 
state or local regulations of all high risk areas if subsidized insurance 
is to be continued for such areas. 
Insurance 
1) Solid estimates are lacking of the total number of structures in high risi 
areas insured by National Flood Insurance programs, claims to date, losse; 
per claim, the adequacy of protection and management standards, and an-
ticipated future trends. FEMA should begin to systematically gather and 
analyze insurance data (and perhaps disaster assistance data) to provide 
such information which is needed not only for future insurance rating but 
also for the establishment of mapping priorities, regulatory guidelines, 
and other management approaches. 
2) It is likely that many existing structures in high risk areas are now 
insured under the National Flood Insurance Program because the areas are 
contained within broader areas subject to preliminary flood maps or flood 
insurance rate maps or because the occupants have applied for such insur-
ance, despite their location outside of mapping risk zones. 
Although flood insurance rates have been made more nearly actuarial for 
coastal velocity areas, no special risk rating has been applied to other 
high risk areas, due in part to lack of maps for these areas or the 
identification of special risk factors on existing maps and the lack of 
special risk-rating procedures related to actual hazard. Such insurance 
has the potential for encouraging unsound development since rates in some 
instances (e.g., alluvial fans) grossly underestimate risk. 
3) Any effort to increase flood insurance rates for unidentified high risk 
areas would require, as a starting point, the identification of such areas 
with a degree of accuracy considered satisfactory for insurance rating. 
Relatively poor initial data might be used if techniques are available to 
refine hazard data and insurance rates on a site-specific basis as has 
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been done with coastal velocity zones. Another approach might be to apply 
high insurance rates on a uniform basis for identified areas with the 
option of the community or developer applying for lower rates if they 
could provide information indicating lower risk or satisfactory master 
planning or engineering to address risk. 
4) FEMA might encourage local or cooperative state/local mapping of high risk 
areas through an "incentive" insurance rating scheme. Lower overall 
insurance rates would be made available to a community willing to map and 
regulate high hazard areas with more specificity than now is required by 
FEMA regulations. Such an approach would encourage community and state 
initiatives in reducing losses and would make sound financial sense, since 
additional community mapping and regulation of these areas would reduce 
federal insurance claims and disaster assistance payments. 
5) Congress could eliminate insurance for certain high risk areas through 
amendments to the flood insurance act or special legislation such as the 
Coastal Barrier Resources Acts of 1982 (which prohibits flood insurance 
and certain other federal subsidies for new development on certain un-
developed barrier resources.) If present rating procedures are not re-
vised to reflect actual risk, such an approach may be needed to prevent 
further encouragement of unsound development. 
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SIMPLE TRUTH IN PUBLIC POLICY 
James E. Tierney 
Attorney General, State of Maine 
The first elemental truth with which I would like to leave you this after-
nbon is that I am far from an expert in managing high risk flood areas. So the 
mtst I can do to keynote this conference is to help you place your tremendously 
1 
important work in a broader context--a context within which public policy will 
1 be made for the rest of our lifetimes. 
Your work and responsibilities were an unknown governmental function 
during the early days of our country when we moved from an agrarian to an 
industrialized society. When our parents, grandparents, and great grandparents 
came as "huddled masses" to these shores, their everyday problems were so 
immense that few were concerned either about protecting the natural environment 
or protecting themselves from it. 
History books are filled with references to the human suffering which 
resulted from those early decisions. The growth of industrialism in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries was hard, bloody, and filled with pain. It was 
only as individuals began to claw a ,semisecure niche in our country that they 
began to feel comfortable enough to assert that, indeed, they did have a right 
to a government that provided basic health facilities, that provided an econom-
ic and natural environment in which they could be happy while they raised their 
families, and that all had the right to live to a prosperous old age in peace 
and dignity. 
So it was that when Franklin Delano Roosevelt swept into office, it was 
with the belief that government itself could be a positive force in people's 
lives. Surely government could be designed to do more than provide for the 
common defense and deliver the mail. 
The first task was to correct the gross disregard previously shown for our 
Ruman and physical environment as a result of the rapid capital formation; 
government had to address the human suffering that prevailed in the land. The 
J 
New Deal and all it meant for America, from social security to electricity in 
~ral America--which, of course, also marked the beginning of 20th century 
!lood control--was clearly only the beginning. 
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After World War II, as our society grew in strength and wealth, the 
American public demanded and received an even higher standard of living. 
Essential to that, and relevant to our discussions today, was the rise of 
environmentalism. Many point to Rachel Carson's Silent ~pring, published in 
1962, which showed the destructive side effects of a number of "miracle" 
pesticides, as the beginning of contemporary environmentalism. This nation 
began to pay attention to a new grass roots movement called "ecology." Earth 
Day, in 1970, provided a clear indication that environmentalism was strong, 
politically powerful, and here to stay. 
Americans were demanding strong laws and were willing to put their dollars 
behind solving some of our most apparent environmental problems. Americans 
refused to allow their rivers to remain open sewers; Americans refused to al.l.o. 
their air to be choked with smog; and Americans refused to see precious wild-
life brought to extinction. 
Public officials eagerly joined this movement. They did so because of "he 
voices of their constituents, and they did so because immediate action was long 
overdue. They did so also, however, safe in the realization that they would 
not have to make very difficult choices in defending the environment because 
America during this period was sustaining a long and uninterrupted period of 
economic growth. 
From 1950 to 1973, the gross national product doubled in real dollars, 
national producti vi ty increased on an average of 3% per year, and inflation v,as 
virtually nonexistent. During this period, the price of oil actually fell ir 
real dollars. While the balance of foreign trade was generally positive, it 
was not deemed essential to economic health because 93% of the gross national 
product went into domestic sales. 
American technological ingenuity powered these increases in productivity 
and the resulting economic growth. People allover the world used our steel, 
drove our cars, and we stood as the world's economic colossus. 
Lest we forget, the outcry for increased environmental protection was only 
part of what Americans were demanding from government. Increased--and I might 
say unfunded--social security benefits were passed on an annual basis. Workers 
were demanding a safer work place. Consumerism raced into vogue at least as 
rapidly as environmentalism. Everyone demanded shorter hours and more pay and 
no one seemed to really care about productivity, growth and competition. 
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politicians were happy to accommodate, and the nation's economic growth 
sustained these new demands. Great successes were made in all areas, but 
especially in the environment as Maine's own Ed Muskie championed the environ-
mental cause with the result of dramatically improved air and water quality. 
Leisure, recreational opportunities and cleaner beaches caused a national 
rush in the 1970s towards the construction of second homes and cottages along 
our now clean rivers and beckoning oceans. The wealth of our nation generated 
the construction, and clearly good things were waiting for us all. 
What does all this mean for us today? Where are we now? Why do my 
remarks seem to evoke a time which, although we all remember it, seems so far 
away? 
My friends, those times are indeed far away, and, I would state as a 
hypothesis, they will not return. There is no doubt that the united states 
will, for the rest of our lifetimes, have an economy of scarcity within which 
every dollar granted by the public sector will be closely scrutinized. 
I am sure we all wish it were different. I am sure we all wish that we 
were sustaining greater economic growth when we are not. I am sure we all wish 
that our federal government was not sustaining deficits of almost 200 billion 
dollars a year which threaten continually to send us into an inflation/ 
unemployment spiral. I am sure we all wish that our nation's goods and 
services were more competitive in the international market. I am sure we all 
wish that Adam smith's invisible hand would appear with enough money in it to 
provide for a dignified life for the elderly, the abolition of ignorance and 
child abuse, full employment, educational opportunities for our youth, and 
markets for goods that are made in America--that are worth what we pay for 
them, safe to use, and made to last a lifetime; and enough money to create 
easily not only a clean environment but also the opportunity to avoid environ-
mental risks that are within our control and to mitigate those which are not. 
As mature leaders we must realize this is not to be. This is not because 
of some mysterious evil force or a political malaise; but rather because other 
nations in the world--both friends and enemies--have worked hard to ach·ieve the 
same goals we have--security, peace, and a clean and safe natural and physical 
environment. These nations, especially since the oil crisis in the early 
1970s, have become technologically sophisticated and diplomatically wise so as 
to create competition that means our nation will always face difficult 
choices. 
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What then is my message to you as you step back from your hectic scheduh 
to begin this conference? What is your message and how do you carry it out 
into a public that is so concerned and so worried about other things? Allowt 
to make a few suggestions. 
1) Regardless of your political preference, insist on a government that 
is clean, active, and strong. Against those people who do not believe that 
government must play an active force in the daily lives of us all, I urge you 
to stand up and be heard. When po Ii ticians and cynics from ei ther the private 
or public sector berate the efforts of the millions of dedicated public offi-
cials in this country, then it behooves you and me to stand up and tell them 
that they are wrong--tell them with our voices, with our feet, with our money, 
and with our votes. 
2) Clarify your message. The efforts that you take and the requests you 
make of public officials--elected and appointed--must be done with a basic 
understanding that their choices are difficult ones. You therefore have a 
special responsibili ty to make your points clear, concise, and based on a real· 
istic listing of priorities. 
The facts are clear enough. Hundreds of lives and four billion dollars a 
year are being los t to our nation because of inadequate planning and manageroen: 
of high-risk hazardous areas. Much of this is avoidable if this society, whid 
has the capacity to do so much, takes it seriously. Refine your message. Mak! 
it clear. Drive it home. 
3) Accept responsibilities for your failures. Be willing to admit your 
mistakes. If in the past you have recommended too much or too little say so 
now. I know I am joined in this by millions of Americans who are tired of 
people who are more willing to point to "the other guy" than they are to say 
that answers they thought were appropriate before are not appropriate now. The 
economics have changed, the culture has changed, and the technology has changed 
in a remarkably short period of time. Don't be afraid to stand up and say so. 
4) Don't be afraid to tell the public that they should not be foolish. 
Clearly there are areas in this country that are so environmentally sensitive 
and dangerous that development should not occur there. Be it the floodplain of 
a river; be it the base of a volcano; or be it atop a sand dune--you must be 
willing simply to say that you cannot build in or live in this place, in this 
time, in this way and, if you do, then the government will not be there to help 
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• Yfu. These are tough words and tough medicine. If you do not say it, no one 
else will. 
i 
1 In conclusion, my remarks roll down to a simple message: The times have , 
changed and changed permanently. Our resources are scarce and our choices 
difficult. And finally, to borrow from Confucius, while all truthful people 
are not in government, all people in government must be truthful. 
I truly hope you enjoy your time with us here in Maine. I hope you learn 
from each other and from us, and that you leave more professional and profi-
cient than when you came. Thank you for asking me to speak and thank you very 
much for being with us here this week in Maine. 
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A NOTE ON INTEGRATED EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT: 
FACT OR FANTASY 
William J. Petak 
University of Southern California 
Albert Einstein stated many years ago that "a perfection of means and a 
cJnfusion of aims seems to be our main problem." If the .problems associated 
• wfth the implementation of an integrated emergency management system (lEKS) are ~ 
looked at in a broad context, one has to agree with Einstein. Although techni-
cal, bureaucratic, and procedural methods of dealing with disaster management 
problems are being perfected, application of these methods in many cases lacks 
clear direction. However, even if the perception of aims were clear, the wide 
choice of means makes accomplishment of the aims a very complex undertaking. 
IEMS is seen by many as "old wine in a new bottle," in that Comprehensive 
Emergency Management, promoted more than a decade ago, is the same thing. 
Others see IEMS as legitimizing preparation for nuclear war by diverting the 
focus to major catastrophic events such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and floods. 
Still others see lEKS as the application of a more rational systems approach to 
understanding and developing solutions to a complex set of problems. 
Whether lEKS is a fact or fantasy is highly dependent upon one's perspec-
tive, which is generally based upon past experience (successes and failures); 
knowledge, skills and attributes; political support within the responsible 
jurisdiction; and the availability of data and information. There appears to 
be little question that, in a time of severely limited resources, economic 
growth as evidenced by increased land development is highly valued, and the 
governmental focus is on limited regulation and more freedom of choice, much 
effort will be required by state and local officials to achieve the aims of 
• I~MS. 
j 
There are many factors working against developing and implementing poli-
cies that will make lEKS a workable system. Included in this list of factors 
~tigating against developing policy support are 1) the absence of sufficient 
j 
B1Pportive political constituencies; 2) absence of effective inside advocates; 3~ significant problems of complexity and uncertainty; 4) confusion of issues 
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of fact and value; 5) administrative inadequacies; and 6) failure to see the 
benefits of multihazard approaches and coordination. 
Once policies have been adopted, implementation is handicapped by 1) slow 
progress in identifying and mapping hazard zones; 2) poor procedures and data 
bases supporting cost/loss reduction analysis; 3) significant turf difference 
across jurisdictions in building code and development policies; 4) inadequate 
codes; 5) limited technical capacity on the part of many jurisdictions' person-
nel; 6) emphasis largely on demands for financial assistance and area protec-
tion works; and 7) past coordination inadequacies on the part of the federal 
government. 
Necessary critical actions on the part of those involved in the emergency 
management system are to 1) develop a positive and creative attitude toward 
IEMS; 2) integrate IEMS into the comprehensive (urban/regional) land use plan-
ning process and engage in pre-event planning; 3) create a participatory system 
designed to help overcome the internal turf issues; 4) apply technical exper-
tise early in the process; 5) develop multijurisdictional relationships and 
memorandums of understanding; and 6) develop and implement training and educa-
tion programs for both jurisdictional staff and the citizenry. 
Only when we increase our level of professionalism will we begin to both 
see and understand the benefits of IEMS. It is important that we learn from 
our successes, share limited resources, overcome turf problems, and, finally, 
emphasize solutions. Agreement on aims and implementation of means is our main 
purpose. 
FEDERAL INSURANCE ADMINISTRATION INITIATIVES 
TO RESOLVE INCONSISTENCIES IN 
FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT REGULATIONS 
William L. Trakimas 
Indiana Department of Natural Resources 
TQe main issues that confront us today are the complexities and incon-
sistencies that exist at the local level for administering an effective flood-
plain management program. This issue is magnified when we start addressing 
high risk areas. 
Problems already exist with the basic terminology and management pro-
cedures for dealing with the "normal" floodplain as shown in the Flood Insur-
ance Studies. The introduction of terms like liquefaction, alluvial fans, and 
fluctuating lake levels has the potential of confusing the part-time local 
official who is the foundation of a successful floodplain management program. 
This does not mean, however, that we should forget these issues in the 
name of simplifying the program. Rather, we should strive harder to work with 
each other to incorporate these ideas into implementation strategies that 
simplify this program, into a framework that truly shows the federal/state/ 
local partnership working together instead of in segmented efforts, each trying 
to protect its own turf. This will require sweat and compromise by everyone if 
we are serious about reaching our goals. 
An effective partnership is beginning to be realized. The FIA planning 
cycle is an excellent example whereby we now know when policy and program 
changes will occur and how we can plug into that cycle. This cycle allows us 
(the ASFPM) as a volunteer group to make wise use of our limited time and 
resources to achieve the biggest results. 
The producers Services Review Committee is another avenue by which we can 
~rovide valuable input on insurance issues to local producers. This group has 
~ 
"teen successful in getting the FIA too revise definitions, develop better claims 
procedures, and make the insurance program operate more like the private 
Industry. 
J The goal or challenge for us is to begin to make better use of these 
lvenues that already exist. Through our past efforts we have seen the NFIP 
28 OVERVIEW AND PERSPECTI~ 
become a program better adapted to local administration. Change has been slow 
in some areas, but it has occurred. Only through a concentrated effort by all 
those involved can we begin to resolve the remaining inconsistencies and make 
the NFIP a program that truly meets the needs of those who need it most--the 
local officials and their citizens who live in high risk areas. 
PART TWO 
SPECIAL HIGH RISK FLOOD AREAS: 
Ice Jams 
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THE COLD FACTS OF ICE JAMS: 
CHARACTERISTICS AND INCIDENCE 
R. Gerard 
Department of Civil Engineering 
University of Alberta 
The Problem 
In cold regions, floods are caused either by high discharge (an open water 
~flood), or the effects of ice, of which ice jam floods are most common. In New 
~ngland ..... ice jam flooding is a frequent occurrence.... Since 1970, 249 
~ommunities in these states have suffered from ice jam flooding. Of the 249 
'''communities documented, 49 were identified as having frequent ice jam floods 
"which caused substantial damage" (McLoughlin, 1980). Oil City, pennsylvania, 
~ 
',provides another example. There, ice j am flood stages far exceed open water 
stages in both magnitude and frequency (Deck and Gooch, 1981). 
Such ice-related flooding should be anticipated anywhere north of the 00 
January isotherm, an area that includes some 80% of North America and 50% of 
the contiguous united States. It should be kept in mind that such a limit is 
just a guide: there have been ice jams on the Mississippi River at New 
Orleans. 
A breakup ice jam flood frequently resembles a flash flood, with extremely 
rapid water level increases with little or no warning. A description of events 
during the severe ice jam flood from the Delaware River at Port Jervis, New 
York, in 1875, illustrates this point. 
" ••• The volume of water in the river appeared to increase as if by magic, 
and within ten minutes a raise [sicl of eighteen feet occurred" (Port Jervis 
paily Union, March 1, 1875). Later the same month, in a separate but related 
ievent: 
Just at this moment, the Erie dispatch engine, which had been sent to 
Delaware Bridge, four miles west of the village, came thundering down the 
track, the shrill whistle announcing the approach of the avalanche of 
water and ice •••• Men, women and children were fleeing in every direction 
for safety ••• (Port Jervis Daily Union, March 18, 1875). 
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Similar events have occurred at this location since, the most recent being in 
1981. 
In Alaska, 
An example of a flash flood from rapidly rising backwater occurred ie. 
the 1975 spring breakup, when a major ice jam formed at Holy Cross on the 
Yukon River. Record flooding occurred upstream at Anvik and Graylin as 
the Yukon River rose suddenly. The ice jam held for six days and the 
water dammed upstream from Holy Cross inundated the tributary Innoko, 
Bonasila, and Anvik Rivers creating a large lake. The lake was estimated 
to have an area of 1,000 square miles. This is comparable in size to Lak, 
Iliamna, Alaska's largest lake. The description of this flood through the 
personal experiences of residents was "worst in the history of the 
villages." Multiple flash flooding by waters suddenly released by an i.ce 
jam occurred at Anik on the Kuskokwim River during the 1972 breakup. The 
town was flooded four different times as the ice jam, that had formed a 
lake extending 30 miles upstream, shifted, releasing sudden surges of the 
impounded waters. 
The art of river forecasting using the best meteorological and hydro-
logic scientific technology has not yet mastered the prediction of times 
of formation and disintegration of moveable ice jams forming suddenly in 
random locations (Bowers, 1978). 
Freeze-up jams are considerably more placid and predictable but, once the 
situation is ripe, can be as inexorable. 
Ice jams are a very site-specific phenomenon. One location can be plagued 
with ice jam flooding while sites a short distance upstream or downstream can 
be completely free of the problem. This differs significantly from open water 
floods. A related feature is that ice jam formation can be very sensitive to 
river changes. After construction of even a small dam, ice jams may begin to 
form at the backwater in the channel upstream; after removal of the dam, ice 
jam flooding may begin at sites downstream that were previously untroubled. 
Gravel removal from the Allegheny River downstream of oil City changed a signi-
ficant ice jam problem into an extremely severe one, while the simple act of 
installing an inexpensive boom a short distance upstream of Oil City will 
likely completely remove the problem. 
Another ice jam feature that follows from this sensitivity is that it is 
very difficult to anticipate ice jam frequency and magnitude, particularly for 
breakup. 
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Causes of Ice Jams 
Ice jam formation is an integral part of the freeze-up and breakup pro-
cesses and is therefore subject to all the vagaries of these phenomena. Never-
theless there are some features commonly associated with sites subject to 
repeated ice jam formation. 
Freeze-up jams are usually associated with steep, shallow streams which 
resist formation of a solid ice cover and therefore produce large quantities of 
frazil ice that eventually must be stored somewhere in the stream channel for 
the winter. It is this storage that reduces, or even eliminates, the waterway 
and hence causes flooding. Harkwick, Vermont, provides an example of this 
(Calkins, 1984). In other cases, the slope may be steep but the velocities are 
low enough that an ice cover forms a thick initial accumulation that increases 
the stage sufficiently to cause flooding. The recent flooding from the Salmon 
River at Salmon, Idaho, provides an example of this (Cunningham and Calkins, 
1984) • 
Most breakup ice jams are caused simply by stalling of the breakup front. 
That is, either the front meets a portion of the solid ice cover that is more 
resistant than elsewhere--is thicker or more shore- or bottom-fast--or the 
channel geometry enlarges downstream so that the breakup surge loses its 
impetus. Freeze-up or winter ice jam accumulations obviously result in much 
more resistant ice covers and therefore pose a strong impediment to breakup. 
Like>lise, a thick ice cover locked into a sharp bend in the channel may resist 
breakup sufficiently to initiate ice jam formation. On the other hand, a 
brer,kup surge is attenuated as it moves into the headwater of a reservoir, a 
lake or even a larger main channel, so that even the normal ice cover may be 
sufficient to resist breakup and initiate an ice jam. A similar circumstance 
applies to the sudden reduction in a channel slope, a change usually accom-
panied in an alluvial stream by enlargement of the channel. The port Jervis, 
New York, site seems to be an example of this. These various factors have 
combined to produce the rule of thumb that the vicinity of a sudden reduction 
in ,'ater surface slope is a likely ice jam location. 
~n obvious cause of ice jams would seem to be ice floes jamming in a 
~ontraction. While this is the usual reason for initial lodgement at freeze-
lP, and hence initiation of freeze-up, and possibly even of freeze-up jams, it 
ls not often the cause of major ice jams at breakup. Likewise, bridge piers of 
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modern bridges over streams wide in relation to the ice thickness rarely 
seriously hinder passage of ice at breakup. 
Characteristics of an Ice Jam 
When fully developed, an ice j am profile will appear as shown in Figure 1. 
Its components are the jam key, which in this case is the solid ice cover; the 
thickened toe region, a result of the steeper water surface slope in this 
gradually varied flow portion; the body of the jam which, if the accumulation 
is long enough, will contain a uniform "equilibrium" section that gives the 
maximum depth that can be caused by such a jam and that plays an important role 
in the simple analysis of ice jam levels described below; a thinning of the 
accumulation to the head of the jam; and a classic backwater curve as the water 
depth decreases to the uniform flow depth some distance upstream. The increase 
in water level caused by an ice jam has two sources: the thickness of the ice 
accumulation, and the increased flow resistance of the much rougher accumula-
tion "ice cover." A fragmented ice mass behaves much like a cohesionless 
accumulation (the ice fragments in a jam are simulated in hydraulic model 
studies by small plastic pellets). Thus the accumulation thickness depends on 
its "geotechnical" strength, and on the drag exerted on the accumulation by the 
flow and the downslope component of its own weight. 
The accumulation thickness, the waterway depth and, therefore, the wate.r 
level, depend mostly on the discharge per unit width of channel, q, the energy 
slope, S (roughly the water surface slope), and the hydraulic roughness, k, of 
the waterway under the accumulation. For example, the maximum depth, h, that 
can be caused by a steady, floating ice jam is given very approximately by 
1 [qkl/6J 3/5 
h '2 
or 
IgS 
[n~ f/5 in 2 SI 
Is 
where g is gravitational acceleration and n is the Manning coefficient. 
(Indeed, it might be noted that the above relations provide the following 
useful rule of thumb: the maximum depth to the water level in a floating jam is 
given simply by calculating the flow depth under the accumulation using a 
regular uniform flow formula (e.g., Mann's equation) and adding 50%.) As 
mentioned, this depth occurs in the equilibrium, or uniform flow, portion. 
(b) 
Figure l(a) TYPICAL ICE JAM CONFIGURATION 
(b) MEASURED WATER LEVEL PROFILE THROUGH AN ICE JAM (Andres, 1980). 
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Varia tions from the profile shown in Figure 1 can occur. If the volume of 
ice is limited, the jam may not be long enough to develop an equilibrium 
portion, and hence the maximum depth along the jam will be more shallow. On 
small, steep streams the required accumulation thickness in the toe region may 
be larger than the depth; the accumulation will then ground, over some length, 
across a good portion of the channel width. The flow resistance over this 
length will increase substantially which may cause a maximum depth along the 
jam greater than the equilibrium depth for a fully floating jam. However, 
analysis of jams in the field to date suggests that the equilibrium depth is 
not often exceeded by much for streams more than about 50 meters wide, even if 
there is a grounded portion near the toe. 
Ice Jam Failure and Reformation 
Probably a greater limitation to using depths calculated assuming a fully 
developed floating jam under steady flow conditions is the possibility of a 
very unsteady flow as a result of ice jam formation and failure. Breakup, in 
particular, is by nature a very unsteady phenomenon. When an ice jam forms, it 
is literally like a dam in the river and, if it fails suddenly, a surge of fast 
moving water and ice will be released. Depending on the nature of the jam and 
the channel downstream, such surges can travel long distances, carrying with 
them, with little attenuation, the increase in water level caused by the jam. 
If the surge encounters another jam, or the jam reforms, the water level may 
rise even further, creating a surge that moves upstream. Such happenings 
explain the dramatic water level increases often associated with ice jam 
floods. For at least some sites--Port Jervis, New York, being one of them--
there are strong indications that the maximum recorded ice-related water levels 
have been caused by such events, rather than by the increase in water level 
caused by a jam at or downstream of the site. 
Ice Jam Flood Frequency 
Before planning ice jam flood mitigation measures, it is necessary to 
define the significance of the problem at a particular site. This will usually 
require estimation of the ice-related flood frequency distribution. There are 
several problems with this, particularly for breakup jams. As mentioned above, 
the location and frequency of breakup jams are difficult to assess without 
historical data. As a result analytical techniques, analogous to rainfall 
runoff simulations for open water floods, are much less definitive for ice-
related floods with regard to frequency. On the other hand, because ice jams 
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l 
ire site-specific and historical records of ice jam floods cannot be trans-
Losed, historical records must be available for the vicinity of the site at 
, 
~ssue. On balance, although analytical estimates of frequency distributions 
;.~ 
may be tenuous, they may be more necessary because of the absence of reliable 
historical data, particularly for shallower floods. 
One reasonable compromise between the limitations of analytically derived 
ice jam flood-frequency distributions, and their necessity, is that outlined by 
Gerard and Calkins (1984). In this approach, analytical techniques are used to 
derive upper and lower bound frequency distributions, and what historical data 
are available are used to assist in deciding on a compromise frequency curve. 
Alternately, if a reasonable amount of historical data is available, such 
analytical techniques can assist in the reasonable extrapolation of the 
historical frequency curve, as is commonly done for open water floods. 
It should be noted that the tenuous nature of analytical frequency esti-
mates, and the general lack of gauge records, make historical ice jam data far 
more valuable than for open water floods, and the luxury of discarding all but 
data for the most extreme events can rarely be afforded. This means that 
historical data from sources of varying reliability and "record length" 
usually must be utilized. The analysis of such data is discussed by Gerard and 
Karpuk (1979). The general problem of flood frequency estimates for cold 
region sites is discussed in more detail by Gerard and Calkins (1984). 
Conclusions 
~ Ice jam floods are much more common and widespread than generally appreci-
ated, and their often substantial contribution to the flood population 
generally has been either overlooked entirely or poorly treated in past 
flood studies. 
~ The characteristics of ice jams are much better understood now than two 
decades ago. 
• Ice jam floods can and should be incorporated quantitatively in future 
flood studies. 
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COLD FACTS OF ICE JAMS: 
CASE STUDIES OF MITIGATION METHODS 
Darryl J. Calkins 
Research Hydraulic Engineer 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory 
Introduction 
There are very few "classic" analyses of mitigation methods for ice jam 
problems. Unfortunately, the sole approach often has been to treat the symptom 
rather than to identify and remove or prevent the cause. 
It is fair to say that half the battle in mitigating ice jam floods is 
understanding the cause of the problem. Once that has been achieved, solutions 
should be evident. The recent ice control structure placed in the Allegheny 
River provides an excellent example. The problem was obvious: ice jam flooding 
at breakup. The cause was not known until winter field investigations revealed 
that too much ice in a pool in the mainstream prevented the tributary ice run 
from entering. Once the cause was identified, the solution was simple: reduce 
the volume of ice in the pool by initiating the ice accumulation at freeze-up 
in the next upstream pool. 
Understanding the cause requires some knowledge of river/ice hydraulics, 
but equally important is keeping an open mind when reviewing the written 
accounts of ice jam floods. Observations of river and meteorological condi-
tions leading up to and including the event can be very informative. Newspaper 
accounts and diaries can be useful. Another source of information is the 
environmental evidence along the river banks. Moving ice or ice that has been 
pushed against the banks often leaves scars on the trees lining the banks. 
These scars can be dated, surveyed for elevation, and used in the frequency 
! 
.::analysis of ice jam stages when direct observations are not available. It 
;1 
',generally takes a lot of time and investigative work to get information on ice 
~ )am flooding. 
I Causes of Ice Jam Flooding It is often difficult to define the cause(s) of an ice jam. In almost 
~very case, an ice jam forms as a result of an existing ice cover blocking the 
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ice run as it moves downriver. The channel geometry plays a role, but an ice 
run moving down an ice-free river will not suddenly stop and jam. A full-width 
or nearly full-width barrier is necessary to halt its movement. 
Once the ice cover has been set in motion downriver, surges of water and 
ice accompany the breakup. As new ice is broken and set in motion, the ice rUn 
almost feeds itself. In some areas the ice cover breaks up and moves away, 
while other sites initiate ice jams that create water level differences of 
several feet before the jam breaks and the process is repeated. 
One classic location for ice jams is in the upper end of the backwater 
behind a dam. The bed slope and the water surface slopes are changed to a 
milder condition than existed in their natural state. Again, the ice cover in 
the pool often retards the movement of the ice jam. 
Even though bridge piers are often thought to cause ice jams, a careful 
look usually reveals that the ice run actually passed the bridge piers, only to 
be stalled by the ice sheet downstream. That is, the toe of the jam was well 
below the bridge piers. 
An important cause of increased flood levels associated with ice jams is 
floodway encroachment. When a river channel is packed with ice (when 50% to 
70% of its depth is ice), the floodway becomes the major channel for conveying 
the water. Unfortunately the designs of many highways have created much higher 
ice j am water levels. In areas prone to ice jams, problems can be caused by an 
approach embankment that constricts or cuts off the floodway or by a highway 
that is elevated and runs parallel to the channel bank. Denial of the floo~way 
causes higher ice jam stages. I have seen the "500-year" open-channel flood 
stages exceeded at three sites as a result of floodway encroachment by an ice 
jam stage whose flow might have a frequency of only a 10-year open-channel 
event. 
Once the ice cover has been broken up, ice jams typically are caused by: 
• Backwaters of reservoirs; 
• Major changes in channel gradient, usually a decrease; 
• Low overbank floodways; 
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1 .~ • Building of dams and regulation of the flow, especially in the winter; 
1 1. Removal of dams from the river; 
~ 
·1. peaking by hydropower dams; 
• water supply reservoirs altering the winter flow distribution; 
• Major sediment deposition; 
• Tributary junctions; and 
• Excessive freeze-up ice cover thicknesses prohibiting channel storage of 
breakup ice. 
For any of these typical jams, an ice cover must exist downstream of the ice 
jam toe to key it in place. 
Potential solutions 
Once the cause (s) of the ice jam has been determined, solutions can be 
eVQluated. Unless the cause is known with a reasonable degree of assurance, 
attempts to solve the problem can be inappropriate and wasteful. 
A modification in the ice conditions at freeze-up can have a significant 
effect on the breakup conditions and any resulting ice jams. A corollary of 
this is that one ice control measure for breakup jams might be the alteration 
of the ice regime during freeze-up. 
A structural solution is defined here as a permanent or temporary modifi-
cation to the river channel and/or the floodplain, including structures that 
are meant to minimize or contain flood levels. Structural solutions include: 
• Ice booms; 
• High/low head structures; i.e., reservoirs, weirs, etc.; 
• Levees, berms, etc.; 
• Floodplain storage facilities for ice; 
\. High level diversion channels; 
· 
.:. In-stream channel improvements; and 
• Thermal suppression. 
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Nonstructural solutions use existing structures or temporary measures ~ 
control the ice and flood conditions. Nonstructural solutions include: 
• Flow control at existing reservoirs; 
• Ice control at existing reservoirs; 
• Dusting; 
• Mechanical removal; 
• Vessel assistance; 
• Removal of structures within the floodplain; 
• Flood warning system; 
• Blasting; and 
• Thermal suppression. 
Allegheny River 
Report: 
Location: 
Problem: 
Cause: 
Solution: 
Implemented: 
Performance: 
Case Studies 
Deck and Good (1981). 
Oil City, Pennsylvania 
Ice jam flooding at the confluence of oil Creek and the 
Allegheny River. 
A river dredging project on the Allegheny created a long, 
deep pool just downstream of the confluence with Oil 
Creek, which caused a large accumula tion of ice. The ie, 
run from the smaller tributary could not penetrate the 
Allegheny River ice cover. The ice j am would remain in 
the tributary channel and the floodplain (Oil City 
business district) would handle the flow. 
Winter field investigations revealed an excessive ice 
buildup--15 feet at the confluence during freeze-up. 
relatively inexpensive ice boom just upstream of the 
confluence was designed to start the freeze-up ice cover 
at that location and minimize the ice volume at the 
confluence area. 
1982 
The volumes of ice have been dramatically reduced. 
Although conditions have been favorable for ice jam 
formation, no ice jam flooding has occurred, as the 
tributary ice run can now move into the main river. 
~kins 
sjlmon River 
Report: 
Location: 
Problem: 
Background: 
Causes: 
solution: 
Israel River 
Report: 
Location: 
Problem: 
Causes: 
Storage: 
Walla Walla District (1984). Cunningham and Calkins 
(1984). 
Salmon, Idaho. 
Ice jam flooding at freeze-up and breakup on both the 
main river and a tributary. 
The river is designated as wild and scenic. Hydraulic 
mining activities created the problem in the late 1800s 
by altering the natural channel characteristics of the 
Salmon River 26 miles downstream of Salmon, Idaho. 
43 
Winter river observations will be expanded to analyze the 
environmental impact and assess the performance of the 
possible alternatives with respect to the ice regime. 
Thick ice cover results in stage increases of 8 to 12 
feet; low temperatures must occur in the basin; 
Floodplain encroachment; and 
Breakup ice conditions occur with a higher flow dis-
charge, which creates even higher stages; mild weather 
must occur to create high flows. 
Alternatives are being evaluated under the 205 program. 
Frankenstein and Assur (1972). Northeast District (no 
date). 
Lancaster, New Hampshire. 
Breakup ice jam flooding in the business district and 
some residential areas. 
Removal of two old mill dams upstream; 
The flooded area is located at a transition from steep to 
mild slope; and 
A thick accumulation of ice develops in the mild slope 
reach during freeze up, reducing breakup ice storage. 
Install submarine net one mile above the flooded area 
where the river changed slope and floodplain relief for 
water and ice was available. 
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Israel River cont'd 
Implemented: 
Performance: 
Solution: 
Implemented: 
Performance: 
Delaware River 
Report: 
Location: 
Problem: 
Causes: 
Solution: 
Peace River 
Report: 
Location: 
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1974. 
The structure has held back ice each year, primarily 
because floodplain relief for the water is available. 
This was a good solution for holding back ice at this 
location. However, the one mile of ice between the net 
and the town was still sufficient to cause ice jams in 
flooded area. 
Construct a low head weir 0.5 mile upstream of the 
flooded area near the site of the first old mill dam to 
serve as a replacement. 
1982. 
The structure does not hold back ice because the pool 
length is too short. Ice jam flooding still exists. 
Additional modifications may be necessary. 
Philadelphia District (1984). Calkins (1984). 
Port Jervis, New York; and Matamorous, pennsylvania. 
Breakup ice jam flooding in two communities. 
Not fully understood yet; only three major events have 
occurred in the last 100 years, with the jam of record 
occurring in 1981, causing $18 million in damage. A 
midwinter jam at Port Jervis followed by the spring 
breakup appear to cause this flood. 
Several alternatives are being considered: Permanent 
hydraulic structure; 
Flow control, freeze-up and breakup; 
Ice control at freeze-up with ice booms; 
High level diversion channels; and 
Levee protection. 
Neill and Andres (1984). 
Peace River, Alberta, Canada. 
calkins 
Peace River cont'd 
Problem: 
Causes: 
solution: 
Implemented: 
Performance: 
Report: 
Location: 
Problem: 
Causes: 
Solution: 
Implemented: 
Performance: 
Freeze-up ice cover flooding. 
construction of hydropower dam 100 miles upstream; 
Release schedule of flow (surges); and 
Increased winter flows versus the natural condition 
(factor of two to three). 
Modify release schedule during freeze up. 
Some modification of the releases. 
Insufficient data have been collected. 
Deslouriers (1965). Michel (1965). 
Quebec, Canada. 
Ice jam flooding at breakup. 
Thick ice accumulations at freeze-up; and 
No river channel storage for the ice at breakup due to 
thickness of the ice at freeze-up. 
Construct a 60-foot-high dam upstream of the flooded 
area. 
1967. 
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Ice jam flooding occurs now in the pool behind the struc-
ture and not in the community. The dam is considered 
very successful. 
Other case studies have been completed, and several are in the analysis/ 
design phase. In each case study listed above, field observations by experi-
enced personnel have played the major role in identifying the cause of the 
problem. Such personnel are few. Unfortunately the engineering and planning 
communities at large are unaware of the significance of ice problems, let alone 
the details of the ice processes. This situation should not be perpetuated, 
and the burden rests with those who can narrow the gap. 
Emergency Operations 
Generally, once an ice jam has formed and flooding has occurred, remedial 
solutions for the ice in the river are not practical. There are times when 
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mechanical removal, such as blasting, or vessel assistance may be used with 
good results. However, the implications of each method must be fully weighed 
before a method is chosen. One may refer to the Ice Engineering Manual pub-
lished by the Corps of Engineers (EM 1110-2-1612) for more details. 
It is obvious that residents of areas subject to ice jam flooding should 
be aware of the potential for flooding and the conditions that cause ice jams. 
Stage increases caused by ice jams can occur very quickly, depending upon the 
river. Rates of water level rise of one foot per minute downstream of an ice 
jam failure are common. Stage increases of 10 to 20 feet within 10 to 30 
minutes due to a jam have been reported. 
Conclusions 
Ice jams are natural occurrences and the misconception that little can be 
done to minimize their impact is disappearing. The causes of ice jams are now 
better understood, and remedial measures are being designed and constructed to 
address them. 
The analytical techniques for ice jams are improving, but technology 
transfer is moving slowly. Alteration of the existing river ice regime by any 
external force will have an impact somewhere; fortunately the tools necessary 
to assess the impact are now being developed. 
The evidence presented in these case studies demonstrates to those re-
sponsible for floodplain management that a change in the winter flow regime or 
modification of the existing river hydraulics will,affect the ice regime. This 
impact has to be assessed to be certain that both the negative and positive 
effects are identified. Simple ice management schemes can nullify the initial-
ly negative impacts. For example, by simply altering the hydropower releases 
below a dam, one can reduce the potential for ice jam flooding. 
• The general lack of data, particularly high quality data, inhibits ice jam 
analysis and makes the causes more difficult to determine. 
• Ice jam flood levels are just beginning to be incorporated into "stage 
frequency" analysis. Several techniques for developing the data base may 
be necessary to ensure that what little data might be available are 
included. 
• The stage damage curve for ice jam flooding has long been assumed to be 
similar to the "open water" damage curve. This may be false. The damage 
can be significantly greater because the high water velocities cause 
erosion and the moving ice floes can damage the structures on impact and 
move objects around like match sticks. 
Calkins 
• The risk to life in ice jam floods is high because the water levels can 
rise quickly and residents can become trapped in their houses. 
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• There are many remedies for ice jam problems, and care must be exercised 
to ensure that the solution will address the cause. The projects will 
take longer to investigate because at least one and probably two years of 
winter observations are required to ensure that the problem is fully 
understood. These studies cost more than traditional "open water" flood 
inves tiga tions. 
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MANAGING RISK BELOW UNSAFE DAMS 
Robert Roden 
Bureau of Water Regulations and Zoning 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources 
Introduction 
One of the emerging "special hazards" issues of the 1980s is the regula-
'ltion of areas subj ect to floods resulting from dam failures. Of course neither 
ifloodplain management nor dam safety programs are new ini tiatives. It is the 
Jidea of linking them together in a coordinated approach to hazard management 
'.that is a recent development. Before exploring the specifics of what Wisconsin 
Jis now doing to address this problem, some of the basic concepts should be 
~outlined • 
Basic Issues 
;What is an "Unsafe Dam?" 
There are certainly a variety of ways to define an unsafe dam. For our 
:purposes, an unsafe dam is one that poses an unacceptable level of risk to life 
:.or property through potential failure of the structure. No dam is 100% safe. 
',lIn fact, in a very real sense, the term "unsafe dam" is redundant. Also, a dam 
'jmi.ght be safe now but unsafe in a few years. 
iWhat Can Make a Dam "Unsafe?" 
There are three ways in which this can happen. First, the dam may not be 
,;designed to pass a large enough flood without "overtopping" (having water 
Jflowing over parts of the dam that are not designed for that purpose). Second, 
-ja dam may not be properly maintained. This can lead to failure at flows well 
,Ibelow the design flood. And third, the dam may not be operated properly. 
lexample of this would be failure to open gates or spillways quickly enough. 
~This could undo assumptions made by the designer • 
. i
~Can We Predict the Likelihood of a Dam Failing? 
An 
The only way to be absolutely sure of a dam's failure is to go out after 
~the flood and see if the dam is still there. We can predict with reasonable 
~ertainty that the likelihood that a well-operated, well-maintained dam will 
~ail is pretty close to the probability of its design flood being exceeded. At 
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the other extreme, a dam which is obviously ready to collapse at any time can 
easily be called ·unsafe." The problem lies wi th the ones in between that, we 
feel, could be a sizeable percentage of the dams in this county. For these, ~ 
may not know what condition the structure is in and thus have little idea how 
·unsafe" it is. Because of all the variables involved, using a frequency 
analysis based on the number of dam failures would probably be misleading. So 
each situation is unique, and there is no approach to assess the likelihood of 
failure. This is in sharp contrast to our usual approach (admittedly far from 
perfect) of predicting flood frequencies from statistical records. 
Do Dams Only Fail During Floods? 
Of course not. While floods and other natural disasters (e.g~, earth-
quakes) have certainly caused their share of dam failures, many dams fail under 
much more "normal" conditions. In Wisconsin, out of 30 failures documented 
between 1973 and 1983, 19 were of the "sunny day" variety. presumably many of 
these failed because they were improperly maintained. 
What Kind of Flooding Results from Dam Failures? 
While gradual failures can occur (these obviously attenuate the surge of 
water and lessen the amount and severity of flooding), a more sudden failure 
can lead to rapid increases in water levels, high velocities, and debris damage 
(including the possibility of debris jams). There may be little or no warning, 
and sudden failures can occur under conditions (e.g., at night) where their 
detection is almost impossible until it is too late. 
Can Flooding from Dams be Prevented? 
As you might guess, the answer is both "yes" and "no". Proper operation 
and maintenance, along with adequate spillway capacity and storage, can go a 
long way towards minimizing the risk, but the plain fact is there are no 
guarantees. At the least, a "bigger and better" flood can always come along, 
yet people historically have put a lot of trust in the "protection" offered by 
dams. 
My sense is that what they really have done is to replace a more likely 
but less serious risk with a less likely but potentially much more serious 
hazard. So while the safety of most dams can be improved, we think it is also 
important to take steps to minimize loss of life and property damage in the 
event the dam fails anyway. 
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Extent of the Problem 
How large a problem are we dealing with? Ignoring the small dams (in 
~isconsin these make up about 70% of the total), there are about 67,500 large 
dams in the united states. Based on the potential for loss of life from fail-
ure, the Corps of Engineers identified 8,800 "high hazard" dams and found 2,900 
(33%) of them to be unsafe (most of these because of inadequate spillway capa-
city). If the same percentage of the other large dams were also found to be 
unsafe, there would be over 22,000 unsafe large dams (by Corps' standards) in 
the country (well over 400 per state on the average). This is probably a high 
estimate. 
To go one step further, if failure of each unsafe high hazard dam could 
affect two downstream communities (Dewberry and Davis, 1982), there would be 
around 6,000 communities facing a degree of risk to lite and property from dam 
failure that the Corps' standards say is excessive. It is also estimated that 
2,000 communities could experience floods greater than the 100-year event due 
to dam failures. All of these figures are "guesstimates". 
Managing The Risk: Now 
What are we doing about this potential time bomb? We are still in the 
process of developing our awareness. Most states have floodplain management 
programs, and quite a few have dam safety programs. Fewer have both, and these 
often are not housed together; my impression is that not that many states are 
clr,~ely coordinating the two efforts. To add another factor, the emergency 
mandgement agency should playa role as well, and this probably is not happen-
inc very often. In Wisconsin, we are just starting to work on coordination 
with our Division of Emergency Government. 
On the federal side, some things are starting to happen. One agency 
(FEOlA) has been given responsibility for dam safety. Since FEMA also houses 
floodplain management and emergency preparedness, there is a potential for some 
me:i.di.ng of these programs into an integrated approach. Indeed, integrated 
emergency management efforts could help us get there. Realistically, there is 
much to be done to address the problem fully. One of our biggest difficulties 
is identifying and mapping the hazard areas accurately so that regulations and 
insurance ratings can be realistic and reasonable. 
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Managing The Risk: The Future 
Here are some key steps to be taken: 
---------
1) Identify the potentially affected areas below dams. 
• Assume any dam can fail and will eventually be removed. 
• Perform a "dam break" analysis at a specified flood frequency. 
(Note: water surface elevations resulting from failure during a floo; 
will almost always be higher than those caused by "sunny day" 
failures.) 
• Do not neglect upstream areas. These should be regulated on the 
assumption of the dam not failing since this causes a higher upstrean 
profile. 
2) Take steps to limit the risk in the identified hazard areas. 
• Hold regular inspections to encourage improved dam maintenance. 
• Establish dam design standards to set an appropriate level of risk, 
assuming proper operation and maintenance. 
• Develop emergency preparedness plans (required by FERC for licensed 
dams) and warning systems where appropriate. 
• Require proper dam operation (set limits and criteria). 
• Require proper design and construction for new dams and for signi-
ficant repairs or alterations to existing dams. 
• Guide land use and development to reflect the hazard (zoning). 
Insurance "disincentives" would be helpful, but it is difficult to 
assess the risk to damage unless major simplifying assumptions (e.g., 
all inadequately maintained dams will fail during the 100-year flooo) 
are made. 
Wisconsin's Current Initiative 
While we have not addressed all of the above program elements, the 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources has recently proposed two administra-
tive rules that deal with this issue. 
1) NR 116--Floodplain Management: Revisions to existing rule to require 
zoning of areas downstream from dams. If the dam can safely pass the 100-
year flood, zoning will be based on the "no-dam" condition to ensure that 
future removal of the dam does not jeopardize downstream development. If 
the dam cannot safely pass the lOO-year flood, zoning must be based on 
failure of the dam during that event. 
2) NR 333--Dam Design and Construction Standards: Requires identification of 
area affected by failure of the dam during the lOO-year flood. Establish-
es a hazard classification based on existing development in this area. 
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The higher the hazard classification, the larger the required spillway 
capacity. When someone wants to build a new dam or undertake "major 
reconstruction" of an existing dam, the rule provides the option of con-
trolling downstream land use to maintain the present hazard classification 
or providing the greater hydraulic capacity required for a "high hazard" 
dam. 
What Might Be Done Under the NFIP? 
Given the variability of dams and how well or poorly they are operated and 
maintained, having an actuarially-based rate structure for insurance in 
affected downstream areas seems out of reach. Instead, I suggest that FIA 
concentrate on: 
• Mapping potential hazard areas during new studies or restudies using both 
dam break analysis and the "no dam" condition. 
C providing some kind of rate incentive for proper dam maintenance (e.g., 
failure of a periodic certification by a public agency or qualified con-
sultant that a dam meets acceptable standards might result in no insurance 
or increase the rate). 
6 Avoiding the creation of an incentive to build below dams by limiting 
recognition of the protection they offer. The approach Wisconsin is 
proposing may be a model. 
G Alternatively, considering whether insurance for protection of downstream 
development might not be considered a responsibility of the dam owner (the 
problem here is separation of "natural flooding" damages from the added 
ones that may be caused by dam failure). 
What Can the States Do? 
6 with local input, identify areas (or at least communities) at risk from 
dam failure and develop priorities for mapping and corrective/preventive 
measures. 
" 
" 
• 
Ensure an adequate dam safety program that includes regular inspections 
plus other inspections as needed; engineering review of plans for con-
struction, alteration, and major repair; the ability to prescribe methods 
of operation; and the ability to take necessary action to correct 
viola tions. 
Establish appropriate standards for land use control in affected areas and 
assist locals to adopt and administer zoning based on them. 
Assist locals and dam owners to develop emergency action plans. 
Within capabilities and based on the level of federal assistance, conduct 
analyses of dams to delineate the hazard areas. 
Inform the public of the risks • 
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What Can Locals Do? 
• Be aware of the problem. Help maintain citizen awareness. 
• Plan community growth around (not in) the hazard area. 
• Encourage proper dam operation and maintenance by the owners. 
• Help the state identify hazard areas. 
• Take the lead in hazard mitigation planning and implementation. 
• Adopt and administer adequate zoning ordinances. 
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DAM SAFETY AND LAND USE 
AN IOWA CASE 
Jack D. Riessen 
Iowa Department of water, Air and waste Management 
The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to present the facts of a 
case in point about dam safety and downstream land regulations; and second, to 
l discuss the implications of that case on dam safety regulations not only in 
Iowa but across the nation. This situation is somewhat unique in that it 
!nvolves dam safety litigation resulting from restrictions placed on land use 
downstream of a dam and not from actual damages sustained from the failure of 
the dam. 
Facts of the Case 
The Dam 
Yeader Creek is a small creek (10 square mile drainage area) with its 
tipper watershed located in a heavily urbanized part of Des Moines, the capital 
dity of Iowa. From the urbanized portion, Yeader Creek flows out of the city 
'iimits into a relatively undeveloped part of polk County, back into the city 
~imi ts briefly and into the Des Moines River a short distance thereafter. 
In 1965, the Polk County Conservation Board proposed the construction of a 
d,am across the lower portion of Yeader Creek to create a recreational impound-
, 
ient as part of a county park. plans called for the construction of a compact-
er earth fill dam 1850 feet long and 39 feet high; a concrete chute spillway 
~th a 30-foot long sharp-crested weir; and an SAF-type stilling basin. water 
~ 
storage was estimated as 3,200 acre feet at normal pool and 6,200 acre feet at ~ ~e top of the dam. In essence, the dam proposal was for a well designed 
*rncture typical of many dams in the Midwest. 
Since 1957, the state of Iowa has had legislation regulating dams and 
~ther floodway construction. Administered by the Iowa Natural Resources 
ebuncil, the law required approval of the Council prior to construction. The ;~an~ for the proposed dam were submitted to the Council for review in 1965. Jt v~ew of the low damage potential of downstream lands at the time of review, 
e dam was assigned a low hazard potential. 
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Design standards then in effect required that low hazard dams be able to 
safely pass a design flood resulting from a rainfall of 7.55 inches in six 
hours over the upstream watershed. The review showed the dam could safely pass 
a flood resulting from a rainfall of ten inches in six hours, thereby exceedin; 
Council standards. All other design standards were met and the Council 
approved the construction of the dam. The dam was completed in 1967 and has 
since been well maintained and is considered structurally sound. As part of 
the County's Easter Lake Park, the dam became known as the Easter Lake Dam. 
Easter Lake Estates Mobile Home Court 
In 1972, Ronald Woods purchased land along Yeader Creek a short distance 
downstream of the dam. Inquiring as to the feasibility of building a mobile 
home park on his land, Council staff informed Mr. Woods that approval of the 
Council would be necessary prior to construction. Notwithstanding, he con-
structed a mobile home park in 1976 and 1977 as Easter Lake Estates, Inc. and 
began renting spaces for mobile homes. The mobile home court is located ·",ithic 
the Des Moines city limits and was permitted by the ci ty, which had no flood-
plain regulations at the time. 
National Dam Safety Act 
Pursuant to the directives of the National Dam Safety Act of 1972, 33 
U.S.C., Sec 47 et seq. (1976), the Council, under contract with the Corps, 
began inventorying all nonfederal dams in Iowa. Initial investigations showed 
that the Easter Lake dam should be classified as a high hazard dam due to me 
presence of the mobile home court downstream. 
A more detailed investigation of all high hazard dams in 1979 showed that 
the Easter Lake dam would overtop during the probable maximum flood (PMF) , the 
nearly universal design standard for high hazard dams. In fact, the dam would 
overtop during the occurrence of the 1/2 PMF. Floodwaters flowing over the da: 
would first cut off access to the mobile home court and progressively flood th, 
mobile homes by as much as nine feet as the dam embankment eroded. Clearly, 
loss of life and substantial property damage could result. The dam safety 
report classified the dam as a "nonemergency high hazard dam" and recommended 
removal of the mobile home court. 
Agency Action Against Easter Lakes Estates 
Prompted by the dam safety report recommendation, the Iowa Natural 
Resources Council commenced proceedings against the mobile home court. various 
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alternatives to removal of the mobile home court were considered (e.g., modifi-
j qation of the dam) by the Council but rejected as infeasible. The Council 
lound that the mobile home court constituted a nuisance and ordered it removed 
j 
within five years. Under Iowa law, the Council had specific powers to abate 
nuisances related to floods and floodplain construction. A flood warning sys-
tem and other safety measures were also ordered by the Council for the interim 
period. 
Court Action 
Easter Lake Estates, Inc. appealed the Council's removal order to district 
court, which affirmed the order, and to the Iowa Supreme Court which upheld the 
district court's ruling Easter Lake Estates, Inc., vs. Iowa Natural Resources 
Council, 328 N.W. 2d 906,909 (Iowa 1982). 
Although the removal apparently is proceeding as ordered, the mobile home 
court has now filed suit for damages against the state, Polk County, the City 
of Des Moines, and the assessor who determined the value of the property prior 
to pu£chase. A court date has not been set at this time, but information 
available indicates that a variety of allegations have been made, including an 
unconsti. tutional "taking." The order approving the dam contained a condition 
that the applicant, Polk County Conservation Board, obtain necessary easements 
prior to construction, but downstream easements were not specifically required 
by che Council. 
:\pparently, the plaintiff feels downstream easements should have been ob-
tained as the presence of the dam encumbered downstream lands. Needless to 
say, the suit raises some interesting questions and bears watching. 
Implications of Easter Lake Estates vs. INRC 
The supreme court decision, while not addressing all relevant issues, did 
endorse some issues that could have relevance in other states. Some of these 
are discussed below. 
Public Nuisance 
The court agreed that the danger to the mobile home occupants was suffi-
cient to constitute a nuisance which in turn justified the removal order even 
though the dam was structurally sound. An earlier Iowa case, Iowa Natural 
~?rces Council vs. Van Zee, 261 Iowa 1287, 158 N.W. 2d 111 (1968), estab-
lished that the lack of a permit in itself was not sufficient to compel removal 
of an illegal levee. Therefore, removal was justified on the merits of the 
nlsance finding alone. Based on this, other s ta tes may be able to take 
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similar actions under a nuisance clause even if they have no state permit 
system. 
Stringent Design Standards for Dams 
The court substantiated the use of an extreme flood event (i.e. probable 
maximum flood) for dam design standards. In view of the catastrophic con-
sequences inherent in a dam failure, the court found the stringent design 
standards to be reasonable. This, of course, contrasts to the usual 100-year 
flood standard used in typical floodplain delineation and regulation. 
Recognition of the public Use Aspects of a Dam 
Accepting the stringent design standards as reasonable, the court then 
realized that either the dam and lake had to be removed or substantially modi-
fied (which was not feasible) or the mobile home park had to go. Weighing the 
meri ts of both sides, the court recognized that removal of the dam would impair 
or affect a beneficial, public use. And the court found that the mobile home 
court had to go, although the illegal nature of the mobile home court was givec 
considerable attention. The implication is that courts will recognize the 
public benefits provided by dams. 
Other Questions Raised by Ensuing Litigation 
The suit now filed against the state, Polk County, the City of Des Moines, 
and the assessor raises some interesting questions. Should easements auto-
matically be required downstream of dams that could fail? In mapping flooo-
plains below dams and implementing appropriate land use restrictions, should 
state agencies accept conditions as they exist and ignore the broader liabilit, 
questions that would result from implementing stringent land use restrictions? 
Are assessors responsible for recognizing the inherent safety dangers and land 
use restrictions below dams (or, for that matter, on any floodplain)? 
As this matter is in litigation and the state is a party, prudence pro-
hibits a more weighty discussion of the merits of the case, but the implica-
tions of a decision are evident. 
Summary 
In closing, let me remark that dam safety issues and programs ~ be an 
integral part of any floodplain management, flood insurance, or flood hazard 
mitigation program. Hardly a year goes by without a report of a dam failure. 
Many dams builtin the 1920s and 30s or earlier are aging, were under-designed, 
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~and certainly will not last forever. we, as floodplain managers, cannot ignore 
~dam safety hoping it will go away, because, quite simply, it will continue to 
Ihaunt us unless we take positive steps to address it. 
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NATIONAL DAM SAFETY 
Jay B. Scruggs, Jr. 
Federal Emergency Management Agency 
Background 
The National Dam Inspection Act (P.L. 92-367) was enacted in August, 1972, 
Ifter a series of dam failures and near failures: the near failure of the Lower 
fan Normal Dam in San Fernando, California, on February 9, 1971; the failure of 
~e Buffalo Creek, west virginia, mine refuse embankment dam a year later; and 
the dam failure at Rapid City, south Dakota, in June, 1972. The law required 
f 
~he Corps of Engineers to compile an inventory of all the dams in the united 
~tates and to perform safety inspections of them. 
Congress, however, did not fund the inspection program until late 1977 
~fter the failure of the Kelly Barnes Lake Dam in Toccoa, Georgia. The results 
of the program show that there are over 68,000 dams meeting the size criteria 
of 25 feet in height or impounding 50 acre-feet or more of water if six feet or 
.hare in height. Over 95% of the dams inventoried, or about 64,000, are non-
federal.. Of these, the Corps inspected some 8,800 high hazard dams. About 
one-'::lird, or more than 2,900, were determined to be unsafe, and 131 were 
JlasEified as emergency unsafe. 
III July, 1979, FEMA was assigned the responsibility of coordinating and 
promoting dam safety by Executive Order 12148. FEMA's most challenging task is 
, 
to enc,}urage the establishment and maintenance of effective nonfederal dam 
safety programs to reduce losses from a dam failure. 
Issues 
To reduce potential losses downstream of dams in the event of failures, 
~ertain tasks, similar to those undertaken by the National Flood Insurance 
Brogram (NFIP), are being addressed by dam safety programs. These tasks in-~ 
qlude but are not limited to the following: 
;1 
~zard Identification 
As the NFIP produces flood hazard maps showing the affected areas of the 
~se flood, FEMA recommends the mapping of potential inundated areas downstream 
~f dams to notify communities of the potential hazard and to designate areas 
64 SPECIAL HIGH RISK A~I 
requiring emergency action plans. To assist states, locals, and dam owners to 
perform such planning, we will be providing a method developed by Danny Fread 
of the National Weather Service for determining downstream flood areas as a 
result of a dam break. This effort will be carried out in addition to those 
undertaken by states that received awards from FEMA's Dam Safety Financial 
Assistance Program during fiscal years '83 and '84. 
Emergency Preparedness Planning 
If a dam should fail, it is important that anyone immediately downstream 
be notified as soon as possible so that measures can be taken to reduce the 
potential for loss of life reSUlting from the impact of the flood wave and 
extensive flooding. Downstream communities should have warning and notifica-
tion procedures, along with plans to evacuate, available and ready to 
implement. Guidelines will be published this year to assist communities 
downstream of dams in the development of flood preparedness plans or to 
evaluate the effectiveness of existing plans. FEMA also will be providing, 
through the efforts of the Interagency Committee on Dam Safety (ICODS), 
guidelines for emergency action planning. 
Training 
One identified need in the nonfederal sector of dam safety is for tnining 
assistance since many states lack personnel competent to conduct inspections 
and other safety activities. FEMA encourages states to establish their ovm 
training program. For states with constraints on funds and staffing, a c~tal~ 
of training courses available from federal agencies will be published thL; 
summer. Most agencies will allow nonfederal personnel to attend such courses 
on a space-available basis and, in some cases, without a fee. 
Public Awareness 
Increasing public awareness is one of FEMA's biggest efforts. Reduction 
of loss of life and property can be improved through such public awareness 
efforts as simply notifying communities of upstream dams and the status or 
classification of the dams. Inundation maps and warning and evacuation plans 
are two means of increasing public awareness of the hazards associated with 
dams. Earlier this year FEMA funded the state of Colorado to develop an aware-
ness program through the Dam Safety Financial Assistance Program. It is hoped 
that the results of this project will be transferable to other states. One of 
FEMA's most successful efforts has been a series of workshops conducted in 
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with the states to inform participants of not only the hazards but 
responsibilities and liabilities associated with dam ownership. 
Risk Management 
The flood associated with a dam failure may well exceed the base flood 
elevation immediately downstream of the dam and possibly farther downstream as 
well. Yet the flood maps of communities in the NFIP do not take into account 
dam failure. Randomly selecting 100 dams, a Dewberry and Davis study showed 
that 219 communities in both the emergency and regular programs would be 
affected by flooding above the 100-year flood level in the event of dam 
failure. The identification on flood hazard maps of the areas at risk from a 
dam failure would be a means of reducing the potential losses of life and 
damage to property, because such identification would facilitate sound local 
land use management and emergency planning. 
Summary 
This focus on the common areas of the Dam Safety Program and the NFIP 
demc,llstrates how the Integrated Emergency Management System can be beneficial. 
Through I EMS , emergency management organizations, states, and local governments 
can maximize their available resources to achieve overall protection of ci ti-
zens from interrelated multiple hazards. 
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Introduction 1 
Since the beginning of recorded history, sea level has risen so slowly 
that, for most practical purposes, it has been constant. This slow rate of 
'.f'se has allowed plants and animals to thrive along the coast, encouraging a 
. iological diversity that was not possible when sea level was rising three feet 
, r century after the last ice age. At the mouth of the Mississippi, for 
·:IxamPle, it permitted the sediments delivered by the river to form a delta with 
thousands of square miles of wetlands ranging from salt marshes to cypress 
~wamps, supporting alligators, eagles, fur-bearing animals, and one-quarter of 
I 
.~e nation's seafood harvest. Civilization has also prospered along the water. 
Aside from temporary increases in water levels during major storms, we have had 
.\ 
~ittle reason to be concerned about rising seas. 
Recently, however, the view that sea level changes are unimportant to 
i,;today's activities has been called into question. Tidal gauges have recorded a 
:l 
,relative rise in sea level of three feet per century along the coast of i ~ouisiana (Hicks et al., 1983), and the wetlands there are eroding at a rate of 1 :fO square miles per year because society has thwarted the processes by which 
~ IThe views expressed herein do not represent the official views :~f the Environmental Protection Agency, the Fish and Wildlife 
Service, or any other agency of the United States Government. 
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the Mississippi delta formerly kept pace with rising sea level (Gagliano et 
al., 1981; see also Jantzen, 1981; Baumann et al., 1984; Louisiana Coastal 
Commission, 1982; and u.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1984). (Tidal gauges 
measure relative sea level rise, which includes land subsidence and global sea 
level rise.) The rate of relative sea level rise along the highly developed 
Atlantic Coast has been one foot per century (Hicks et al., 1983), enough to 
cause significant erosion along most recreational beaches (Pilkey et al., 1981: 
New Jersey Department of Environmental protection, 1981; and State of 
Massachusetts, 1981). 
The expected greenhouse warming could accelerate these trends. Increasi,.; 
concentrations of carbon dioxide, chlorofluorocarbons, methane, and nitrous 
oxide are likely to raise the earth's average temperature 3-8o F in the next 
century (Charney, 1979). Such a warming would cause ocean water to expand, 
mountain glaciers to melt, and, possibly, polar glaciers to disintegrate. Al-
though global sea level rose only four to six inches in the last century 
(Gornitz et al., 1982), the National Academy of Sciences (Revelle, 1983) and 
the Environmental Protection Agency (Hoffman et al., 1983; Hoffman, 1984) have 
estimated that it will rise one and one-half to five feet in the next century. 
Local governments throughout the coastal zone of the United States are 
formulating strategies in response to erosion caused by current sea level 
trends. 2 The decisions they make could involve controversial choices between 
individual and community rights. These officials view the prospect of an 
accelerated sea level rise as a sword that could cut either way. It may gener-
ate the public awareness necessary to enact measures that would be required to 
address current problems; but it also could overwhelm their efforts or, if 
subsequently proven to be a false alarm, make their foresight look like folly. 
Coastal officials want to know more about sea level rise as soon as they can, 
but many fear that they will have to act before they know enough. 
2Almost every coastal state has a coastal management agency 
affiliated with the federal government's Office of Coastal zone 
Management. These agencies work with local governments such as 
Ocean City, Maryland; Atlantic City, New Jersey; and Terrbonne 
parish, Louisiana to develop planning and engineering responses ~ 
erosion. Many of the participants are unaware of the extent to 
which erosion is caused by relative sea level rise, a factor that 
has often contributed to local decisions to use groins and other 
measures that are ineffective at addressing erosion caused by sea 
level rise. 
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Nowhere is the need to do something about the erosion caused by relative 
sea level rise better established or more urgent than in coastal Louisiana • 
• J 
For over 6,000 years, nature has allowed the Mississippi River Delta to keep up 
and even expand with a rising sea (see Gagliano et al., 1981; and Gagliano, 
1984). Even the additional sea level rise from the greenhouse effect would 
not, by itself, prevent more than about half the delta from continuing to 
thrive. Yet human activities are preventing the delta from keeping pace with 
current sea level trends to the point that I'll of the wetlands are destroyed 
every year, and that rate may be accelerating. 
In the last twenty years, scientists have established beyond any reason-
able doubt the human causes of wetland loss in Louisiana: levees, dams and 
reservoirs, river control activities, and canals. No one denies that these 
activi.ties have played an important role in the economic development of 
Louisiana and the nation. But it is now time to ask: Is there no way to modify 
these activities so that we can avoid losing one of the most important aquatic 
"farms" in the united States? 
1'he scientists and local governments have done their job; there is a 
wealth of information and the public perceives that there is a problem. But 
the questions remain: how much more vulnerable will New Orleans be to a hurri-
cane after the wetlands have vanished? Where will America get its seafood and 
how m"ny fishermen will lose their jobs? How should building codes and flood 
insurance provisions be modified? How would these outcomes change if the 
Mississippi River was diverted or if ring levees replaced river levees? Would 
the public prefer minor variations of the status quo or a fundamental departure 
froro C\l:crent policies if it fully understood the consequences that await us and 
the opt.ions by which they might be avoided? How much would the projected rise 
in sea level accelerate the destruction of wetlands or change the best way to 
address the problem? 
\;e hope that our efforts will stimulate the awareness necessary to address 
these issues, because time is running out. This paper addresses human causes 
of wetland loss in Louisiana, and proposes a policy study of the possible 
sOlutions. Coastal erosion in Louisiana is no longer an issue of interest only 
to scientists, engineers, and analysts. Our goal is to ensure that the public 
and all levels of government have the information to determine and possibly 
alter the fate of coastal Louisiana while there is still time to do so. 
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Sediment Transport and the Delta 
The Mississippi River Delta formed over thousands of years as sediment .,,1 
deposited along the lower portion of the river, and through accumulation of 
organic material in the associated wetlands. The river branched out into 
several distributaries, each of which carried fresh water and sediment to the 
Gulf. As ridges (natural levees) formed along these channels, the delta would 
gradually advance into the sea, with low-lying marshes occupying the areas 
between the channels. Much of the water and natural levee-building concen-
trated around a single main channel, which advanced farthest into the sea. 
Because this process lengthened the river's course, the river would eventually 
divert most of its flow to a shorter route to the sea, and the process of 
natural levee building would repeat itself. Previous main channels include 
Bayou Lafourche and a route extending east from New Orleans. Today, only the 
Old River Control Structure at Simmesport, Louisiana prevents the main flow of 
the Mississippi River from switching to the Atchafalaya River. 
Thus, coastal Louisiana today consists of numerous thin ridges along 
present and former distributaries of the river, on which most development has 
occurred. In between are thousands of square miles of highly productive >let-
lands ranging from freshwater swamps to salt marshes, on which Louisiana's $40: 
million seafood industry and many wildlife resources depend (Davis, 1974). 
Al though the river has always carried life-sustaining sediment to the 
wetlands, natural destruction of marshes has taken place as well. When the 
main flow changes its course, most of the sediment is diverted to the new main 
channel and wetlands associated with the former main channel(s) receive less 
sediment. As the deltaic sediments subside and sea level rises, the outer 
wetlands along the former main distributary revert to open water. Furthermore, 
because salt water from the sea is no longer held back by the river flow, it 
diffuses upstream and kills cypress swamps and other wetlands that cannot 
tolerate salt. until people interrupted the natural cycle, occasional river 
flooding provided sufficient sediment for most of the delta to keep up with 
subsidence and sea level rise. New growth fully offset the natural loss of 
older delta areas. 
Most of us learned in school that the Mississippi Delta is thereby growing 
into the Gulf of Mexico. Unfortunately, this is no longer the case. The 
natural processes that created and sustained the wetlands are being thwarted by 
human beings, and the wetlands are now disappearing at a rate of 40-50 square 
t,itus/Edmonson/Campbell/van Beek/Cordes 73 
~les per year (Gould, 1970) (see Figure 1), implying that in the next 20-25 
~ars, Louisiana will lose an area equal in size to the state of Rhode Island. 
~e projected rise in sea level from the greenhouse effect will further accel-
:rate the rate of wetland loss. 
The Disappearing Delta 
The forces of nature once supplied the Mississippi River Delta with sedi-
ment in a fashion that maximized the area of marsh creation, but we have modi-
fied the plumbing of the Mississippi in a way that comes close to maximizing 
the rate of marsh destruction. As sea level rises three feet per century 
relative to the land, the sediment that once allowed wetlands to keep pace with 
this rise is deposited off the edge of the continental shelf, because of flood 
and river flow regulation. Salt intrusion caused by a variety of activities is 
killing cypress swamps and some types of marshes. (By "river flow regulation," 
we include 1) river control structures whose primary purpose is to divert 
water; and 2) levees that seal off minor distributaries. The latter are de-
signed with flood control in mind, but water diversion also occurs, a fact that 
is sor.letimes overlooked.) 
A quick glance at a map of Louisiana tells the story about sediment supply 
(Gould, 1970) (Figures 2 and 3). Along the main channel of the Mississippi, 
the delta has advanced far into the Gulf. To facilitate economic development 
and provide flood protp.r.~ion, ~he Corps of Engineers has constructed river 
control structures and levees which have sealed off minor distributaries. 
These flow regulation activities now confine 70% of the river flow to the main 
channel as far downstream as the Birdfoot Delta. These structural measures 
maintatn the flow down the main channel, and by decreasing sediment deposition, 
help mair.tain a deep navigation channel to the Gulf of Mexico. Although the 
artificially maintained river banks south of Venice do not protect property 
from floods, they have more than paid for themselves in reduced dredging 
costs,3 disregarding their impacts on wetlands. 4 
3 Por example, see, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (1984). Page 2 
states that a proposed levee system would reduce baseline dredging 
requirements from 54.2 to 12.7 million cubic yards per year. 
4The ability to estimate wetland loss associated with levees is 
fairly new. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers project, for 
example, does not estimate the wetland loss associated with 
sediment starvation induced by the levee system. However, Steve 
Mathies of the New Orleans District says that a planned levee 
extension along the Atchafalaya River will incorporate such an 
analysis. 
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Without river flow regulation, the Atchafalaya River would capture an 
increasing volume of the flow of the Mississippi and cause more wetlands growth 
around its mouth. The many smaller bayous that have been sealed off by levees 
would also carry water and sediment; wetland losses from sediment deprivation 
and salt intrusion would be much less. It is easy to understand why marsh 
creation would have been greater. Along most of the coast where sediment would 
normally be deposited, the Gulf is less than 20 feet deep, while it is over 400 
feet deep outside the continental shelf where the sediment is now being de-
posited. Because the water is over twenty times as deep at the end of Birdfoot 
Delta, additional marsh creation requires over 20 times as much sediment. 
Thus, flow regulation has caused the delta-building process to be less than 
one-twentieth as efficient at creating marshland as it used to be. 5 
Besides sealing off minor distributaries, levees also contribute to wet-
lands loss by preventing them from flooding. Much of the sediment that would 
normally allow marshes to keep pace with relative sea level rise was supplied 
by annual flooding of the river. By preventing the river from overflowing its 
banks, the levees keep life-sustaining sediment, freshwater, and nutrients from 
reaching adjacent wetlands. 
A final cause of wetland destruction concerns saltwater intrusion. Both 
r,atural and artificial canals for navigation wi thin the wetlands permit salt-
",dt.er to reach brackish and freshwater environments. Cypress trees and other 
vegetation frequently die, and the wetlands convert to open water. Flow regu-
lation increases freshwater for some areas and decreases it for others, allow-
ing saltwater to intrude farther into such areas as distributaries that have 
cEen sealed off and the mouth of the Atchafalaya River. By slowing the flow 
rate, sea level rise allows salt water to intrude farther inland everywhere. 
Implications of the Greenhouse Effect 
A rise in sea level from the greenhouse effect would accelerate the loss 
of wetlands that Louisiana is experiencing today. Marsh drowning and saltwater 
intrusion both would increase. The time required for Terrebonne Parish to 
SThis assertion is a result of elementary geometry. If the 
water is twenty times as deep, it takes twenty times as much 
sediment to reclaim land from the sea. 
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convert to open water, for example, would be reduced from 100 to 60-75 years, 
if no action is taken. 6 The local government there has developed a 25-year 
construction plan to help restore natural processes and curtail wetland loss. 
Given the long lead time necessary for gaining a public consensus on the public 
works that may have to be built or modified, decisions that local officials 
might like to delay until 2020 will probably be necessary within the next ten 
years. 
One of the most important problems concerning the greenhouse effect is our 
inability to forecast future sea level rise accurately. Although much of the 
nation has the luxury of being able to wait 20 years until better forecasts are 
available, Louisiana does not. Thus it is very likely that we will have to 
develop a wetland protection strategy that addresses the possibility of a 
"greenhouse" rise in sea level before we know what its magni tude will actually 
be. 
Nevertheless, the sooner we have better forecasts of sea level rise, the 
sooner Louisiana will be able to develop strategies that address an accurate 
understanding of what lies ahead. Several federal agencies fund research 
concerning the greenhouse effect and sea level rise, including the Departme~t 
of Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Academy of 
Sciences, the National Science Foundation, the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 
Although the outcomes of decisions involving billions of dollars in Louisial,a 
alone will depend on whether we can accurately anticipate future sea level 
rise, the federal government only spends about $100,000 per year developing 
better forecasts. Recognizing the need for better information, Terrebonne 
Parish recently became the first local government in the nation to call for 
increased federal efforts to forecast sea level rise (Terrebonne Parish 
Council, 1984). 
bThis is a conservative estimate. Given current trends of 
relative sea level rise (3 feet per century), Terrebonne could 
completely erode in 100 years. EPA's "low" scenario implies that 
sea level will rise 0.8 feet by 2050, by which time subsidence 
should be 2.2 feet for a relative rise of 3 feet by 2050. EPA'S 
"mid-range high" scenario implies a rise in relative sea level of 
3 feet by 2040. Thus, the greenhouse warming could accelerate the 
occurrence of a 3-foot rise from 2080 at current trends to between 
2040-2050. We further note that EPA's "high" scenario would imply 
a relative rise of 3 feet by 2025, but that scenario is extremely 
unlikely. 
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Saving the Land 
The most fundamental threat to any government is the possibility that its 
land will be taken away. In response to current trends, local governments and 
the State of Louisiana have initiated a level of effort unprecedented in the 
history of environmental protection. The Louisiana Legislature created a $35 
million Coastal Protection Trust Fund to research, develop, and demonstrate 
methods to slow coastal erosion. Local governments have also appropriated 
millions of dollars, and have been joined by private landowners such as Texaco 
and Tenneco LaTerre. Terrebonne Parish has initiated a public awareness cam-
paign that includes billboards, pamphlets, slide slows, and its secondary 
school curriculum (Edmonson and Jones, 1984). 
The federal government, however, has played a much smaller role in trying 
to develop a solution to the problem of relative sea level rise and land loss 
in Louisiana. This is unfortunate because a wide variety of federal activities 
are inextricably intertwined with both the problem and any possible solution. 
The Corps of Engineers is involved with river control, levee construction, 
freshwater diversion, dredging, and coastal land loss studies. The Federal 
Emergency Management Agency operates the National Flood Insurance PrograJll, 
·,;hich already pays more flood claims to two parishes in Louisiana than anywhere 
else. The Environmental Protection Agency, the Fish and wildlife Service, and 
the National Park Service all have vital mandates to maintain the important 
·'cosystems of coastal Louisiana, which has one-half the nation's coastal wet-
lunas and produces one-quarter of the nation's seafood harvest. 
The history of environmental protection in the United States suggests that 
a.ct.hough the state and local efforts are a start, they will not be sufficient 
without significant intergovernmental cooperation and a federal mandate to 
correct the problem. Solutions to environmental problems, even when economic-
ali.y justified, are almost always too controversial and involve too many juris-
dictions outside of local control for a state government to implement on its 
own. This is even more the case in Louisiana, where federal policies involving 
navigation and flood mitigation are largely the root of the problem. Only the 
federal government can undertake the basic research or the reevaluation of its 
own practices that will be necessary to adequately address coastal erosion and 
wetland loss in Louisiana. 
The major reason for optimism is that the river carries enough sediment to 
sustain a large portion of the wetlands. Our challenge is to devise a strategy 
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that can take advantage of the forces of nature, without sacrificing the tre-
mendous economic infrastructure that was unfortunately developed without an 
understanding of the consequences of subsidence and rising seas. Terrebonne 
Parish has developed such a plan but requires more accurate forecasts of sea 
level rise and the actions of other government agencies before final budget 
estimates can be solidified. 
We cannot rule out the possibility that coastal Louisiana must eventually 
choose between becoming like Holland or like Venice. (Already people discuss 
the possibility of a large dike along the marsh to harness the productive 
estuary; the possibility of several island cities in the Gulf of Mexico would 
not be altogether inconceivable for a culture that relied on water transporta-
tion for centuries.) If we allow events to overtake us, and merely respond to 
erosion as it occurs, these will be our only options. Only if we reexamine the 
activities that are causing land loss, only if we plan today, is there even the 
most remote chance that coastal Louisiana will remain the growing delta that it 
has been since the beginning of recorded history. 
A Proposed Study of Solutions to Land Loss 
Many government activities would benefit from a comprehensive study of the 
impacts and responses to relative sea level rise in coastal Louisiana. Such a 
study' could provide a clearer understanding of the implications of what is 
known, and thereby suggest which coastal protection, wetland management, and 
hazard mitigation options warrant additional consideration. Our objectives 
include the following: 
1) Provide the state of Louisiana with an independent overview of the costs 
and benefits from each of the wide variety of policy options at its 
disposal. 
2) Provide participating parishes with an assessment of the impacts of wet-
land protection alternatives on their environment, and identify the inter-
relationships between the actions of particular parishes. 
3) Provide Terrebonne Parish with data, analysis, and recommendations on 
optimizing the trade-off between flood protection and the vitality of its 
wetlands. 
4) Provide EPA's Office of Policy Analysis with estimates of the environ-
mental benefits of planning for sea level rise in Louisiana, and the value 
of better forecasts of sea level rise. 
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5) Provide the Federal Insurance Administration and other offices within the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency with estimates of future flood 
damages, insurance premiums and payments, and federal disaster assistance 
under alternative wetland protection policies. Determine how frequently 
the insurance rate maps must be redrawn. Develop data necessary to assess 
whether rates should reflect the average risk over the life of a property, 
or current risk only. 
6) Provide the Army Corps of Engineers with estimates of wetland impacts of 
alternative strategies of flood control, river control, and channelization 
under various sea level rise scenarios, and the impact of wetland protec-
tion strategies on the Corps' navigation, dredging, levee, and EIS activi-
ties. 
7) Provide EPA's Office of Federal Activities and Region VI with estimates of 
the wetland loss that will result under alternative policies for various 
sea level rise scenarios. 
8) Provide EPA's Office of Drinking Water with estimates of water quality for 
alternative policies. 
9) Provide the Department of Interior's Fish and Wildlife Service and the 
National Park Service with useful information for management of wetlands 
under their control and for compliance with Coordination Act requirements. 
Provide the Mineral Management Service with projections of the value to 
coastal parishes of making offshore sand more readily available. 
10) Provide legislators and people who allocate research budgets with esti-
mates of the value of improving forecasts of future sea level rise and the 
resulting impacts. 
il) Provide the research community with a ranking of research priorities. 
12) Provide the citizens of Louisiana with an easily read document that ex-
plains the choices facing the state. 
Research has been completed that sheds light on these issues, and this 
information could be used to project the impacts of additional sea level rise 
from the greenhouse effect. A wide variety of solutions has also been pro-
posed. But the various pieces of the puzzle must be put together in a form 
appropria te for deci.sion making. 
Table 1 outlines the proposed study. The study should begin by projecting 
shoreline change expected under current management practices for current trends 
and two global sea level rise scenarios. It would rely on existing mapping 
studies, estimates of sediment transport, wetland drowning, and salt intru-
fJion. 
Next, a panel of leading coastal hydrologists, geologists, and engineers 
would specify a wide variety of technically feasible methods to slow or halt 
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net wetland loss. The possibility of the virtual destruction of coastal 
Louisiana as we know it is so real and so severe that drastic measures should 
not be ruled out in a comprehensive policy study merely because they appear 
politically infeasible today. Thus, the proposed study should cast as wide a 
net as possible in considering options, including 
• Do nothing to stop erosion immediately, but build a large levee past which 
it could not proceed; 
• Alternative river diversion and rediversion; 
• More dredging in lieu of levees and jetties at South Pass and Southwest 
Pass; 
• Alternative flood protection/levee strategies, including supplementing 
river levees with ring levees in well developed areas; 
• Stopgap measures such as barrier island restoration, dune building, marsh 
building, and minor water diversions that prevent saltwater intrusion. 
The costs and impacts of each of the proposed options would then be 
assessed. Flood damages would play an important part; river diversion, ring 
levee construction, and river levee destruction could all substantially change 
the flood damages in lightly developed areas. But the wetland destruction that 
would otherwise occur may leave New Orleans and other highly developed areas 
ripe for a hurricane disaster that would be much worse. Allowing the river to 
flow out of more distributaries would increase the Corps of Engineers' dredging 
requirements but might save costs for subsequent water diversion and hurricane 
protection projects. 
We have no illusions about the level and quality of resources that must be 
invested to solve the coastal erosion problem in Louisiana. A comprehensive 
policy study is a small but necessary step in addressing a problem that will be 
with us for decades. The impacts of relative sea level rise are so diverse 
that no one government agency can be reasonably expected to address the entire 
problem. But all of these impacts must be laid out and estimated in a single 
document. The importance of Louisiana's wetlands demands nothing less than a 
clear picture of where we intend to go and how we intend to get there. 
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Table 1 
STUDY OUTLINE 
85 
I. Use existing data to project shoreline changes under current levee, 
dredging, and water regulation policies, assuming current sea level trends 
(3 feet by 2085), a 5-foot rise, and a 7-foot rise by 2085. 
II. Panel Specifies Alternative Coastal Management Options 
A. Current policies 
B. Atchafalaya natural diversion 
C. Atchafalaya delta management 
D. Diversion into former or new distributaries 
E. Sediment supplementation via jet-spray or hydraulic dredging 
F. Supplement or replace river levees with ring levees around major 
population centers 
G. Barrier island restoration 
H. Large hurricane protection levee along the Gulf Coast and wetland 
management inland of that levee 
I. Combinations 
III. Estimate the impact on shoreline location and wetland acreage by type, for 
each of the management alternatives, using available research. 
A. Impacts for alternative implementation dates 
B. Saltwater intrusion along main channel of the Mississippi River and 
elsewhere. 
C. Flood risks to life and property from river and hurricane protection. 
D. Impacts on seafood production, loss of land, pelt production, highway 
maintenance, unemployment, other. 
E. Calculate the value of better forecasts of sea level rise. 
IV. Design a study plan to provide better estimates or reference existing 
studies under the Louisiana Coastal protection Trust Fund that would help 
secure better understanding of the impacts. 
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THE COASTAL BARRIER RESOURCES ACT: 
PRESENT STUDIES 
Albert G. Greene, Jr. 
Division of Special Service projects 
National Park Service 
u.S. Department of Interior 
Coastal studies are presently being conducted by the u.S. Department of 
the Interior to meet the requirements of the Coastal Barrier Resources Act 
which specifies the submission of a report to Congress in October 1985. The 
first important legislation that formed the basis of our present approach was 
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OREA), passed in August 1981. 
This Act directed the Secretary of the Interior to conduct a study within one 
year that would result in proposed designations of undeveloped coastal 
barriers. As a result of this Act's passage, the Secretary established a 
Coastal Barriers Task Force--an interdepartmental group of people who had 
expertise in coastal matters. This group had representatives from the U.S. 
Fish and wildlife Service, the National Park Service, the u.s. Geological 
Survey, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Solicitor's Office of the 
Department, the Congressional Liaison Office, among others. On August 16, 
1982, the Secretary submitted a report to Congress recommending designation of 
188 units as undeveloped coastal barriers, which included approximately 750 
miles of the 2,700 miles of the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico coasts. The 
principal effect of such designation was that, effective October, 1983, new 
development on these units was not eligible for federal flood insurance. In 
addition, the Secretary recommended that the Act be amended to include barriers 
that were designated as "otherwise protected." 
On October 18, 1982, the Coastal Barrier Resources Act (CRBA) was signed 
into law as P.L. 97-348. This Act superseded the ORBA provisions concerning 
coastal barriers; it established and identified a 186-unit undeveloped Coastal 
Barrier Resources System along the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico coasts. 
The units included were basically those recommended by the Task Force. Effec-
tive on October 18, 1982, the areas designated became ineligible for most kinds 
of federal assistance for such things as building bridges to the barriers, 
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sewage treatment plants, and roads; the federal flood insurance prohibitions 
were delayed until October 1983. In recognition of certain overriding national 
interests, the Act includes some areas excepted from ineligibility, such as 
defense, channel maintenance, highway maintenance, energy development, and 
research. 
Included in the requirements of CRBA is the preparation of a report to 
Congress with "recommendations for the conservation of the fish, wildlife, and 
other natural resources of the System based on an evaluation and comparison of 
all management alternatives and combinations thereof," and "recommendations for 
additions to, and deletions from," the System. This study provision reflects 
the concern that the removal of federal financial assistance alone may not be 
adequate, in and of itself, to protect the identified System units. This 
report is currently being prepared by the Coastal Barriers Study Group, a group 
similar to the Coastal Barriers Task Force, with major field work conducted by 
four NPS field representatives. Regarding recommendations for additions to or 
deletions from the System, three bureaus within the Department of the Interior 
--the National Park Service, the Fish and wildlife Service, and the Geological 
Survey--are working together to identify potential sites at these locations: 
1) On the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico coasts: protected areas, and 
areas that may be additions to or deletions from the Coastal Barrier 
Resources System; and 
2) On the Great Lakes, the Pacific Ocean coasts, and the 
u.S. Trust Territorial areas: additional coastal barriers. 
We have almost completed the accumulation of data for identifying addi-
tional undeveloped coastal barrier areas, and have tentatively identified on 
u.S. Geological Survey topographic quadrangles areas in California, Oregon, 
Washington, the Great Lakes, and the Caribbean. Aerial photography flights 
have been completed for most of the areas. The Trust Territories and Alaska 
remain to be studied, but only existing mapping and aerial photography will be 
considered as preliminary data indicate that an adequate job of identification 
can be done using this information. 
The other part of this task--that of identifying the "otherwise protected 
areas' (local, state, and federal parks; federal and state wildlife areas; 
private conservation organizations' lands)--has just about been completed for 
the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico coasts. The affected states have been 
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working with the Fish and wildlife Service and the National Park Service to 
identify all protected areas by providing maps and documentation of the levels 
of protection. This exercise may lead to a recommendation that CBRA be amended 
to include these areas. It is the Study Group's position that these areas 
should be included within CRBA's protection as the exemptions under Section 6 
of the Act allow continued federal assistance for protected areas as long as 
conservation and recreation are the management objectives. Inclusion of these 
areas within the System under the Act would prevent federal assistance only 
should the status of such areas change in the future to allow development. 
This amendment, if accepted by the Secretary, recommended to and passed by the 
Congress, would greatly enlarge the size of the present System and would in-
crease the consistency of federal policy on coastal barriers. A similar study 
for the other coasts will also be completed. 
We are examining proposals from state governments and other interested 
parties for additions to and deletions from the Coastal Barrier Resources 
system. One option we are considering is recommending that the definition of a 
coastal barrier in the Act be changed to include areas of consolidated sediment 
in high energy areas like the Florida Keys, larger bays like the Chesapeake, 
and important biological habitats in intertidal zones that do not have a land-
liard aquatic habitat. Other considerations involve the possibili ty of re-
defining the "level of development, n enlarging units based on state reques ts, 
iind adding developed areas destroyed by storms or hurricanes. In line with the 
!eet's manda te, we are cooperating with s ta te and local governments and the 
?rivate sector in defining criteria for any mOdifications to the existing 
cri teria. 
In directing us to consider additional management alternatives that foster 
conservation of the Coastal Barrier Resources System, Congress has provided us 
','i th the very exciting possibility that a wise federal policy could lead to 
further protection without further federal involvement! In response to this 
challenge the Study Group has focused on two major categories of governmental 
actions, in addition to financial assistance, that affect the coast: tax policy 
and permits/zoning. These issues are being analyzed at the state and local as 
well as the federal level. 
The study process itself has been broken down into a series of components. 
~he majority of state and local alternatives are being reviewed by the four NPS 
field representatives appointed by the Director specifically for this purpose. 
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They are responsible for assessing all state and local issues except the impact 
of tax policy as a possible management alternative. Federal alternatives are 
being considered by the Study Group in WASO, and include federal tax policy and 
the impact of federal permits on coastal barrier conservation. 
To be more specific, the four NPS field representatives are collecting 
data on the current use and management of coastal resources on the Atlantic and 
Gulf coasts in order to 1) identify and evaluate resource management issues; 2) 
compare and evaluate existing state and local laws, regulations, and/or other 
mechanisms that encourage, facilitate, or adversely affect protection of the 
coastal barriers; and 3) review and assess the impacts and opportunities for 
private sector conservation initiatives, such as private land trusts and dona-
tions. The assessment of the feasibility of new management alternatives will 
be a part of the effort of both this group and the Study Group in WASO. These 
alternatives will include surplus property land exchanges and mechanisms for 
institutional cooperation (regional coastal commissions). 
The Secretary will submit a report to Congress in October 1985 with the 
study's findings and recommendations. There are still many opportunities for 
the state and local governments, conservation groups, private citizens, scien-
tific groups, and all others to submit their ideas and recommendations to the 
Department. We are trying to keep everyone informed through the Federal 
Register and other means. Remember, this is a cooperative effort. 
LONG RANGE MANAGEMENT PLANS FOR BARRIER ISLANDS 
Rutherford H. Platt 
Professor of Geography 
University of Massachusetts 
Introduction 
Like the Gaul of Julius Caesar, coastal barriers may be divided into three 
parts. The total extent of U.S. coastal barriers along the Atlantic and Gulf 
shorelines is estimated to be approximately 1,685 miles in length with a land 
area of about 1.6 million acres (Table 1). For present purposes we may class-
ify this total resource into subgroups according to the state of development 
and legal status. The first subgroup includes coastal barriers protected 
through public ownership or as holdings of the Nature Conservancy or other 
conservation organizations. This subgroup accounts for about 36% of the total 
barrier shoreline and slightly more than half of the total acreage. The second 
subgroup includes barriers that are undeveloped but not owned by a public or 
conservation organization. This subgroup is now synonymous with the "coastal 
barrier resource system" (CBRS) as established under the Coastal Barrier 
R8sources Act of 1982. It comprises about 24% of the total barrier shorelines 
and 29% of its acreage. These barriers are "protected" to the extent that 
federal flood insurance and grants for such development infrastructure as 
roads, bridges, and erosion protection are precluded under the 1982 Act. 
Barriers not included in the preceding subgroups are assigned to a third 
category most crucial for management purposes, namely "developed and unpro-
tected." This subgroup accounts for about 40% of total shoreline length (1,058 
miles) but only 17% of barrier acreage. This subgroup was the subject of the 
Conference on Managing Developed Coastal Barriers held in Virginia Beach, 
January 15-18, 1985. Since the other subgroups of barriers enjoy one or 
another form of protection, the developed and unprotected barriers clearly pose 
the most significant long-term management problems. 
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Table 1 
Geographical Extent of Atlantic and Gulf Coastal Barrier Features 
Shore Length 
All Barriers 
Miles Percent 
Total 2,685 
Undeveloped 644 24.0 
Otherwise protected 954 36.0 
Developed/unprotected 1,050 40.0 
(in miles) 
148 Major 
Barrier Islands 
Land Area (in acre 
Miles Percent Acres ~ 
1,610 1,645,000 
334 20.7 480,000 29.0 
624 38.7 885,000 53.7 
549 34.0 280,000 17.0 
(Ringold and Clark, 1980) 
(Godschalk, 1984) 
Geographic Variation Among Developed Coastal Barriers 
Management options for developed coastal barriers must reflect extreme 
geographic diversity that exists among their features. A paper for the 
virginia Beach Conference classified coastal barriers according to various 
parameters: e.g., population size and density, date of settlement, economic 
function, land values, and political structure. For present purposes we may 
simply note that developed barriers range from full-scale "cities on the beacil" 
(e.g., Miami Beach, Florida; Galveston, Texas; Atlantic City, New Jersey) to 
resort communities experiencing rapid and high density growth (e.g., Ocean 
City, Maryland; Clearwater, Florida) to more isolated resort communities with 
carefully planned land use patterns (Hilton Head, South Carolina; Captiva 
Island, Florida) to miscellaneous barriers having a mixture of developed and 
undeveloped areas (e.g., Topsail Beach, North Carolina; Amelia Island, 
Florida). 
Developed barriers may also be distinguished according to the status of 
planning control. Jekyll Island, Georgia, is owned and totally planned by the 
State of Georgia. Some barriers are divided among multiple jurisdictions, both 
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municipal and county, while others are within a single political unit of local 
government. Some are governed by municipalities that are limited to the 
barriers such as Galveston, while others are part of much larger urban govern-
ments such as Rockaway Beach in New York City. Counties govern unincorporated 
areas. These and other factors complicate the problem of recommending long-term 
management policies for developed coastal barriers. 
Assembly of appropriate data would facilitate the preparation of long-term 
management plans for barriers by states and their subunits of authority. Such 
plans should embrace at least the following elements of public policy concern: 
• Ultimate population/development levels; 
• Infilling policy; 
• Erosion; 
• Emergency warning and evacuation; 
• water supply; 
• Wastewater management; 
• Public open space and beach access; 
• Cultural and historic preservation; and 
o Natural area preservation. 
Inevitably, federal policies and programs influence the realization of 
planning goals set forth above. The "federal consistence" provision of the 
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 may be operative to the extent that long-
term barrier management plans are incorporated into overall state CZM plans. 
But several specific areas of federal influence should be targeted for parti-
cular attention. 
Federal Subsidies for Infrastructure 
Distinction between developed and undeveloped barriers in many places is 
arbitrary. The Department of Interior had to make many judgment calls in 
drawing boundaries around units designated for the Coastal Barrier Resource 
System (CRBS). The areas omitted from the system for political or planning 
reasons nevertheless are substantially undeveloped at this time but remain 
eligible for federal infrastructure assistance on flood insurance. It makes 
little sense to deny federal incentives for development in one part of a 
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barrier while allowing other areas, nominally outside the CBRS, to develop even 
more intensely to meet the existing demand. Indeed, the arguments made on 
behalf of the Coastal Barrier Resources Act largely recited conditions of 
overcrowding, hurricane hazard, and other problems afflicting developed 
barriers. It would undermine the intent of Congress if federal aid to areas 
outside the CBRS induced additional development and intensified these 
problems. 
Accordingly, a distinction must be made for developed barriers, between 
federal aid that simply replaces and updates infrastructures serving existing 
development and aid that facilitates expansion of development into new areas or 
to a higher level of density. The latter would be inconsistent with the spirit 
if not the letter of the Coastal Barrier Resources Act. 
I am suggesting that, for purposes of federal assistance, each developed 
coastal barrier should be viewed as subject to a "growth cap" at its present 
level of development. Minor infilling, of course, may occur, if it can be 
accommodated by existing infrastructure. But where federal assistance would 
significantly expand population and investment risk, it should be curtailed. 
This is presumably the intent of Executive Order No. 11988 regarding federal 
investment in flood hazard areas. This does not mean that further development 
may not occur; it means that state, local, and private sources will have to 
foot the bill for expansion of necessary services. 
Flood Insurance 
In a study of six coastal and barrier communities, the General Accounting 
Office (1982) found that new development was occurring in the Coastal High 
Hazard areas of each with the benefit of flood insurance. There has been 
considerable improvement of the administration of flood insurance for coastal V 
Zones through the consideration of wave height in hazard mapping studies and 
the requirement of engineer certification of first flood elevations. Neverthe-
less, the very definition of "coastal high hazard areas" suggests the folly of 
providing any flood insurance in this zone. Furthermore, where beach recession 
is occurring due to sea level rise and other causes, the coastal hazard area 
may be entirely under water within a matter of a few years (Kaufman and Pilkey, 
1983). 
with regard to A Zones and other areas of coastal barriers landward of the 
V Zone, flood insurance for new development must be carefully monitored to 
ensure that true actuarial rates are charged. Frequent updating of rates and 
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maps are necessary as shoreline recession and other physical changes occur. In 
view of the dynamic nature of coastal barriers, the NFIP should consider estab-
lishing a special zone for such features which would involve a surcharge above 
normal coastal A Zone rates. 
Land Acquisition 
The optimal long-term management strategy for coastal barriers is to 
acquire them for public purposes. According to the Conservation Foundation 
(1982, p. 311), the Federal Land and Water Conservation Fund (LAWCON) between 
1965 and 1978 allocated $51 million to state and local governments for open 
space acquisition on barriers. It allocated another $128 million to federal 
agencies, chiefly the National Park Service and the Fish and Wildlife Service, 
for this purpose. These amounts are surprisingly modest for a 13-year period 
which spanned the "era of environmental awareness." Certainly, the extremely 
high values of shorefront property preclude extensive acquisition. Yet un-
developed parcels within "developed coastal barriers" are local targets for 
public acquisition. The National Park Service has lengthy experience in the 
use of easements and leasebacks to cut costs in a long-term acquisition 
p::ogram. ConSidering that LAWCON derives much of its funds from off-shore oil 
and gas revenues, it is appropriate that a portion of the fund be earmarked for 
coastal barrier acquisition. 
Furthermore, Congress should increase the federal share in LAWCON from 50% 
to 80% of project costs in the case of coastal barrier projects. This would be 
~qlJivalent to the federal share in coastal zone management grants and would 
reflect the limited state and local resources available for barrier acquisition 
activities. A larger federal share for barriers than for other open space 
acquisition is justified by the greater national interest in preventing further 
d·,velopment of barriers and avoiding increased disaster relief outlays. 
postdisaster Mitigation 
In 1980, ten federal agencies at the direction of the Office of Management 
and Budget signed an interagency agreement to cooperate in the identification 
of opportunities for mitigating future flood losses. The agreement provides 
that an interagency and intergovernmental team will convene under the direction 
of the FEMA regional office immediately after a presidential flood disaster 
declaration. An initial report recommending mitigation actions within 15 days 
after the disaster must be submitted to the appropriate federal, state, and 
local authorities. 
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This procedure affords a unique tool for long-term coastal barrier manage-
ment. As hurricanes and northeasters occur, all levels of government should 
strenuously seek to alleviate future hazards. Measures available include 
acquisition and relocation, redesign or elimination of certain public infra-
structure (such as bridges or roads), the adoption of tighter building codes 
and land use regulations, and floodproofing for remaining structures. Warning 
and evacuation capabilities should be examined as well. Since adoption of the 
agreement, only two major hurricanes, Frederic (1980) and Alicia (1983), have 
significantly damaged coastal barriers. Mitigation procedures were novel in 
1980; the aftermath of Alicia should be instructive as to whether postdisaster 
recommendation are in fact followed. 
Essential to this process is advance planning and identification of "hot 
spots" that require immediate attention in the event of a disaster. According 
to Frank Petrone, Director, FEMA Region II, preparation of the 15-day mitiga-
tion report in his region strongly reflects ongoing contact between federal, 
state, and local planners and emergency managers. To start from scratch in the 
wake of a major disaster is most difficult. 
Conclusion 
This brief paper has indicated certain avenues for long-term management of 
coastal barriers. The CBRS is only a first step to limiting federal incentives 
to further barrier development. It addresses only the easiest case. The 
harder cases are those where development now exists or is in progress. CBRS 
will worsen settlement and hazard trends for such areas unless policies and 
programs are promptly modified, as outlined above, to limit federal investment 
in still developing areas. 
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COASTAL HIGH HAZARD AREA PROBLEMS 
IN MASSACHUSETTS 
Gary Clayton 
Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs 
Coastal Zone Management Program 
Introduction 
High rates of erosion as well as rapid and/or long-term inundation are 
characteristic of coastal high hazard areas in Massachusetts. The risks 
associated with these natural hazards may be substantial in areas where de-
velopment has occurred. In Massachusetts, these high hazard coastal areas are 
generally associated with barrier beaches and coastal banks. Such sedimentary 
landforms are found along all the Massachusetts coast and are continually being 
modified by physical processes including storms (northeasters and hurricanes) 
and rising sea level. 
The development now encroaching upon these coastal high hazard areas is a 
relatively recent phenomenon. An awareness of the land use history associated 
with barrier beaches and coastal banks offers an important perspective on the 
resource management problems that exist today. 
Historic Background 
The earliest European settlers of the Massachusetts coast were sustained 
by the abundant resources of the land and sea. These settlers were also wary 
of situating their homes and structures too close to the coast. As early as 
1635 they had observed serious tidal flooding along the coast during storms. 
An important event promoting the subsequent development of the coastal 
region was the development of a railroad and, eventually, the highway network. 
By the late 1800s and early 1900s shorefront resort development increased, a 
trend accelerated by the rising popularity of the automobile. Unlike the early 
coast-wise residents, summer dwellers and vacationers unfamiliar with the 
natural processes of the coast built in areas that would have been considered 
unsuitable by the early settlers. By the 1950s the edges of cliffs and dunes 
had become valuable real estate and more and more of these areas had been 
developed. Today, the seasonal housing stock in these areas is being rapidly 
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converted to year-round use. The results are problems that previous genera-
tions had not encountered. 
The response of these new shoreline dwellers to the loss or potential loss 
of property due to flooding and erosion was often the development of various 
coastal engineering structures. Each of these structures is designed to act 
either as a barrier to trap sediment being transported along shore, or as a 
wall to protect cliffs, dunes, or buildings from destructive wave action. 
Until the 1960s, engineering structures were perceived as the optimum solution 
to coastal hazards. With increased recognition of the natural processes gov-
erning coastal change came public pressure to preserve the features which 
provide the natural protection of the coast. In Massachusetts, various regula-
tory, acquisition, and planning programs have been established to address land 
use management problems associated with coastal high hazard areas. Despite 
significant progress, important problems still remain. This paper identifies 
some of the problems that remain not only in Massachusetts but in many other 
states and recommends possible solutions. 
Coastal High Hazard Problems 
Identification of Hazard Zones 
One serious difficulty associated with many mapping programs in coastal 
high hazard areas is a failure to account for the potential of relatively rapid 
changes in shoreline position. Barrier beaches and coastal banks are two 
examples where changes in the location, form, and elevation of the landforms 
can be catastrophic. In Massachusetts, some of these landforms in open coast 
areas are eroding at an annual average rate of one to three feet per year. In 
extreme cases, annual rates of retreat may exceed ten feet per year. Obvious-
ly, maps that portray high hazard boundaries such as velocity zones as static 
features are seriously flawed. 
Maps for coastal high hazard areas must reflect the dynamic nature of the 
coastline. For example, Massachusetts has initiated a comprehensive historic 
shoreline position mapping program to identify the direction and rates of 
shoreline change. These digitized data will describe three historic and one 
present-day shoreline for much of the state's 1,500 miles of tidal shoreline. 
Only shorelines that have been heavily urbanized and stabilized and the upper 
reaches of estuaries and embayments that have existed for long periods of time 
have been excluded. 
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The digitized shoreline change data provide an opportunity to utilize 
rates and trends of shoreline erosion or accretion for more effective coastal 
zone management. This information may be used for new or strengthened local 
erosion setback bylaws, Executive Orders regarding the use of state funds, and 
modifications in existing regulatory programs. Finally, it will be an impor-
tant educational tool for increasing the public's general awareness of the 
dynamic nature of the shoreline. 
Use of Fill in a Flood Zone 
Filling in coastal floodplains can often exacerbate flooding problems by 
increasing the velocity of floodwaters on adjacent properties. Filling can 
also change the direction and depth of flow, thereby inducing or intensifying 
erosion. 
Wave action in the A Zone is generally less severe. In the A Zone of 
coastal high hazard areas like barrier beaches, however, wave action and high 
velocity flow can eventually be a problem as the landform is modified by over-
wash, submergence, and new tidal inlet formation. These physical processes 
make fill undesirable in A Zones even if proper slopes are provided for the 
fill and protective measures such as riprap or vegetation are applied to sea-
ward slopes. Building codes should be modified to require all new or substan-
tially reconstructed buildings in A Zones in coastal high hazard areas to be 
elevated and firmly anchored on pilings. 
Subsurface Wastewater Disposal Systems 
Development in coastal high hazard areas may include the disposal of 
r·,sidential wastewater in subsurface disposal systems. These septic systems 
include subsurface concrete structures and pipes. In coastal high hazard areas 
these facilities can present potentially serious public health problems if they 
or their contents are exposed by erosion or flooding. In addition, the con-
crete subsurface structures that are exposed by erosion may also lead to addi-
tIonal scouring of adjacent areas if floodwaters are diverted. (A recent 
regulatory decision in Massachusetts [DEQE Wetlands File 19-188) denied con-
struction of a single-family residence on a barrier beach based on the high 
probability that the system would eventually be exposed by erosion.) Sub-
surface septic systems located in coastal banks also contribute to increased 
erosion of these areas through accelerated bank slumping caused by groundwater 
seepage. In coastal high hazard areas, board of health regulations should be 
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modified to prohibit the placement of new septic systems in the velocity zone 
or in rapidly eroding coastal banks. 
Flood Insurance 
The high risks of flooding and erosion on barrier beaches and coastal 
banks are directly reflected in the significant costs associated with repairing 
and rebuilding storm damaged structures in these areas. A study of developed 
barrier beaches in Massachusetts provides an example of the potential magnitude 
of these costs. There are approximately 2,100 structures on intensively de-
veloped barrier beaches in 29 Massachusetts coastal communities. These commu-
nities account for over half of the flood insurance policies written in the 
state and half of the $1.1 billion (1983) in flood insurance coverage for high 
hazard areas. 
The disproportionate flood insurance coverage clearly indicates the rela-
tive risk associated with development on barrier beaches. It is imprudent to 
cuntinue to subsidize insurance for new development on barrier beaches as the 
subsidies promote a costly cycle of destruction and rebuilding. Action is 
needed now to at least contain the costs associated with development in high 
hazard areas. This should include no new flood insurance coverage for 1) new 
structures; 2) substantial improvements to existing structures or; 3) struc-
tures that have been destroyed or substantially damaged. In addition, a com-
plete phaseout of the national program for direct federal flood insurance at 
subsidized rates must be accomplished. Over the past five years, the national 
program has cost the federal taxpayer approximately $140 million per year. 
Enforcement of flood insurance program regulations and federal Executive Orders 
on wetlands and floodplains needs to be vigorously pursued. 
Acquisition Program 
Public acquisition of coastal high hazard areas is one of the most effec-
tive techniques to reduce future storm damage losses while providing increased 
open space, recreation, and public access opportunities. Unfortunately, local 
and state acquisition of these areas is sometimes precluded by lack of funds. 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) offers two programs for acquir-
ing flood-damaged structures. The 1362 program allows FEMA to purchase proper-
ty from willing sellers when the insured buildings have been damaged more than 
50% in a single storm or at least 25% in three storms over a five-year period. 
The local or state government is then given the land to manage for open space 
purposes. The Constructive Total Loss (CTL) Program authorizes FEMA to pay up 
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to the full face value of the flood insurance policy in force where local 
regulations do not permit rebuilding and when the structure is in an extremely 
hazardous location. 
Even when funds are limited, governments can acquire coastal high hazard 
areas at less than fair market value by exercising foreclosures on tax delin-
quent properties. Communities can adopt a local subdivision bylaw that re-
quires developers of large parcels to place a restriction on a certain percen-
tage of that land for use only as recreation or open space. A landowner may 
also be willing to sell land to the community at a price lower than the proper-
ty's fair market value in return for a tax deduction equivalent to the 
difference. 
Coastal Barrier Resources Act 
The Congress, through the Coastal Zone Management Act, has found that the 
protection of high hazard areas serves the national interest and that states 
should be "encouraged and assisted to exercise effectively their responsibili-
ties in the coastal zone through the protection of natural resources ••• to 
help minimize the loss of life and property caused by improper development in 
flood-prone, storm surge, geological hazard and erosion-prone areas." 
The Coastal Barrier Resources Act (CRBAl represents a step toward imple-
menting this policy by prohibiting and/or discouraging further growth and 
development in coastal high hazard areas. The Act should be strengthened by 
expanding the prohibition of federal expenditures already in CBRA to other high 
ha~ard coastal resource areas. This would include floodplains, erosion-prone 
areas and coastal barriers, whether developed or undeveloped, along all coast-
lines of the United States. Other forms of federal subsidies such as casualty 
loss tax deduction for property loss in high hazard areas should also be elimi-
na~ed through CBRA. 
Public Awareness and Opinion 
Effective management of high risk flood areas requires identification and 
implementation techniques often based on scientific, engineering, and economic 
analyses. These analyses can provide a compelling justification for insti-
tuting or modifying public policy. Yet implementation of such a policy may 
f21ter or fail unless the perception and attitude of the affected population 
are adequately considered. Consequently, improving land management standards 
and other flood loss reduction measures requires more than merely developing 
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methods and guidelines. Sound floodplain management policy also addresses the 
concerns, expectations, and awareness of landowners in high risk flood areas. 
In Massachusetts public attitudes concerning coastal high hazard areas 
have been assessed in several opinion surveys. These surveys identified that a 
large percentage of landowners on developed coastal barriers are unaware of 
local evacuation plans; few of them have experienced a serious storm. Another 
survey indicated a majority of citizens across the state strongly support the 
acquisition of remaining undeveloped coastal hazard area lands for conservation 
and recreation use. The sampling results offer an opportunity to develop 
policies and target funding more effectively. 
Storm preparedness 
Storm preparedness includes addressing the problem of evacuating large 
numbers of people from hazard-prone areas when a major storm approaches. Storm 
evacuation plans for affected communities are intended to accomplish this. 
These plans, however, may not be sufficiently comprehensive especially in 
coastal areas where population growth is rapidly increasing. 
Comprehensive storm evacuation plans should be fully integrated with 
similar plans of adjacent communities, counties and sometimes nearby states. 
This can be particularly important with respect to the transportation network 
and the provision of emergency supplies and shelter. 
A comprehensive plan should also incorporate the National weather Service 
use of probabilities in hurricane forecasting. These probabilities are intend-
ed primarily for decision makers in government and private industry who must 
begin protective actions prior to 24 hours before forecasted landfall. For 
example, residents in coastal areas with very long evacuation times will have 
to begin evacuation when probabilities of a hurricane landfall are as low as 12 
to 20%. 
Comprehensive plans must also recognize that the potential for damage a~d 
loss of life from a hurricane varies greatly depending on the intensity of the 
storm. On the Atlantic seaboard, for example, hurricanes can rapidly increase 
in size and speed, moving hundreds of miles in less than 24 hours. Unfortu-
nately, even within 24 hours, forecasts of a hurricane landfall can be made 
only with a maximum probability of 50%. 
Conclusion 
Despite the significant risks to property and life, the pressure to de-
velop coastal high hazard areas is unlikely to abate. Prudent public policy 
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for these areas, however, should seek to ultimately minimize and avoid further 
loss and damage. Otherwise, the potential for extensive and recurrent storm 
damage will increase substantially. 
Immediate steps can be taken by public agencies to improve coastal hazard 
area management through planning, funding, legislative, and regulatory changes. 
These changes, some of which are suggested in this paper, do not necessarily 
require the investment of additional public funds. Effective measures can be 
implemented by redirecting or eliminating the use of public funds and resources 
for hazard-prone areas. Other techniques, such as land acquisition, will 
involve substantial public expenditures although these expenditures can be 
significantly less in the long term than if these hazard-prone areas are 
allowed to be developed. These and other measures can be part of a coastal 
hazard area management program to reduce or avoid storm damage and loss. 
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PREDISASTER PLANNING FOR 
POSTDISASTER RECONSTRUCTION 
Clark Gilman 
New Jersey Division of water Resources 
Through its Bureau of Flood Plain Management, the New Jersey Division of 
water Resources acts as the state coordinating agency for the National Flood 
Insurance Program (NFIP). A primary goal of the Bureau's program is the reduc-
tion of flood damage potential throughout New Jersey and not just within the 
coastal zone. The Bureau pursues a three-stage program aimed at reducing flood 
damage potential. The three steps or stages of this program are basically the 
same regardless of the source of the flooding, which in the coastal zone would 
be the result of storm surge combined with wave action. 
The first step is to identify hazard areas. This is accomplished by 
undertaking floodplain delineation or flood insurance studies, wave height and 
vulnerability analyses. The second step requires adoption or modification of 
municipal flood damage prevention ordinances and monitoring new construction 
and substantial improvements to existing structures to insure enforcement of 
these ordinances. The third and final step requires development of hazard 
mitigation plans to reduce the damage potential to existing structures to the 
maximum degree possible. 
Coastal storm or flood predisaster planning, or more properly flood hazard 
mitigation, of the type described as step three, has only recently been recog-
nized as a separate work element in New Jersey. This recognition is primarily 
the result of New Jersey involvement in the Coastal Storm Planning and 
Preparedness Program through which FEMA has funded vulnerability analyses of 
three of our barrier islands. The vulnerability analyses of the Atlantic 
County barrier islands, namely Absecon and Brigantine Islands and Ocean City, 
Cape May County, has indicated that most of the damage from an intense storm 
generating a 100-year surge would not be a result of the hazards identified by 
either a Flood Insurance Study or Wave Height Analysis. 
Wave runup on seawalls and timber bulkheads and waves overtopping these 
structures together with the scour and erosion caused by overwashing waves 
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appear to be the primary source of potential damage. In areas where stillwater 
surge depth exceeds 3.5 feet, flotation of unanchored or inadequately anchored 
structures will be a primary cause of damage, and battering by floating debris 
will increase damage throughout the hazard areas. 
Our vulnerability analyses have further indicated that advanced warning 
time could be quite short. The National weather Service attempts to provide 
hurricane warnings that leave 12 hours of daylight before the arrival of 
hurricane force winds and peak storm surge. These 12 hours unfortunately 
cannot be fully utilized to evacuate residents, since time is required to 
mobilize citizens, and escape routes become impassible due to flooding two to 
three hours before the peak surge occurs. These analyses have indicated that 
the area studied is highly vulnerable to loss of human life and property damage 
and is relatively unprepared to withstand a major coastal storm or intense 
hurricane. Since the find{ngs of these studies can be generally applied to 
most of the coastal areas of New Jersey, hazard mitigation has been included 
this year as a task assigned to the State Assistance Program of the NFIP and 
has been included in the Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement for Emergency 
Management Services between FEMA and the State of New Jersey. 
During the current fiscal year, members of my staff will be required to 
meet with and investigate the feasibility of developing hazard mitigation work 
plans for twenty-five New Jersey municipalities. Though this work has been 
delayed by the storms and severe flooding experienced this spring, damage 
caused by these events still should stimulate interest in this program and 
provide motivation for its implementation. 
The specific methods of mitigation being considered under this program 
are: 
1) An update of municipal Emergency Operations plans (EOPs) is needed. Our 
studies, furthermore, recommend rudimentary situation plans for individual 
structures--such as condominiums, retirement communities, and nursing 
homes--located in vulnerable areas. 
2) Though our Community Assistance and Program Evaluation activities have 
indicated that NFIP floodplain management standards are generally being 
enforced in New Jersey, more specific standards arp needed in some in-
stances. A committee of construction officials has been established to 
review and develop required detailed standards. State and FEMA repre-
sentatives are also members of this committee. 
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3) DUring the recent flooding advance warning failed to filter down to the 
citizens. It appears that a standard operating procedure must be de-
veloped and adopted by local governments to alert residents of vulnerable 
areas. 
4) Though preliminary investigation has indicated that only limited use of 
contents removal plans is feasible on barrier islands due to the limited 
amount of time available for evacuation, such plans appear to be feasible 
in other coastal municipalities and within inland municipalities that 
experience riverine flooding. 
5) Many of the older structures located within areas prone to flooding are 
either unanchored (gravity unanchored) or inadequately anchored. 
Anchorage surveys to determine which structures (particularly single-story 
timber-frame buildings) require retrofitting to properly anchor them can 
ultimately reduce damage related to flotation, lateral movement, and 
collision of floaters. 
6) Field reconnaissance within areas recently studied has identified poorly 
maintained or deteriorated seawalls and timber bulkheads in both public 
and private ownership. While the total replacement of these structures 
may be undesirable and the cost excessive, repair or reinforcement of some 
of them is feasible. The false sense of security created by seawalls and 
timber bulkheads has resulted in many structures being constructed close 
behind these barriers, where they are vulnerable to damage from wave 
runup. Establishment of adequate setbacks by local governments before the 
next storm is being encouraged. The need for setbacks can be determined 
as part of local inspection programs which also identify structures re-
quiring maintenance. 
7) Traditional flood fighting techniques are under-utilized as a way of 
reducing damages in New Jersey, primarily due to short warning times and a 
lack of plans that employ them. Planning at the present time for their 
use and stockpiling of the material required to utilize them could expand 
their use. 
8) Finally, though the purchase of flood insurance is encouraged in New 
Jersey and is the primary way in which damages are recovered, it really 
should not be considered as a mitigation technique. 
Unfortunately, the success of our prestorm mitigation program cannot be 
assessed at this time. We do feel that the techniques listed and discussed, if 
seriously considered, thoroughly investigated, and fully implemented, can save 
lives and considerably reduce storm damage, and thereby reduce the effort that 
will have to be expended during the recovery phase. 
Significant damage is undoubtedly going to occur in certain areas where 
vulnerability is the greatest. Total destruction, in fact, is almost inevi-
table should overwashing and breaching occur in some places. Long-term hazard 
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mitigation and recovery planning is, therefore, needed to develop strategies 
and ultimately to adopt policies that can be applied to these areas. 
The New Jersey Division of Coastal Resources, under the final phase of the 
Coastal Storm Planning and preparedness program, is investigating mitigation 
strategies. They have recently established steering committees within each of 
the five municipalities being studied on the Atlantic County barrier islands 
and in Ocean City, New Jersey. They plan to meet with these committees during 
the summer and prepare a report containing recommendations by the end of 
September, 1984. 
PREDISASTER PLANNING FOR 
POSTDISASTER RECONSTRUCTION 
Ruth Ehinger 
Division of Coastal Resources 
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection 
Background 
I will briefly describe the approach the Division of Coastal Resources is 
presently taking in coastal storm planning and preparedness and then focus on 
three municipalities, Brigantine in Atlantic County and Avalon and Upper 
Township in Cape May County. 
The Division is working with municipalities individually to incorporate 
coastal storm hazard mitigation into their master plans, zoning, and other 
ordinances. In part, New Jersey has taken this approach due to a lack of 
regulatory au thori ty to guide most development in these areas. All of New 
Jersey's barrier islands are densely developed, but many are redeveloping at an 
ever greater density. 
A northeaster hit the New Jersey coast on March 28 and 29, 1984, and re-
mained through two successive high tides. Besides its occurrence on average 
ti(:es of the month, the factor that saved the New Jersey coast from a possible 
nevI storm of record was the fact that after two destructive high tides, the 
wind dropped and shifted to the NNW before a third high tide. The storm was 
termed only a 10-year event, based on surge or tidal flood elevations of 8.4 
feel MLW, but resulted in damages estimated by the state at $24 million for 
sand and dune replacement and an additional $6-10 million for debris removal. 
Damage surveys have not yet been finalized. Four coastal counties were de-
cle.red disaster areas by President Reagan. The storm has increased the aware-
ness of the public and municipal officials of the storm hazards they face and 
increased their interest in and support of the Division's efforts. 
Avalon, New Jersey 
The Division of Coastal Resources began working with the Borough of Avalon 
in the late 1970s to build dunes in the community, providing technical advice, 
and sand fencing. This was followed by a grant for prestorm planning. The 
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grant provided for a geologist, Stewart Farrell from stockton State College, 
and a planner, John Sinton, to study the island's geological processes and 
storm vulnerability and devise short- and long-term hazard reduction 
strategies--including changes in building codes, dune nourishment, and zoning 
changes. Proposed changes included establishing setbacks from dunes and 
changing residential zones to conservation zones. The report is now being 
prepared for publication. It has not yet been implemented by Avalon, although 
they are agreeable to the recommended changes. 
Avalon's dune protection and restoration program has been quite success-
ful. There was Significant dune erosion in the March, 1984, storm, less than 
or similar to that throughout the state, but no structural damage. Only a two 
to three block area with no dunes in the nodal zone of the island was 
overwashed. Estimates for damages to public facilities were $44,000 for dune 
repair, $14,000 for debris removal, and $18,000 for repairing a parking lot. 
Farrell and Sinton recommended that this parking lot be fronted with a 
protective dune due to its vulnerability, and it has been recommended by the 
Hazard Mitigation Team that disaster aid funds be so conditioned. 
Brigantine, New Jersey 
At present, the Division is working with six municipalities, including 
Brigantine, Atlantic City, and Ocean City, under a FEMA funded program. The 
Division has reviewed a variety of hazard mitigation strategies in use thro'l''lh-
out the country and presented them to municipal steering committees with the 
goal of incorporating such techniques at the municipal level. Evacuation 
concerns are being addressed separately. I will use Brigantine as an example. 
Brigantine is a developed barrier island in Atlantic County, which is 
accreting at the southern,end due to stabilization of Absecon Inlet by a large 
jetty (3,730 feet long) built in the 1950s and incrementally extended in the 
early and mid-1960s. Wide dune fields have grown in one portion of the island. 
However, the northern end of the city is experiencing erosion and has narrower 
beaches, little dune protection, and therefore is bulkheaded. The erosion rate 
in this section is on the order of three to five feet per year. In the early 
1900s a now abandoned hotel was 1,000 feet from the beach. We are most 
concerned about the north end of town in the narrowing section of the island. 
Many areas were overwashed during the March, 1984, northeaster. The damage 
survey reports for public facilities eligible for federal disaster aid funds 
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were surveyed at approximately $1 million, about $800,000 of which was for dune 
fencing and restoration. 
The Brigantine hazard mitigation steering committee is composed of the 
mayor, two commissioners, the city administrator, engineer and emergency 
manager, and the county planner. 
At our first meeting, the vulnerability analysis prepared by the Bureau of 
Floodplain Management was presented. The vulnerability map and report were 
used in conjunction with the shoreline change map, and photographs of New 
Jersey's last major destructive storm (March, 1962) in discussing and identify-
ing hazards. The vulnerability map indicates the presence of high hazard 
areas, wave runup zones, flotation zones, and structures with evacuation 
problems. 
We superimposed the city zoning map on the vulnerability map for use by 
the committee in considering zoning problems and changes needed. This pointed 
out the high risk areas presently zoned for high density residential use. 
zoning and master plan changes are a major focus of the effort. Among 
these changes are widening of the oceanfront conservation zones and establish-
ment of setbacks. The present conservation zones consist of most beach and 
dune areas. Extension of this zone to allow dune migration or creation is 
essential to protect property. In addition, areas are being identified where 
dunes can be augmented and dune cuts eliminated or reoriented to the southeast. 
Trading of low density uses for high density is also being considered, as is 
establishment of seasonal recreational uses rather than year-round residential 
use. 
Specific consideration is being given to identifying target poststorm 
acquisition areas and areas where destroyed infrastructure should not be re-
built. Anchoring of homes in flotation zones and elevation of low homes are 
also being pursued; the construction official will be recommending needed 
changes to the uniform construction code. The local steering committee will be 
reviewing the hazard mitigation techniques and vulnerability maps prior to our 
second meeting next month when specific applications will be discussed. 
One possible result of this effort would be the expansion of the conserva-
tion zone, establishment of setbacks, abandonment of a segment of road, and 
rezoning. Several more workshops are planned throughout the summer to discuss 
and evaluate specific proposals. The Division will prepare a report containing 
recommendations this fall. ultimately, the municipality will decide what 
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mitigation measures to adopt, allowing it to better face and recover from the 
next major storm. 
Upper Township, New Jersey 
Another hazard mitigation planning effort is beginning in Upper Township, 
Cape May County. This municipality consists of mainland and a barrier island 
segment. The municipality and the Division of Coastal Resources are presently 
negotiating a contract for the township to study the use of Transfer of 
Development Rights (TDR) as a hazard mitigation technique. TDR involves the 
establishment of conservation zones with attendant development rights and the 
establishment of receiving or transfer zones where development rights can be 
purchased to exceed the zoned density. In the context of storm hazard mitiga-
tion, high-hazard, high-erosion areas would be designated preservation zones 
and safer areas as receiving zones. 
The barrier island portion of Upper Township is heavily developed. The 
Whale Beach area is about 200' wide and less than 10' (MSL) in elevation; most 
is in the V zone. The high water line has moved inland at the rate of 
approximately five feet per year since it was first mapped by the USCGS in 
1842. A more recent erosion rate of 2.8m3/m/yr from 1963-1972 was established 
in 1978. 
The March, 1962, storm devastated the island, requiring the building of 
6.5 miles of emergency dunes costing over $1 million. six shore protection 
projects, both groins and beachfill, were undertaken at Whale Beach between 
1964 and 1983 at a cost of nearly $1.7 million. A $3 million beachfill project 
is proposed for 1985. Whale Beach was overwashed in the March, 1984, storm; 
Ocean Avenue covered by approximately four feet of sand; and the few dunes 
present lost. Damages were estimated at $400,000 to replace the dunes alone. 
There is presently very little to no beach at high tide. 
The excessive costs to protect Whale Beach, the relatively low number of 
structures located on that section of the island (about 80 single family homes 
and 20 condominium units), and the extreme high risk to people and property in 
the area have led the state and municipality to look for alternative solutions. 
The proposed study will evaluate the feasibility of TDR. The Whale Beach area 
and perhaps high hazard portions of Strathmere could be designated 
conservation/recreation zones and mainland portions of Upper Township would 
become receiving zones. 
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The study will explore TDR in terms of market considerations, equity for 
landowners in the preservation district, evaluation of transfer zones and 
availability of infrastructure, and economic benefits--cost savings and 
avoidances. The approach is attractive as it would ideally eliminate develop-
ment in the high hazard area, greatly reduce federal, state, and local 
spending, and monetarily compensate property owners for not developing or 
redeveloping their property. This effort has been supported by the Interagency 
Hazard Mitigation Team assembled in response to the Presidential Disaster 
Declaration of March, 1984. The Team's 15-day report recommends that an 
acquisition/relocation project be implemented for the area, changing the use 
from single family residential to open-space/recreational. TDR is one 
suggested means of financing this change. 
Summary 
The Division of Coastal Resources is pursuing predisaster planning on an 
individual basis with municipalities and has found interest and support from 
those towns, along with a desire to utilize the state's technical expertise. 
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ASSESSING COMMUNITY FLOOD MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY 
Cynthia J. Rummel 
Senior Environmental Analyst 
Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection 
Background 
The management of coastal high hazard areas generally brings to mind the 
Gulf states ~nd southeastern coastal regions. The Connecticut shoreline has 
not experienced a multitude of hurricane events, but nonetheless has been and 
remains vulnerable to such occurrences. A long period has elapsed since the 
last major storm struck Connecticut's coast. Unfortunately, from a state flood 
management point of view, this has resulted in a general feeling of apathy and 
disinterest to hurricane preparedness among the shoreline municipal officials. 
In a local newspaper article about the State's flood management program they 
claimed, "The sea is not furious here. Cottages nestled as close to the water 
line as possible in Old Lyme and Old Saybrook are testimony to owner's faith in 
the stability of Long Island Sound's waters." 
An interesting contrast is found in the following description of those 
same waters written on September 23, 1938. 
Millions of dollars in property damage and heavy loss of life, despite 
examples of heroism and fortitude wrote finis to the 1938 season at the 
various Connecticut shore resorts strung along Long Island Sound. Surf 
which did not wait for high tide to top sea walls, rushing waters which 
twisted and tore cottages from their foundations, floated furniture into 
ditches and boats onto highways caused monetary loss which chaotic highway 
and communication conditions Thursday made it impossible to estimate. A 
long list of persons unreported or known to be missing held an ominous 
threat for the expansion of a long casualty list. 
The shoreline has not suffered a major coastal storm in approximately 
thirty years but during that period has undergone intensive development. These 
factors led two years ago to an inventory of coastal flood damage potential 
along Connecticut's shoreline. The results showed that 40,000 structures are 
located in flood hazard areas, 4,000 of them in the coastal V Zone. A major 
coastal storm hitting Connecticut could potentially cause millions and millions 
of dollars in damages and could severely disrupt the state's economy. These 
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findings led to the development of a municipal assistance program designed to 
document and upgrade local ability to deal with flood events. 
The Municipal Assistance Program consisted of several elements. First, 
after completing the inventory of flood-prone structures, "municipal profiles" 
were developed for each of Connecticut's 25 coastal towns. They included the 
names of local officials who would be key players in flood preparedness and 
response activities; a survey of the population and structures occurring within 
flood zones; the town's history of flooding; flood studies that had been com-
pleted; a list of flood control structures and projects' flood warning systems; 
the status of Emergency Operations Plans; an analysis of public ownership in 
flood zones; National Flood Insurance policy and claims data; and a survey of 
watercourses, impoundments, wetlands, dams, bridges, marinas, utilities, and 
water supply information. 
Second, local zoning regulations governing floodplains were reviewed. 
Next, existing emergency operations plans were reviewed and carefully 
evaluated, looking specifically for flood preparedness and flood mitigation 
measures. 
Finally, additional flood insurance needs were identified; local road, 
bridge, and culvert design standards and stormwater management plans were 
examined; and the feasibility of acquiring flood-prone areas was explored. 
Results 
Are Connecticut's communities prepared for a major coastal storm? In 
working with the coastal towns, we found a great diversity in levels of pre-
paredness. Those communities that seem best prepared are either those that 
experience frequent "nuisance" flooding or those that have the highest proper-
ty values, and even these towns have welcomed our assistance. 
The City of Milford has 600 buildings (including a number of apartments 
and condominiums) on the direct shoreline, many of which flood practically 
every time high tide rolls in. Milford heeded our suggestion that they write a 
flood annex to their emergency operations plan, and now has an extensive and 
very specific warning and evacuation plan. 
Westport, one of our "gold coast" towns, has an extremely well prepared 
and well-equipped emergency response team. Their police and fire departments 
have access to amphibious vehicles, maintain a list of every handicapped and 
elderly resident who may need assistance in evacuation, and stage regularly 
scheduled drills. While they appear to be very well prepared in emergency 
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response, they are seriously considering some of our other suggestions. After 
reviewing our assessment, the Public Works Director wrote to his First 
selectman: 
The recommendation that the Town develop a Comprehensive Drainage plan is 
one that should be given much consideration. The Town has never developed 
a comprehensive plan for handling all storm drainage. This could be 
costly, but also could save the Town money by having developers provide 
drainage projects that fit a Town wide plan. Our small drainage projects 
are often a band-aid approach; a comprehensive plan would tie everything 
together. 
Stamford, the home of many corporate world headquarters, became the first 
municipality in the state to install an automated flood warning system. The 
results of our inventory played a role in their securement of financing for 
this effort. Stamford furthermore requires that an evacuation plan be sub-
mitted with any proposal for an office building or multifamily housing unit to 
be constructed within a flood zone, and has used our recommendations as guide-
lines in reviewing such plans. 
At the other end of the spectrum are the town officials who rely on the 
cmll"lon sense and "go-wi th-the-flow" approach to flood management. One town 
se'.ectman, when asked about his Emergency Operations Plan, was "quite" sure 
that his Civil Defense Director had some sort of "plan" stashed somewhere. He 
then concluded that since his CD Director worked a long distance from town, he 
likely would be unavailable during an emergency anyway. 
Most towns fall somewhere in the middle of this range. They do maintain 
10(,,11 emergency operations plans which are updated every two years (as required 
by the State Office of Civil Preparedness), but these plans address nuclear 
considerations and not natural disasters. 
Many local officials simply do not perceive coastal flooding as an issue 
that demands much attention or planning and, therefore, do not address it. 
Coastal flooding occurs infrequently in Connecticut. The federal and state 
governments have historically done a good job of funding disaster assistance 
and recovery, and the events are forgotten within a surprisingly short period 
of time. While these towns have not developed planning that addresses coastal 
flooding, there was not a single local official who was not extremely confident 
that his or her town could prevent loss of life in most any situation. So, in 
summary, while the towns are prepared to undertake life saving actions, with 
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very few exceptions they are unprepared to implement any measures to reduce or 
minimize property losses. 
Deficiencies 
What are the most serious deficiencies? Inadequate coastal flood warning 
has to top the list. While most local officials are confident that, in hurri-
cane situations, the National Weather Service would provide more than adequate 
warning, they feel strongly that the more frequently occurring "Northeasters" 
will never be predicted. Even minor coastal floods have proven that either the 
warning simplY is not there, or if a warning is available, it will likely not 
reflect the extent of flooding which will ultimately occur. 
Last March, I visited the Mayor and civil preparedness Director of Milford 
after that city sustained over $1 million in private property damages from a 
"minor" coastal winter storm. When I asked what kind of warning time they 
received, they replied, " We're still waiting!" When the Mayor called a local 
radio station to encourage public cooperation with evacuations the station 
personnel doubted the validity of the information, as most of Connecticut was 
unaware that a serious storm was underway. While Connecticut is presently 
installing a statewide automated flood warning system, the system will not 
adequately address coastal flood warning, at least in the first few years. 
Another area of concern is that of floodplain zoning. While zoning regu-
lations in all coastal towns were found to be adequate and consistent with 
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) standards, enforcement was very often 
lacking. Some towns admitted they had problems requiring a new structure to be 
elevated to base flood elevation when surrounding existing buildings are much 
lower. Other towns seem to do a fairly good job of either ignoring the regu-
lations or misinterpreting them. One of the coastal towns indicated to us that 
the only way to correct this problem would be to have either the state or 
federal government provide better "watchdog" service, and require quarterly or 
even monthly reports (vs. annual reports) on building permits granted in flood 
zones. They expressed doubt that the annual reports they submit to FEMA are 
ever even reviewed. 
Public awareness, or rather lack thereof, of storm damage potential was a 
major problem, and this resulted in inadequate flood insurance coverage. The 
Municipal Assistance Program included a public awareness section, in which 
questionnaires regarding flood preparedness were distributed to a representa-
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tive sample of coastal homeowners. Fifty percent of the respondents had pur-
chased their coastal property within the last ten years and had never witnessed 
a major coastal storm. It appears that many of these individuals believe that 
the "abnormally" high tides and routine street flooding they have experienced 
represent the extent of the effects of a coastal storm. Even the folks who had 
lived through the 1938 and 1950s storms appear not to have been in the major 
damage centers, and, surprisingly, from their responses, seem no better pre-
pared than the newcomers. 
As a result, flood insurance coverage hit a low of 17% of the structures 
subject to the 100-year flood in one town, with the average coverage being 58%. 
When we distributed our questionnaires, we had homeowners write back who had 
not even heard of the National Flood Insurance Program; and our office was 
instrumental in the actual sale of approximately one hundred policies. other 
property owners expressed disinterest in the NFIP because the maximum coverage 
limits only approached a fraction of the true value of their real estate. 
These people must be made to understand that the chances of a flood completely 
destroying their property are small, and that, in most cases, the flood insur-
ance will cover the losses sustained. 
This problem must be addressed through a more aggressive and continuing 
public awareness program. While the Connecticut program involved questionnaire 
distribution and display exhibits, we were able to reach only a small percent-
age of the population who may be affected. This year we plan to work directly 
wi.th the beach associations along Connecticut's coast, arranging informational 
meetings and distributing information through them. In addition, we are con-
sidering providing "flood audits" to interested homeowners. The flood audits 
would be similar to energy audits performed in New England; the home would be 
inspected and specific recommendations made to the property owner that would 
minimize future flood losses. 
Conclusion 
The Municipal Assistance Program has proved to be valuable in a number of 
ways. The towns are working with our recommendations and are taking steps to 
improve their local flood management programs. The communities, for the most 
part, seem eager to do the best job they can but have had neither the personnel 
nor the expertise to develop comprehensive programs. At the state level, we 
have taken care of much of the legwork and have spelled out specific measures 
for local governments to take--providing a good deal of initiative for local 
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action. In addition, this program has gone a long way in improving state/ 
municipal liaison. 
staffing and budget limitations will certainly preclude the implementation 
of some aspects of this program and will, therefore, force us to seek "creative 
financing." One possible source that we are optimistic about in Connecticut 
(and may be applicable in a number of states) is the Integrated Emergency 
Management System. The preliminary analysis of hazards in Connecticut clearly 
identified flooding as the number one hazard. It is hoped that this finding 
will result in the channeling of additional resources towards flood prepared-
ness planning. 
Finally, this program has been successful in convincing the towns that 
the state has documented and is well aware of the coastal flood hazard poten-
tial. Even more importantly, by providing specific measures the locals can 
take to reduce flood losses, the state has assured that the towns cannot claim 
ignorance of flood management techniques when the flood occurs. This is a very 
important consideration given the shift of responsibility for flood prepared-
ness and recovery from the federal to the state and local governments. 
PROBLEMS AND APPROACHES IN MAPPING VELOCITY 
ALONG THE U.S. COASTLINE 
Christopher D. Miller 
Bernard Johnson, Incorporated 
Introduction 
In the coastal zone, storm effects are varied and complex. Not only do 
the high velocity water associated with surge and waves challenge the structur-
al integrity of buildings, but also the erodibility of the shore itself can be 
a cause of structural degradation or failure. The hazard potential of a site is 
further complicated when coastal protective devices are present (e.g., sea-
walls, groins, and breakwaters.) 
To assess the absolute, or total, hazard requires that the interactions 
water~~sediment~~structure~~water be understood and quantified. 
Specification of the water motion (e.g., surge elevations and currents, wave 
heights and runup) on a nonerodible shoreline in the absence of human-made 
structures can be accomplished with a reasonable degree of accuracy. When the 
movement of the sediment and the modification of the flow by structures are 
included, such a specification becomes much more inexact. That is, the inter-
actions can neither be described nor modeled in minute detail. Approximations 
are required. 
A few examples illustrate the nature of these interactions. When a shore-
line is attacked by waves, waves running up the front face of the dunes exca-
vate material and transport it offshore. The consequent shoaling and flatten-
ing of the beach profile seaward of the dune reduce the height of the incoming 
waves and the rate of dune erosion. This type of feedback mechanism is common. 
A groin, whose purpose is to stabilize the shoreline (at least locally) can, 
because of its blocking action, induce a rip current. This narrow jet of water 
may transport sediment seaward and scour a channel parallel to the groin. 
Upland property could be destabilized and larger waves allowed to impact the 
groin. When coastal areas are filled in and bulkheaded for development (e.g., 
backshore lagoons and marshes) surge waters can no longer disperse their energy 
at low velocity over a wide area. Rather, the channelization funnels and 
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intensifies the surge currents. Scour and possible undermining of structures 
result. 
How these and other interactions evolve over the course of a storm is only 
partly understood. The easiest study approach is to combine poststorm obser-
vations (beach profiles, location and degree of damage) with gross storm 
characteristics (peak surge level, significant wave height) to develop predic-
tive relationships among the governing physical parameters. Even this "easy" 
approach has not realized its full potential. 
In conducting flood insurance studies, the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) has attempted to strike a balance between ease of implementation 
and level of technical sophistication. The goal has been to provide a reason-
able description of the hazard and to do so in a uniform, evenhanded manner 
along the entire u.S. coastline. At the same time it has been recognized that 
science does not have all the tools necessary to accurately and economically 
predict the full range of storm hazards. Of necessity, FEMA's technical 
procedures have evolved gradually over the past decade as the program has 
become more established and the scientific community has been stimulated to 
study coastal phenomena in greater detail. Limitations in the past have 
related to the practical implementation of such a broadly based program and to 
gaps in our knowledge of the physical processes governing the coastal zone. 
Although these two considerations still pertain today, technical pro-
cedures have become more comprehensive and more defensible. The storm surge 
hydrodynamic model has advanced in sophistication; wave heights and wave runup 
have been incorporated in the "base flood elevation; n be'ach and dune erosion 
are being considered to some extent. The flood insurance program has also 
responded to local conditions. One example is the prediction of wave runup in 
the northeast U.S.; previously only the stillwater (surge) elevations were 
computed, and these levels consistently fell below the observed storm damage. 
Now with the inclusion of wave runup, the predicted upland penetration of high 
velocity water more closely mirrors historical observations. Erosion has 
always presented a problem for program implementation. This is because of its 
multifaceted nature and our scientific ignorance about how moving water and 
sediment interact. Recently some quantitative approaches have been introduced 
to partially address this deficiency (Tayfun et al., 1979; Balsillie, 1982; 
Vellinga, 1983). 
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Erosion--Approaches and Constraints 
Not all aspects of surge and wave-induced erosion can realistically be 
accommodated in a flood insurance study. Erosion due to currents is to be 
differentiated from erosion due to direct wave action; scour at the base of a 
structure is different from scour at the base of a dune; the dramatic short-
term erosion experienced during a single storm may contrast with a long-term 
trend of accretion for a particular segment of the shoreline. FEMA has taken 
some first tentative steps to account for the phenomenon. However, because 
FEMA's mandate is to establish flood elevations, all the nuances of the erosion 
phenomenon are beyond the scope of the flood insurance studies. An eroded 
ground profile is the starting point for the computation of wave crest eleva-
tions; the direct impact of the erosion itself on a structure is not the focus 
of attention. 
Consideration of erosion at all represents a significant leap forward. 
Since FEMA's objective has been to establish minimum national criteria, it is 
incumbent on the individual states and communities to provide the detailed 
analyses and engineering criteria necessary for the siting and design of build-
ings in their respective localities. 
Some of the kinds of erosion are described below: 
1) Wave-induced buildup of pore pressure internally in soils may lead to 
liquefaction, i.e. the soil behaving like a fluid. 
2) Currents associated with the surge can cause scour around the foundation 
of buildings and breaching of low-lying sections of barrier islands. In 
backshore areas the storage of surge water during a storm can eventually 
lead to the formation of strong currents directed toward the backside of 
the barrier island when onshore winds cease and/or reverse direction 
(Leatherman, 1983; Miller, 1983; Miller and Bachman, 1984). Channels and 
other rigid human-made structures may exacerbate these flows. 
The primary objective of coastal flood studies is to predict water 
elevations, not currents, although the two are mutually dependent. 
Currents may be examined during the model calibration process (i.e. evalu-
ation of the capability of a hydrodynamic surge model to reproduce 
observed elevations), but no hazard assessment is made based on the magni-
tude of these currents. In addition, in areas inland from the open coast, 
the water motion is usually resolved at a scale of about one mile; the 
effect of physical features (either natural or human-made) with dimensions 
less than this may not be revealed by the modeling. 
3) Scour at the base of a seawall (or other protective structure), or removal 
of supporting backfill by overtopping waves, can undermine the structure 
and allow higher waves and progressive erosion to threaten upland 
buildings. 
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4) Deposition of sand or debris under an elevated building, as might Occur 
because of overwash, would restrict water flow underneath the building and 
concentrate wave energy on the structure. 
5) An inlet prone to migration or erosion may be destablized during a storm. 
The large volume of high velocity water that is conveyed could erode the 
banks of the inlet. Additionally, accumulation of littoral drift on the 
updrift side of the inlet would favor erosion of the downdrift shore and a 
net migration of the inlet. Erosion or inlet migration of modest propor-
tions could endanger nearshore development. 
6) Shorelines are ephemeral. They are subject to change on short and long 
time scales. There are reversible seasonal changes; reversible and 
irreversible long-term trends (e.g. end points of a barrier island 
eroding, or retreating; the middle section of the island accreting, or 
prograding such as on Kiawah Island, South Carolina); and episodic changes 
due to individual storms. Summer beach profiles are obviously more appro-
priate for a determination of velocity zones due to hurricanes; winter 
beach profiles are more appropriate for northeasters. 
Data on the long-term rate of change of U.S. shorelines, including 
the Great Lakes, have been assembled (May et al., 1982; Dolan et al., 
1983). This data set, which draws upon various individual and organiza-
tional sources for 1,689 coastal sites, is designed for presentation as a 
series of U.S. Geological Survey maps at a 1 :2,000,000 scale. The origi-
nal rate-of-change data on 3-minute grid cells, and statistical summaries, 
are provided in a Computerized Erosion Information System (CEIS) at the 
University of Virginia. (More detailed local information is available 
from other sources, e.g. Benton, 1983). 
The Atlantic and Gulf coasts are experiencing long-term shoreline re-
cession rates of 0.8 and 1.8 meters/year. The Pacific Coast has a 
recession rate of only .005 meter/year. These are averages. Not all 
coasts are eroding; some are accreting (e.g. the rocky shores of Maine, 
and parts of South Carolina). 
Arguments have been made that risk assessment should acknowledge the 
fact that not all barrier islands are created equal (Hayes et al., 1981). 
Many of the barrier islands of South Carolina have been categorized as 
"regressive", i.e. developed through the seaward accretion of beach 
ridges/land-based sediments, which are deposited atop more seaward sedi-
ments (Nummedal, 1983). In contrast, "transgressive" (landward moving) 
barriers have formed seaward of the mainland on the continental shelf 
during a period of lower water and have migrated shoreward as the water 
level rose (e.g. the Outer Banks of North Carolina). 
A stable or growing barrier island is one for which the vertical rate 
of sedimentation (material supplied by rivers, for instance) exceeds the 
rate of sea level rise. In the case of an eroding barrier the balance has 
swung the other way. In other words, a shoreline may actually build 
seaward even though sea level is rising. From this observation one can 
argue that a setback line for development must incorporate local dynamics. 
The shore adjacent to an inlet may be unstable, but toward the central 
portion of the island long-term stability could pertain. 
Long-term erosion or accretion is a response to storm surge and 
waves, aeolian (wind transport) processes, rising sea level, and littoral 
transport mechanisms (rivers, wave-induced longshore currents, inlet tidal 
flows). Delineation of these trends and fluctuation is important when 
establishing setback lines for development. However, the task is often 
difficult because long-term trends can be masked by short-term fluctua-
tions and patterns of erosion/accretion can migrate alongshore. In flood 
insurance studies analyses are performed with a topography that is con-
temporary (as best as can be estimated with available maps) or is the 
expected shape of the landform immediately following the 100-year storm 
event. Realistically, long-term shoreline changes can only be accommo-
dated by adjusting study results periodically. 
7) The scour/undermining of dunes is a dramatic short-term event. Because it 
occurs coincident with the surge and waves generated by a storm, the 
inland propagation of the surge and the maximum attainable wave height are 
functions of the rate of erosion of the dune field. Therefore, specifica-
tion of the "base flood elevation" must include this interaction. various 
approaches have been adopted. The method most widely used at this time is 
historical reference--examining pre- and post-storm beach profiles to 
identify shoreline adjustments to severe storms. An example is the beach 
profile data gathered in Alabama after Hurricane Frederic. This method is 
obviously limited by the availability and quality of historical data. A 
variation on this technique is to assume that a reasonable erosion profile 
is obtained by drawing a line from the toe of the dune to the point on the 
leeside of the dune where the first slope break occurs. A more general 
approach, based on field observations and laboratory experiments, has been 
applied in North Carolina (Tayfun et al., 1979; Tetra Tech, 1983; Hodges 
et al., 1984) following the work of Edelman (1968, 1970). The method 
assumes that dune material is deposited directly offshore, and, con-
sequently, the volume of sediment eroded from the dune equals the volume 
of deposition. Beach slopes are reduced (flattened) by a set factor. 
Recent work by Vellinga (1983, 1984) offers the prospect that the shape 
of the eroded profile (slopes) can be adjusted on a site-specific basis as 
a function of the sediment size. 
The drawback of these methodologies is that they are not explicitly 
designed for the case of surge overtopping, i.e. cases in which the storm 
surge level is above the crest of the dune. Practical modifications have 
been made to model this case (Hodges et al., 1984), although the results 
are only indicative of the erosion pattern to be expected. The transition 
to onshore sand transport (washover) is not accounted for. Investigations 
parallel to those in North Carolina have been undertaken in Florida 
(Balsillie, 1982; 1983). 
Scour of the beach and dunes is a process that cannot be ignored in 
flood insurance studies. scour was a major damage factor--second only to 
wind--during Hurricane Alicia, a moderate storm that struck the Galveston-
Houston area in 1983 (Miller, 1983). Once it was recognized that storm 
waves were capable of inflicting substantial damage, the establishment of 
V Zones was undertaken. There have been and continue to be problems in 
identifying and delineating this special hazard; however, as the work has 
proceeded the gap between problems and solutions has gradually narrowed. 
The incorporation of beach and dune erosion can be expected to follow a 
similar path. At the moment a uniform approach is not forthcoming. The 
effort should be made to sift through and synthesize the various data and 
methods. What is required is a comparison and consolidation of the 
several pieces of work that exist today--the scientific stUdies and the 
procedures that some states have already implemented. The increased 
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interest in erosion mandates that more sophisticated thinking be brought 
to bear on the problem. 
All of the erosion categories described above are worthy of further atten-
tion and study. However, the diversity and subtleties of the erosion phenomena 
defy complete analysis. Of the seven (nonexclusive) categories identified, 
only category seven can be implemented with some degree of confidence. Never-
theless, FEMA should work with and encourage coastal states in their efforts to 
quantify the erosion potential in all its aspects and to establish appropriate 
setback or land use criteria. 
Coastal Structures--Protection versus Hazard 
When protective structures are placed in the coastal zones (e.g., sea-
walls, groins, breakwaters, bulkheads, beach fill) some disturbance of the 
balance among waves, currents, and sediment is inevitable. The natural forces 
will tend to realign themselves to accommodate the presence of the structure. 
Although ambivalent feelings are often expressed about the benefits to be 
gained with the use of such structures, it can probably be stated that the 
adverse effects generally outweigh the benefits. However, there are several 
exceptions. When an absolute need, or some other justification (usually eco-
nomic) exists, then a structure may be considered. A nuclear power plant, with 
its cooling requirements, has to be sited where large quantities of water are 
available; an established development may have to be "retrofitted" with a 
floodwall because current protection proves inadequate; a resort area that 
anchors a community economically may require periodic renourishment of its 
beaches or maintenance of its shorefront facilities; a port or harbor needs 
jetties to stabilize an inlet for navigation or a breakwater to intercept and 
reduce wave action. 
In assessing the protection afforded by coastal structures there are 
several considerations (and potential unknowns): 
1) Was the structure designed for a 10-year storm? a 100-year storm? 
2) Is the design adequate for the specified design period? Were construction 
procedures adequate? 
3) Is this a major structure or does it protect only a narrow stretch of the 
shoreline (e.g., one residence)? What is the diversity and density of 
structures along the shore? 
4) To what degree does the structure destabilize the beach or ground around 
it? 
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During Hurricane Alicia the failure of oceanfront bulkheads and grade 
slabs on Galveston Island was fairly common (Miller, 1983). These bulkheads 
were obviously not designed for a severe storm. In contrast, on the same 
island sits the Galveston seawall, a formidable structure built to withstand 
severe stresses. Large, publicly funded projects, like the Galveston seawall, 
have a built-in risk factor that is usually predictable. Small and/or private-
ly funded projects are less likely to have design and construction criteria 
that can be easily accessed and evaluated. Therefore, it becomes problematic 
how to assess the vulnerability of individual structures to a 100-year storm. 
The problem is compounded when the structure varies in design and type 
from point to point along the shore. For example, one homeowner may elect to 
protect his property with a stone revetment; his neighbor may rely upon a 
timber bulkhead. Each protective device has different dimensions and surviva-
bility. In both cases, however, the 100-year storm will probably exceed the 
structures' design thresholds. In fact, parts of the structures could become 
projectiles during a storm, endangering the residences they were presumed to 
protect. During design this presumption can promote a false sense of security 
and lead to insufficient setback of the residence. 
Ideally, each protective structure along the shore should be individually 
certified by an engineer. In practice this is not entirely feasible in flood 
insurance mapping where a broader brush stroke is applied. If, for instance, a 
group of protective structures is shown or assumed to remain intact during an 
extreme storm and their top elevations do not vary appreciably one from the 
other, then they may be treated as a single structure for the purposes of 
computing wave heights. 
The creation or renourishment of a beach is a nonstructural protective 
device. The elevation of the beach berm will control the maximum heights of 
the wave that propagates inland. Losses and reworking of the placed fill mean 
that the shoreline and the beach profile vary over time. Fill projects are 
often characterized by relatively rapid loss or migration of material (both 
offshore and alongshore), especially in the initial stages of the project. If 
these losses have been accommodated in the design and/or periodic renourishment 
is scheduled, then it may be possible to define a "stable" berm elevation. 
However, the art of beach design and the prediction of maintenance requirements 
is still rather primitive. More comprehensive measurement programs are needed 
to be able to identify those conditions for which an efficient design is 
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possible. If a beach has demonstrated stability over a number of years, then 
that beach configuration can be the starting point for the V Zone 
determination. 
The destabilizing influence of solid structures on contiguous sediments 
has been alluded to earlier. Immobile, nonyielding structures can concentrate 
flows and intensify local scour. The beach profile tends to deepen at the base 
of a seawall. This in turn could precipitate structural failure during a 
storm. A seawall that is not properly tied back into the shore at its end 
points may be flanked by wave action and undermined. In California, winter 
storms require that periodic reconstruction of destroyed seawalls and bulkheads 
be undertaken. Along these same lines, it appears that in some cases a family 
of groins will induce a steepening of the offshore beach profile, permitting 
larger waves to approach the shore and promoting offshore transport of beach 
sediment. Because solid structures inhibit the natural transfer of material 
between the beach and the offshore area, a disequilibrium can occur whereby 
additional erosion of adjacent, unprotected shorelines is required to re-
establish the sediment balance in the nearshore area. Thus, the presence of a 
seawall can enhance the local rates of erosion (Walton and Sensabaugh, 1976). 
In North Carolina there is a policy to disallow any shore hardening and a 
special setback to account for the immobility of structures. 
Are there situations in which coastal structures provide a level of pro-
tection that would otherwise be absent? Certainly a well-engineered structure 
will protect the property behind it. Seawalls will break the incoming waves, 
as will an offshore breakwater or a shore-attached breakwater. FEMA's wave 
height method accounts for wave transmission over thin, human-made barriers 
(seawalls, floodwalls) but not over or around more massive structures such as 
breakwaters. Wave runup on sloping revetment structures mayor may not be 
considered depending on the level of detail brought to the study. A groin, 
because it is oriented perpendicular to the shoreline, does not supply appre--
ciable protection against waves arriving perpendicular to the shore. With 
respect to its sediment gathering capability, a groin has a differential effect 
on the shoreline, causing accretion in one area but erosion elsewhere. There 
are special cases in which groins can have a long-term beneficial effect. 
Sediment that is being lost from the tip of an island due to longshore drift 
may be retained by the placement of a single groin. Since the sediment was not 
feeding downdrift beaches, no detrimental effect ensues. Considerations like 
Miller 
this are somewhat academic, since it is a "snapshot" (not a history) of the 
beach and shoreline that is incorporated in the V Zone calculations. 
Summary 
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The impacts of erosion and structures on the determination of V Zones have 
just begun to be explored and quantified. This is partly due to program con-
straints (the inclusion of wave heights alone was, and is, a formidable under-
taking) and partly due to the state of the science. variations on the water-
structure-sediment interaction theme defy current analysis. Some have been 
discussed here, others may be important. It is imperative that there be in-
ternal consistency in the methods to compute V Zones. With respect to erosion, 
in particular, the establishment of a uniform procedure(s) is needed. As the 
study guidelines are routinely updated, they should be made more explicit 
concerning the options available to the study contractor, conditions that 
require special attention, and procedures to be followed. 
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EROSION RATES AND HAZARD MAPPING IN 
COASTAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
David W. OWens 
Director, Office of Coastal Management 
North Carolina Department of Natural Resources 
and Community Development 
Introduction 
Developing a clear delineation of natural hazards is an essential element 
in coastal resource management. Knowing the magnitude, frequency, and impacts 
of various natural hazards is a necessity in properly managing development 
aloDg the coast. It is therefore important that data gath~ring and analysis on 
hazards be an integral part of a management system to insure that the necessary 
information is available and that it meets the legal and political needs of the 
management program. 
In the North Carolina coastal management program, properly managing devel-
opment in natural hazard areas has long been a principal goal. The state's 
Coastal Resources Commission, in adopting its standards for development along 
Norch Carolina's 320 miles of ocean beaches, set three specific objectives for 
its oceanfront development: 
1) Minimizing the loss of life and property; 
2) Reducing the encroachment of permanent structures onto the active beach 
system; and 
3) Reducing the public costs of improper development, particularly the costs 
of disaster relief, infrastructure repair and replacement, flood insurance 
losses, and income tax losses through casualty loss deductions. 
Operating primarily through the regulatory and planning provisions of the 
Coastal Area Management Act, the state actively manages the location and design 
of new coastal development to meet these three objectives. 
In order to successfully implement such a management program, accurate 
information on natural hazards is necessary. In determining how large an 
oceanfront setback to adopt and how stringent building design and construction 
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standards should be, the Commission had to secure accurate hazard delineation 
data. 
To be used in such a management program, hazards data have to meet three 
standards. First, they must be realistic. If they are not accurate, the 
management system that is based on them will be ineffective. It is critical to 
test hazards data not only against academic models, but also against past 
experience and other studies. Second, the data must be available for use. If 
they are too costly to secure or too time-consuming to generate or use, they 
cannot be used practically in a management scheme. Third, the data must be 
legally defensible. This standard does not require perfection, but it does 
require reasonable accuracy. The level of detail and accuracy required varies 
with the uses to which the data are put, but this factor must be carefully 
considered when selecting a method for hazard delineation. These three factors 
again emphasize the importance of developing hazards data and a management 
system concurrently and in close coordination. Knowledge of how the data will 
be used and what standard of accuracy and detail is required is essential in 
determining what information to collect and analyze. Similarly, knowledge of 
what data are or can be made available and their limitations is critical in the 
design of management systems. 
Hazard Delineation for the North Carolina Oceanfront 
In designing North Carolina's coastal management program, three natural 
hazards received particular attention--long-term erosion, inlet formation a::d 
migration, and flooding. Such hazards as fire or high winds in coastal storms 
were deemed to be adequately addressed by other programs. 
Erosion Studies 
Erosion along North Carolina's oceanfront has two dimensions--the long-
term fluctuation of the shoreline over many years and the dramatic short-term 
fluctuation of the shoreline in major storms. Attempts have been made to 
address both in the state's management program. 
Long-term Erosion. It has long been known intuitively that many segments 
of the state's ocean shoreline are receding. Structures first built along the 
ocean 50 years ago have been moved landward several times. Highways built in 
the 1940s have washed to sea, with segments being replaced in more landward 
locations. Subdivisions platted in the 1950s now have ocean front cottages on 
what were once second and third tier lots. While understanding of the impacts 
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of sea level rise is relatively recent, this experience has confirmed the fact 
that much of the state's coastline is indeed eroding over the long run. 
After reviewing over 93 studies delineating erosion rates for the state's 
beaches, it was concluded that none met the required standards of being 
adequately realistic, available, and defensible for use in the state's manage-
ment program. Those that seemed reasonably accurate were only available for 
small segments of the coast. Those with statewide coverage were either too 
general for use with regulations or were early efforts with untested scientific 
reliabili ty. 
Because of the critical need for accurate long-term erosion rate informa-
tion and its central part in the emerging management program, the state decided 
to invest in a new study that would generate the needed data. This study, 
completed in 1980 and updated in 1981, is the most detailed, accurate, and 
comprehensive oceanfront erosion rate study conducted in the state and is now 
used as a key part of the management system. 
These erosion rates, which depict past erosion and do not purport to 
project future erosion ~ se, were produced using a method developed largely 
by Dr. Robert Dolan (Dolan, Hayden, and Heywood, 1978). Low altitude aerial 
photography, dating from 1935 to 1980, was compared to ascertain shoreline 
movement. This time period reflects both the period for which high quality, 
accurate photography suitable for analysis is available as well as being the 
40-50 year time frame that much of the state's management program is designed 
to address. 
In summary, the methOdology involves: 1) enlarging 7-1/2 minute quad 
sheets to produce standard 1 :5,000 base maps; 2) establishing a base line on 
this map parallel to the shoreline, with transects at 100-meter intervals for 
campara tive shoreline measurements; 3) overlaying aerial photographs on the 
base map with a reflecting projector or zoom transfer scope; and 4) tracing and 
digitizing the projected shoreline to allow computerized analysis of the vege-
tation and high water line movement. 
While the accuracy of this raw data is acceptable (Dolan, Hayden, May, and 
May, 1980), further data manipulation was undertaken to improve its usefulness 
for management purposes (Benton, 1983). In order to eliminate the impacts of 
possible operator error in individual measurements and to filter out short-term 
localized erosion phenomena, smoothing of the raw data via a running mean was 
undertaken. For each 100-meter transect, an average erosion rate was generated 
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using the 15 stations on either side of it. This produces, at lOa-meter inter-
vals, an erosion rate for the 3,100 meter segment of shoreline centered on that 
transect. This procedure provides increased statistical reliability for the 
data. Where fewer than 31 stations were available, as near inlets, linear 
regression was used to smooth the raw data. 
In addition to smoothing via a running mean, blocking of areas with simi-
lar erosion rates was done to make the data administratively useful. Segments 
with similar erosion rates, using a minimum length of one-half mile, was 
assigned a common erosion rate factor to be used in determining permit juris-
diction and minimum oceanfront setbacks. The data was then displayed on 
1"=400' aerial photographs for use by the permitting staff and on 1"=2 mi. maps 
for public information and general planning purposes. 
While constant updating of these data is required and developing methods 
must be evaluated constantly (Leatherman, 1983), the hazard data developed i.n 
this manner have proven to be realistic, available, and defensible. The re-
sults produced are generally compatible with older studies, including data from 
longer-term analysis using 19th Century U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey charts. 
Also, since 1980, the state has expressed a willingness to modify the data for 
individual sites if more accurate and reliable localized data can be produced, 
and, to date, only one such request has been made, and the submitted data in 
that instance were found to be unreliable. The method has been challenged and 
upheld in administrative appeals, and none of these has continued to judicial 
review. 
Short-term Erosion. In contrast to this active and successful use of 
long-term erosion data, the state has been less successful in developing useful 
short-term erosion data. While it is certain that the shoreline is subject to 
dramatic short-term changes in storms, often measuring several hundred feet in 
major storms, there have been only a few studies documenting the change in 
North Carolina. The models predicting shoreline recession in storms are still 
evolving and to date have not successfully resolved the question of predicting 
the impact of dune overtopping on recession rates, a factor that likely will be 
common when a lOa-year storm strikes North Carolina. 
Still, since short-term recession is such a critical factor for coastal 
management, efforts have been made to incorporate this aspect of coastal haz-
ards into the state's management program. A study was conducted in 1979 to 
generate the best possible estimate of projected erosion in a lOa-year storm 
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(Tayfun, Rogers, and Langfelder, 1979). The method used was a semiempirical 
model that balanpes areas of upland erosion and offshore deposition in a major 
storm. Three hundred and eighteen beach profiles were used to generate the 
recession estimates, which were then mapped on a 1"=400' scale. While these 
data were not deemed precise enough for use in regulations establishing minimum 
ocean setbacks, the figures were used to delineate the hazard zones that set 
permit jurisdiction. within these hazard zones minimum building standards are 
applied. For this more limited purpose--building standards rather than set-
backs--the data were deemed sufficiently realistic and defensible, since more 
accurate data are not available. 
Inlet studies 
The inlets connecting the Atlantic Ocean to North Carolina's extensive 
estuarine system of rivers and sounds appear to be stable and permanent. A 
number of the inlets have been bridged and development along their shores has 
increased, lending credence to this popular perception. 
However, analysis of the inlets' creation, closing, and migration show 
these to be among the state's most dynamic and hazardous areas. With the 
exception of the few with jetties or those that are naturally stable, the 
state's inlets are constantly shifting. Some move continuously in one direc-
tion, while others fluctuate back and forth. All are subject to swift change 
that can destroy any improperly located development. 
Delineation of a hazard zone for existing inlets was carried out via 
statistical analysis of past inlet movement (priddy and Carraway, 1978). 
Surveys and aerial photographs of past inlet location were mapped and analyzed 
to predict future inlet migration within varying confidence levels. This 
mapping also took into account such natural features as an unusually narrow 
barrier island or overwash area, and existing human alterations such as jetties 
and channels. The confidence intervals were then used to locate a minimum 
inlet setback and a broader hazard zone within which density and construction 
standards are applied. These inlet hazard area delineations, first applied in 
1978 and updated in 1981, have been successfully used in the management pro-
gram. 
Establishing hazard zones where there is a high potential for new inlets 
has not yet been accomplished. While new inlet formation occurs only rarely on 
the barrier islands that are large enough for substantial development, it is 
recognized to be a serious and real hazard. Formation of an inlet during a 
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major storm would obliterate development in its path and sever vital trans-
portation and utility links. However, the state has not yet been able to 
generate data with sufficient reliability to justify use in the management 
program. 
Flood Studies 
To avoid unnecessary expense and duplication, the state generally uses 
flood insurance rate maps published by the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) to delineate flood hazard areas. Any area shown as a high hazard flood 
area (the open velocity zones) on such maps is automatically brought within 
state coastal permit jurisdiction. Use of the V Zones has the advantage of 
using a familiar map that is readily available and generally recognized to be 
accurate. 
However, FEMA's recent remapping of the coastal flood areas to incorporate 
wave heights has caused several difficulties in North Carolina. While the 
state had requested and supported this move to produce maps that more real-· 
istically portray flood hazards, the results depicted in the draft maps pre-
pared under contract for FEMA were disappointing. The first draft maps sub-
mitted to the state for review showed generally small V Zones when wave heights 
were added. In fact, in one case the V Zone depicted on the map was entirely 
seaward of the current mean high water line. 
Ensuing discussions with FEMA over the course of 1981-83 revealed that 
several disturbing assumptions were made in preparing the updated maps. First, 
the maps totally ignored long-term erosion, even though the state had detailed, 
reliable, and readily available data on past erosion rates. While this pre-
sents few difficulties in stable areas with high elevations, it leads to a 
major understatement of risk in high erosion areas. Locating a 60-foot wide V 
Zone in an area with a 15-foot/year erosion rate without taking account of 
erosion is folly, unless new rate maps are going to be issued semiannually. 
Second, the models failed to take account of storm-induced erosion. As 
with long-term erosion, flooding and wave action in past storms clearly indi-
cate that this is a seriously fallacious assumption. 
Third, the models assume that sand dunes are stable physical features in 
storms. Basing a V Zone on the seaward 15-foot elevation contour of a 16-foot 
oceanfront dune, and assuming this will be stable in a 100-year storm, ignores 
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reality and seriously understates risk. 
Fourth, there are some indications that storm surge levels were under-
estimated. Finally, outdated base maps may have been used, further exacer-
bating the above problems in high erosion areas. 
143 
Fortunately, some of these concerns appear close to resolution after two 
years of discussion with FEMA. The models have been revised to take account of 
at least some estimation of storm-induced erosion. However, FEMA has concluded 
that policy and legal constraints require them to ignore long-term erosion as a 
factor in mapping and that this can only be addressed through periodic map 
updates. 
In addition to these technical concerns, the lack of coordination with the 
state has been troublesome. As an example, FEMA has recently explained the 
two- to three-year delay in finalizing the maps to local governments (who in 
some cases are anxiously awaiting the maps in order to move from the emergency 
to the regular program) as being due to state requests to include erosion 
effects. Since this problem has been identified by numerous reviewers on a 
national level over the past years and since FEMA does have a responsibility to 
promulga te reasonably accurate maps, such intergovernmental complaints are 
misleading and contribute little to effective coordination. 
Management System for Oceanfront Development 
Regula tory Provisions 
Using the studies described above, the state has established a program to 
manage development in the most hazardous areas along the oceanfront (Owens, 
1981) • 
The regulatory program applies in three delineated high hazard areas that 
are officially designated in administrative rules adopted by the state Coastal 
Resources Commission. The "ocean erodible area" starts at mean low water and 
extends inland a distance equal to 60 times the long-term average annual 
erosion rate plus the projected 100-year storm recession (this distance being 
measured from the vegetation line). The "inlet hazard area" includes areas of 
potential inlet migration adjacent to existing inlets, and the "high hazard 
flood area" includes all numbered V zones on published flood insurance rate 
maps. 
with these three areas, permits are required for any development or land-
disturbing activity. The principal locational requirement in the permit stan-
dards is the minimum oceanfront setback. The setback rule establishes four 
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tiers for development. First, no development may be located seaward of the 
vegetation line. Second, in the zone extending from the vegetation line land-
ward, a distance 30 times the annual erosion rate (a GO-foot minimum), no 
permanent substantial structures are allowed although parking lots, tennis 
courts and the like can be located there. Third, small structures (those with 
fewer than four units and/or less than 5,000 sq. ft. of floor area) can be 
located between 30 times and GO times the annual erosion rate landward of the 
vegetation line. Larger structures must be at least GO times the annual 
erosion rate behind the vegetation line. Figure 1 illustrates these require-
ments. Development must also be landward of the inlet setback, the landward 
toe of small frontal dunes, and the crest of larger primary dunes. 
Beyond this setback, any development in the delineated hazard areas must 
meet minimum construction standards. For the most part these standards arE 
based on those required by FEMA for floodplain zoning ordinances and the 
state's minimum building codes. Some standards, such as minimum piling size 
and penetration, have been increased. New moves by FEMA to establish grad"ated 
insurance rates based on the quality and survivability of structures will help 
reinforce these standards. community risk rating would also contribute to the 
coordination of state and FEMA programs. 
Other state development standards include density limits in the inlet 
hazard area (only single family detached units are allowed), limits on any 
growth-inducing public investments in hazard areas, and limi ts on oceanfront 
erosion control structures. significant new policy initiatives now being 
proposed in this last area would preclude any permanent shoreline stabilization 
and any projects that would block public use of the beach or increase erosion 
on neighboring properties (Outer Banks Erosion Task Force, 1984). 
Nonregulatory Provisions 
The state also actively employs nonregulatory techniques for managing 
oceanfront development. Coastal local governments are required to prepare 
comprehensive land use plans that are consistent with state standards. As of 
1983, the plans must include a poststorm planning element that addresses steps 
to be taken prior to coastal storms to minimize damage, specifies evacuation 
and recovery operations, and sets forth poststorm rebuilding policies. In 
addition, the state has actively used land acquisition to further its manage-
ment objectives (Owens, 1983). This includes a beach access acquisition pro-
gram with an explicit priority for acquiring lots unsuitable for development, 
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tax credits for the donation of hazardous areas, estuarine sanctuaries and 
other programs. 
The state has strongly encouraged FEMA to more aggressively use relocation 
as a means of reducing certain future flood insurance losses, but to date this 
effort has been unsuccessful. The state is still pursuing adequate funding for 
Section 1362 acquisitions and coverage of prudent relocation under flood insur-
ance policies. 
Conclusions 
The state of North Carolina has made substantial progress in the past five 
years in identifying hazard areas along its oceanfront and assessing the magni-
tude of risks there. Accurate oceanfront erosion rates have been determined in 
a cost effective manner. Additional research is needed to quantify projected 
short-term erosion during major storms, and careful attention must be given to 
new flood insurance rate maps to assure that they do not significantly 
understate very real and serious hazards. 
Similarly, the state's management systems, at both the state and local 
level, have dramatically improved over the past five years. There remains a 
strong need for continued federal funding of these efforts to assure that these 
gains will not be lost and that progress in reasonable resource management will 
continue. 
Continued and improved coordination is badly needed. Academic efforts to 
study and delineate hazards must be closely related to management needs. 
Federal programs affecting development in hazardous areas--especially flood 
insurance, emergency management, land acquisition, public investment, and 
coastal management programs--must be coordinated to avoid counterproductive 
efforts. Through such renewed cooperation, better delineation of hazard areas 
and better management of inevitable coastal development is possible. 
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MAKING MAPS USEFUL FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
Donna M. Mack 
water Resources Management 
State of Georgia 
The possible approaches to making maps more useful would be unlimited if 
one had unlimited funds. Since this is not the case, we, as state floodplain 
managers, must be innovative in helping local officials to use the maps. Many 
local officials are not aware of the true hazards associated with high risk 
areas such as coastal V Zones. Most have not been fortunate enough to have 
heard Neil Frank's message and perhaps do not understand the seriousness of the 
threat. 
Before I tackled this issue, the problem had to be clearly defined, which 
seems like an easy enough task. Yet, as I have discovered during my six months 
as Georgia's Floodplain Coordinator, when you are dealing with the NFIP, 
nothing is simple. So I distributed a questionnaire to 15 coastal communities 
in Georgia to gain insight irito the day-to-day struggles facing the officials. 
The questionnaire covered topics such as: problems encountered with the maps; 
whether officials felt the maps were useful; and what suggestions officials 
could offer to improve the maps. Ten of the 15 local governments responded to 
the questionnaire, and the others were contacted by phone. 
In response to the question concerning problems encountered with the maps, 
there was a broad range of responses. Some of the cited deficiencies were 
quit8 legitimate. They ranged from a lack of benchmark locations for survey-
ing, to inadequate base maps, to the generality and difficulty of referencing 
the maps. There seemed to be a common feeling of frustration among the offi-
cials having to enforce these maps. 
Most of the officials I dealt with were generally knowledgeable about the 
maps. I discovered that if there was confusion, it was primarily with the 
insurance aspects of the program and not with actual flood mapping. Most 
officials were aware of what a V Zone defined and why the storm surge/wave 
height had recently been added to the maps. They did not agree with the wave 
height elevations or think that they were a necessary addition, but they did 
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understand fairly well the concept behind wave height mapping. Most officials 
thought that the maps were technically sound and reliable. Their concern was 
not that the data was correct, but rather that it was too general and therefore 
open to differing interpretations from homeowners, developers, or local 
officials. 
One of the most common complaints was that the base maps, which included 
roads, streets, legends, contour intervals, topography, and scale, were in-
adequate. Many officials find it incredibly difficult to reference any speci-
fic site on the maps and determine, without a doubt, what the site elevation is 
and in which zone it lies. This is further complicated in McIntosh County, 
because there are few benchmarks there to determine first floor elevations. 
Another dilemma is posed to some Georgia communities because of height 
restrictions on buildings located on barrier islands. For example, off the 
southern coast of Georgia, on St. Simon's Island, which is currently experienc-
ing a condo boom, the county had restrictions in effect limiting building 
heights to four stories before the adoption of the flood maps. The velocity 
zone elevations of those maps have resulted in requests for variances to build 
five-story buildings with parking below the first floor. Thus, the well in-
tended flood program has left local officials with the problem of deciding 
between local and federal regUlations. 
Regarding the insurance applications of the maps, many local officiaL;, 
being planners and engineers, are ignorant of FIA requirements. When design 
standards are reviewed, many FIA requirements are not considered. A prime 
example of this occurred in Chatham County, where misunderstanding of the 
requirements for an elevation certificate caused chaos for several weeks. 
Engineers there refused to sign the elevation certificate for several struc-
tures because they had not been built according to FIA standards. These 
particular structures were built with garages below the first floor level--
which is allowed if the walls are breakaway or have openings every several feet 
to allow the free flow of water. Since these stipulations were ignored, the 
first floor elevation for these structures was determined to be garage level, 
even though that level might have been used for storage purposes only. Need-
less to say, the Chatham County developers were more than slightly annoyed when 
they were told this. This problem was not a direct result of the flood maps 
but does reflect the confusion that can occur when not everyone is properly 
informed of the maps' use and the pertinent regulations. 
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The suggestions local governments offered for improving the flood maps 
centered on 1) improving the base maps; 2) providing training and education for 
those individuals who enforce V Zone regulations; and 3) conducting more de-
tailed mapping. 
Inadequate base maps are usually a result of the map being out of date so 
that other maps must be used for reference. 
Training and education does seem to be widely needed. Improved interac-
tion between state and local officials, federal and local officials, and FIA 
and local officials was specifically requested. Local officials also desper-
ately need information on current construction standards and floodproofing 
techniques for commercial structures in A and V Zones. Increasing the aware-
ness and understanding of officials as well as private citizens concerning the 
prediction of, forces involved with, and damages resulting from a hurricane 
should help discourage development in V Zones. If it does not discourage 
development, at least it will increase awareness for evacuation purposes. 
The third suggestion made by the officials was to make the flood maps more 
detailed, so that officials would have a scale they could work with and be 
conEdent with. The method used for mapping does not seem to be the problem. 
Instead it seems to be the unsatisfactory way in which the data is presented on 
the maps. A larger scale map would definitely help. Most officials are able 
to enforce the wave height regulations but not without resistance from locals. 
From my standpoint, the major difficulty for local officials in dealing 
with the maps results from the maps' representing a predicted or theoretical 
flood potential rather than a perceived flood potential. This makes it diffi-
cult to impose wave height regulations on individuals who have lived in the 
area for a number of years and have never experienced anything more than aver-
age seasonal rainfall. This problem is, of course, not specific to the coast, 
but has been magnified there because of the recent imposition of increased wave 
height elevations. Because Georgia has not experienced a storm with hurricane 
force winds in several years, locals generally do not believe that a storm 
sufficient to produce the wave heights shown on the FEMA flood maps could, in 
fact, occur. 
In conclusion, there are several possible steps that could be taken to 
guide local officials: 
First, more training and education should be provided. workshops that 
review Federal Insurance Administration regulations are definitely needed. The 
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flo.od maps have limited usefulness without some understanding of the corre-
sponding regulations. The maps should not be presented to local officials 
without also providing a clear understanding of the objectives and goals to be 
met in using those maps. A coastal construction workshop to better acquaint 
local officials with construction designs and standards required by the FIA and 
NFIP would also be of tremendous assistance. 
Second, the relevant published research information--including handbooks, 
brochures, and manuals--should be distributed generously to officials. Again, 
the officials are able to benefit from the program only if they are knowledge-
able about its maps and regulations. 
Third, hurricane awareness should be promoted and adequate evacuation 
measures taught. 
Fourth, local officials should be requested to record the type of con-
struction, floodproofing methods, and standards used on various projects for 
reference, so that successful and not-so-successful techniques can be deter-
mined. 
Fifth, and most importantly, local officials should be provided with 
realistic planning guidelines in areas of high risk. The maps should be used 
as a tool to identify and recognize the areas that are most vulnerable. 
Sixth, areas such as inlets, beach frontages, and hazardous erosion zones 
should be emphasized to the officials as extreme high risk areas, so that 
management in these areas is more effective. 
I am certain there are many other possible ways to help local officials 
with the flood maps, but I think we can all agree that the number one priority 
is simply to educate them so that they can understand the maps and, perhaps 
more importantly, the NFIP. There will be little accomplished if we decide to 
improve the flood maps and ignore this basic lack of understanding. 
PART THREE 
STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING HIGH RISK AREAS: 
Mapping 
This 
page 
. 
IS 
intentionally 
blank 
THE FUTURE OF FEMA'S FLOODPLAIN 
MAPPING PROGRAM 
John M. Gibson 
Assistant Administrator 
Office of Risk Assessment 
Federal Insurance Administration 
Federal Emergency Management Agency 
Introduction 
The future direction of FEMA's flood mapping program can be thought of as 
being divided into three major areas: 1) the direction the program will take 
between now and the end of FY 1987; 2) the direction the program will take in 
FY 1988 and subsequent years; and 3) related goals we intend to accomplish 
along the way. Before I begin, let me tell you of a telephone call I received 
Friday as I was leaving the office. Jim Holton, Director of Public Affairs, 
called. "John," he said, " we would like to feature your office in our next 
issue of the Emergency Management newsletter." "Great," I said, "I will look 
forward to getting my copy." "OK," he said, "but that is not why I'm calling. 
Just what is it you guys do up there?" 
Like Jim, many of you might not know what the Office of Risk Assessment 
does. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the Office's position within the Federal 
Insurance Administration, and Figure 3 lists its goals and activities. 
The most important thing I can tell you of my office is that it, along 
with <,he Office of Loss Reduction, was reintegrated as a unit of the Federal 
Insurance Administration on November 20, 1983. This was an important reorgani-
zaUon in that it now permits a more direct approach to resolving inconsis-
tencies in insurance, mapping, and regulations that might have come into being 
during the past few years when units responsible for these functions operated 
more or less autonomously. 
Near Term Direction (NFIP) 
Flood Insurance study Program 
FY 1984 to FY 1987 
The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 established a 1983 deadline for 
the completion of all initial flood insurance rate studies. However, that Act 
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MISSION STATEMENT: 
THE OFFICE OF RISK ASSESSMENT DEVELOPS POLICIES, PROCEDURES AND 
METHODOLOGIES AND CONDUCTS FLOOD HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK 
ASSESSMENT STUDIES WHICH PROVIDE DATA NECESSARY FOR THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF AN ACTUARIALLY SOUND NATIONWIDE FLOOD 
INSURANCE PROGRAM AND THE REDUCTION OF FLOOD LOSSES THROUGH 
LOCAL FLOOD PLAIN MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS. THE FUNCTIONS OF ITS TWO 
MAJOR DIVISIONS ARE: 
TECHNICAL OPERATIONS DIVISION 
• INITIATE NEW STUDIES AND RESTUDIES 
• PROCESS REQUESTS FOR LETTERS OF MAP AMENDMENT/MAP REVISION 
• PRINT AND DISTRIBUTE MAPS AND REPORTS 
• TRACK FLOOD STUDY FUNDS 
• RESPONSIBLE FOR SPECIAL CONVERSIONS 
RISK STUDIES DIVISION 
• MANAGE FLOOD RISK STUDY AND MAPPING PROGRAM 
• DEVELOP TECHNICAL POLICIES, GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES 
• PROVIDE A NATIONAL FOCAL POINT FOR DEVELOPMENT OF FLOOD HAZARD 
AND RISK DATA 
• PERFORM TECHNICAL REVIEW OF FLOOD INSURANCE STUDIES 
• RESOLVE TECHNICAL ISSUES OF APPEALS 
Figure 3 
Office of Risk Assessment Functions 
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assU!ned that there were only about 5,000 flood-prone communi ties in the na tion. 
Today, we know that there are almost 22,000 flood-prone communities in the 
United states. We have prepared Flood Hazard Boundary Maps for about 19,100 of 
these communities. As of the start of FY 1984, about 17,500 of these communi-
ties participated in the NFIP. The status of these communities is shown in 
Figuce 4. 
',he near term direction of the flood study program will focus on providing 
full ~rogram status--that is, conversion to the regular program--to the 7,826 
comm,mities presently in the emergency program. 
Although well over the original estimate of 5,000 community studies have 
been completed, the question remains: how many emergency program communities 
warrant a flood risk study, and what level of effort should be expended to 
develop risk data for them? 
In 1983, the u.s. General Accounting office released a report, "The 
Federal Emergency Management Agency Can Reduce Mapping Costs,· in response to 
the desire by Congress to consider options for expediting the conversion of 
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21,926 FLOODPRONE COMMUNITIES NATIONWIDE 
PARTICIPATE IN THE NFIP 
DO NOT PARTICIPATE 
17,542 COMMUNITIES PARTICIPATE IN THE NFIP 
REGULAR PROGRAM 
EMERGENCY PROGRAM 
4,384 COMMUNITIES DO NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE NFIP 
MAPPED 
UNMAPPED 
Figure 4 
Status of the NFIP as of the Start of FY 1984 
remaining unstudied communi ties to the Regular Program. The GAO recommend'ed 
that FEMA undertake a systematic approar.h to determine the level of study 
needed, including the following actions: 
• Rank communities on the basis of development potential; 
• Incorporate other mapping approaches in the decision-making process; and 
• Weigh the benefit of additional detailed study against study costs in 
making decisions. 
In November, 1983, Congress passed P.L. 98-181, which amended Section 
1360(a)(2) of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, to extend the flood 
insurance study program to September 30, 1985, and added a new subsection re-
quiring the Director of FEMA to submit to Congress a plan for converting all 
communi ties to the Regular Program of the NFIP by September 30, 1987. congress 
also extended the Emergency Program and the initial studies completion date to 
September 30, 1985. 
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FEMA has responded to this legislation and the GAO report by initiating a 
number of actions which will determine the future directions of the flood 
insurance study program. In FY 1983, FEMA initiated a study to evaluate the 
floodplain development potential in the remaining unstudied communities. This 
contract was awarded to Donnelley Marketing Information Services, a company of 
the Dunn and Bradstreet Corporation. Donnelley is a leading firm in small area 
demography. The final results of this study were received in May 1984, and 
include an assessment of existing floodplain property at risk and projected 
future property at risk for the period 1984-1998. About $13.8 billion in new 
development is expected to occur in the unstudied floodplains during this 
period (Figure 5). The Donnelley study indicates that only 3,712 communities 
would experience significant new development in their unstudied special flood 
hazard areas--the 100-year floodplain--during this period. The rest of the 
communities would experience steady or declining development in their 100-year 
floodplains. The unstudied communities were then ranked based on the value of 
property at risk in the 1 ~O-year floodplain. 
In FY 1984, FEMA entered into an Interagency Agreement with the u.s. 
Geological Survey to review all remaining unstudied communities that had been 
recommended for detailed study by the FEMA Regional Offices. The purpose of 
that review is to assess the applicability of less costly and less time con-
suming methods for assessing the hydrologic and hydraulic condi tions wi thin 
those communi ties and to recommend various types and levels of study based on 
those findings. The location of the 2,400 communities being screened by the 
u.s. Geological Survey is shown by state on the map of the united States in 
Figure 6. The U.s. Geological Survey will complete most of its screening 
efforts this summer. 
F2MA is currently in the process of preparing the report to Congress 
required by the 1983 amendments to the National Flood Insurance Act. This 
report will detail the number of communities to be converted to the Regular 
Progra~ by the various methods (i.e. full detail study, limited detail study, 
existing data study, minimally flood-prone conversion or non-flood-prone con-
version), the funding required, and the time required. The decision whether a 
community warrants a flood insurance study and, if so, what level study should 
be performed, will be based on a benefit/cost analysis. This analysis con-
siders the costs associated with the various types of study in relation to the 
future benefits of reduced flood losses that can be expected as a result of 
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Figure 5 
1,415 COMMUNITIES WITH 
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Results of the Demographic Survey of 7,497 Communities 
Figure 6 
Number of Study Areas to Be Evaluated by USGS 
for Less Detailed Study Methods 
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improved floodplain management based on the data provided by the study. We 
have determined that the benefit of a flood insurance study, in these terms, is 
about 2.5 cents per one dollar of future development that would have been 
otherwise unwisely sited in the 100-year floodplain. By comparing this benefit 
with the average study cost of the different types of flood insurance studies 
and Donnelley's estimates of the value of future development, we have been able 
to determine the most cost-effective means of converting the 6,476 unstudied 
communi ties to the Regular Program. 
Results of our analysis show that some 820 full detail studies and 770 
limited detail studies can be supported by future floodplain development. We 
also find justification for studying about 190 additional communities using the 
existing data study process. The remaining unstudied participating communi-
ties, approximately 4,700, will not receive a study and will be converted to 
the Regular Program as either minimally flood-prone (with approximate flood 
hazard mapping) or non-flood-prone (without a map). These study initiations 
and special conversions will all occur between FY 1984 and FY 1987 (Figure 7). 
o THE ACTUARIAL SOUNDNESS OF THE NFIP AND ITS LEGALITY REST ON THE 
ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF ACCURATE AND CURRENT FLOOD 
HAZARD DETERMINATIONS. 
\1 A CONTINUING PROGRAM IS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN THE TECHNICAL 
ACCURACY AND USEFULNESS OF EXISTING FLOOD RISK DATA WHICH 
FORMS THE BASIS FOR ACTUARIAL INSURANCE PREMIUM RATES AND 
LOCAL FLOOD PLAIN MANAGEMENT. 
t} PUBLISHED FLOOD INSURANCE MAPS MUST BE REVISED TO: 
• REFLECT CHANGES IN FLOOD PLAIN HYDROLOGIC OR HYDRAULIC 
CONDITIONS 
• REFLECT ADVANCES IN STATE·OF·THE·ART METHODOLOGIES 
• ACCOMMODATE THE EMERGENCE OF NEW OR REFINED DATA 
• CORRECT SCIENTIFIC OR TECHNICAL ERRORS IDENTIFIED IN THE 
ORIGINAL STUDY 
• EXTEND AREAS OF DETAIL STUDY TO OTHER PARTS OF THE 
COMMUNITY 
Figure 7 
NFIP Need for Flood studies Maintenance Activity 
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• MORE THAN 19,000 FLOOD INSURANCE MAPS HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED SINCE 
THE INCEPTION OF THE NFIP. HISTORICALLY, MORE THAN $100 MILLION OR 
ABOUT 20% OF TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS HAVE BEEN SPENT TO KEEP THESE 
MAPS ACCURATE AND UP TO DATE. 
• PUBLISHED FLOOD INSURANCE MAPS AND STUDIES MAY BE UPDATED BY 
FOUR MEANS: 
• FLOOD INSURANCE RESTUDIES I PERFORMED WHEN CHANGE IS EXTENSIVE 
• FLOOD INSURANCE STUDY REVISIONS } PERFORMED WHEN AN 
LETTERS OF MAP REVISION (LOMRs) R 
LETTERS OF MAP AMENDMENT (LOMAs) APPELLANT P OVIDES DATA 
• WITH THE START OF FY 1988 THE STUDIES PROGRAM WILL BEGIN TO 
OPERATE AT THE FULL MAINTENANCE LEVEL. 
• ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS OF ABOUT $36 MILLION WILL BE REQUIRED TO 
SUSTAIN THE ESTIMATED LEVEL OF MAINTENANCE TO BE ACCOMPLISHED 
liN FY 1988 AND SUBSEQUENT YEARS. THESE FUNDS WILL SUPPORT THE 
FOLLOWING ACTIVITIES: 
• 215 FLOOD INSURANCE RESTUDIES 
• 400 FLOOD INSURANCE STUDY REVISIONS 
• 1,520 LOMRs/LOMAs 
Figure 8 
NFIP projected Flood Studies Maintenance Activity 
FY 1988 and Beyond 
OUr plan to Congress will recommend that, after netting out studies 
started durinq FY 1984 and FY 1985, funding be provided to initiate the remain-
il!lllJ oost.-effective studies in FY 1986 and FY 1987 and authorization to conduct 
1these ne'" st:udies be extended to cover those two years. The new studies ini-
tiated durinq FY i 984 will be those recommended to us by our regional offices. 
~t. of the FY 1985 funding for new studies will be used to initiate those 
limted. detail studies recommended by the U.S. Geological Survey. 
All minimally and non-flood-prone communities will be converted to the 
i!l.equlLar Prograa during FY 1984-1987, with an average of about 1 ,200 communi ties 
sdllednled for conversion each year during this period. Our plan to Congress 
will also recomDend that the Emergency Program be extended to September 3D, 
]990. to allow all communities that had studies initiated in FY 1986 and FY 
]987 to be converted with effective Flood Insurance Rate Maps. 
Gibson 
Long-Term Direction of the NFIP 
Flood Insurance Study Program 
FY 1988 and After 
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FEMA intends to begin a full maintenance-level progra3 of flood ~nsurance 
rescudies and aap revisions beginning in FY 1988. The philosophy of appl~'inq 
benefit cost relationships in study decision making will continue in t.'te re-
study prograJll. 
In FY 1986, FilMA will establish a formal restudy decision-making process 
that will take into consideration both insurance and floodplain aanagement 
benefits to be derived from restudies relative to their cost. ~~ will also 
be encouraging cost sharing, either by direct contribution of funding or by 
actual performance of various study eleJIents by state or local goven-ments. as 
a means of increasing restudy priority. FEMA will ,also respond to appeals by 
individuals or cOllmlunities to revise maps when such appeals are supported ... ·ith 
technical data supplied by those groups. 
My best estilllate of the level of activity that will occur as the flooo 
study program operates in the maintenance lIIode is that we will be revising 
about 5% of all the effec)tive flood insurance studies with base flood eleva-
tions each year (Figures 7 and 8). We project that one-third of these updates 
will be accomplished by the restudy process and the other two-thirds through 
the rr,,-p revision/amendment process. This would translate into initiating about 
215 restudies per year, performing about 400 map revisions, and issuing about 
1,520 letters of lIIap revision or amendment. Congress would have to provide 
fund!.ng of about $36 million per year to support this level of activity. We 
will have a more realistic picture of FY 1988 and beyond after we have com-
pleted the formal study we will be undertaking next year. 
Actions Related to the Flood Insurance Study program 
In January we had ambitious plans for having the map initiatives program 
far enough along by now that I could talk to you about likely alternative map 
products and whether we would continue to print separate Flood Insurance Rate 
Map and Flood Boundary Floodway Map panels. Unfortunately, we underestimated 
the time it would take to get input from agents, lenders, appraisers, others in 
the insurance industries, and public officials. Our original timetable was 
premised on piggybacking the map ini tia ti ves survey onto already scheduled 
workshops. After conducting two insurance workshops in this manner in 
February, we realized that the project was too important to squeeze it into an 
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• Changes common to all new samples: 
• Zones.compressed - maximum of 5IAE. VE, A. V. and 01 
In coastal communities and 3 In riverine communities IAE. A. and 01 
• Differences between sample and current format in explanatory box. 
• Map repository address and zone identification dates eliminated. 
• Changes in new FIRM Index Panels: 
• F100dprone straat index 
• SFHA delineated shown 
• Map information shown beyond corporate limits 
• Changes in new FIRM Panels: 
• Alpha-numeric street locator grid 
• RectiHnaarized SFHA 
• Small scale single panel FIRM for entire community 
• New FIRM/FBFM Panels: 
• New Initiative to show all information on one map 
• Shows insurance information IS FHA. Zones. BFEsl and floodplain 
management information Ifloodwav. cross-sections. river milesl 
Figure 9 
Map Initiatives Project 
Final Map Sample Selection 
already ambitious agenda. We want it to be given the attention it deserves, 
The last workshop was conducted on June 7, 1984, and the tabulation of the 
questionnaires is to be completed by June 30. The sample maps and question-
naire relate to changes shown in Figure 9. 
We have received from the Association's Mapping and Standards Committee 
Chair about 220 completed questionnaires with a preliminary evaluation of the 
results. Likewise, we have received a preliminary analysis of the 180 re-
sponses submitted during three agent/lender workshops and 14 completed ques-
tionnaires from four of our regional offices. Preliminary findings based on 
these partial samples are shown in Figure 10. I am pleased with the reaction 
received from all survey respondents. The response has been overwhelmingly 
enthusiastic, and it looks as though we will have more than 800 opinions from 
all sections of the country upon which to base our future decisions. 
I have given you the bad news--the survey was not completed as originally 
scheduled. The good news is that we can make up the slippage in the schedule. 
All cost-effective recommendations for alternate formats are scheduled to be 
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NO. OF RESPONDENTS 
PRELIMINARY FINDING 
ELIMINATE TWO MAPS 
(FIRM/FBFM) 
PREFER RECTILINEAR FIRM 
PREFER CURVILINEAR FIRM 
PREFER LESS DETAIL ON FIRM 
PREFER MORE DETAIL ON FIRM 
PREFER SFHA ON FIRM INDEX 
PREFER STREET INDEX" GRID 
PREFER CROSS HATCHED 
FLOODWAY 
INCLUDE AREA BEYOND CORP. 
LIMITS 
PREFER MAP SAMPLE NO. 
AGENTSILENDERS ASFPM FEMA REGIONS 
180 
80% 
86% 
14% 
YES 
NO 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
F2 
219 
88% 
9% 
91% 
NO 
YES 
YES 
R3 
14 in 4 Regions 
100% 
0% 
100% 
NO 
YES 
YES 
NO 
YES 
YES 
R3 
MAP F2 = NEW FORMAT -SINGLE PANEL, SMALL SCALE FIRM WITH RECTILINEAR 
SFHA COMPRESSED ZONES, FLOODPRONE STREET 
GRID AND STREET LOCATOR GRID 
MAP R3 = NEW FORMAT-MULTIPLE PANEL, LARGE SCALE COMBINED 
FIRM/FBFM WITH COMPRESSED ZONES, CONTOUR 
LINES, LANDMARK BUILDINGS, SPOT ELEVATIONS AND 
INFORMATION SHOWN BEYOND THE CORPORATE 
LIMITS 
Figure 10 
Map Initiatives Project preliminary Findings 
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implemented at the start of FY 1985 as new maps are issued or as existing maps 
are revised. 
Some of the innovative mapping initiatives we are pursuing are a feasi-
bility study of providing users with microimages of our maps rather than paper 
copies; a feasibility study of the LIDAR laser ranging system to produce topo-
graphic maps; and the use of geographic information systems to produce digi-
tized maps and to fully automate the production and distribution of flood 
insurance maps. A summary of the future directions of the NFIP Flood studies 
Program is given in Figure 11. 
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NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 
• EMPHASIS FY 1984-1987 
COMPLETE THE INITIAL STUDIES PROGRAM 
• INITIATE ALL COST·EFFECTIVE STUDIES BY SEPTEMBER 30, 1987 AND 
COMPLETE THEM BY SEPTEMBER 30, 1990 
• INITIATE AND COMPLETE ALL SPECIAL CONVERSIONS BY 
SEPTEMBER 30,1987 
• EMPHASIS FY 1988 AND BEYOND 
• BEGIN FULL MAINTENANCE LEVEL ACTIVITY IN FY 1988 AND OPERATE 
IN THIS MODE DURING SUBSEQUENT YEARS 
• FY 1988-90 COMPLETE PIPELINE OF STUDIES STARTED IN FY 1986·87 
• RELATED ACTIVITIES 
• IMPLEMENT MAP INITIATIVES PROJECT RECOMiVlENDATIONS 
• ISSUE COMPREHENSIVE APPEALS PROCESS MANUAL 
• COMPLETE COUNTY-WIDE MAPPING FEASIBILITY STUDY 
• COMPLETE HURRICANE CLIMATOLOGY STUDY 
• COMPLETE STORM SURGE MODEL REVISIONS 
• COMPLETE ALLUVIAL FAN METHODOLOGY UPDATE 
• COMPLETE LIDAR LASER RANGING SYSTEM FEASIBILITY STUDY 
• COMPLETE ALASKA COAST TSUNAMI STUDY 
• COMPLETE MICRO IMAGING FEASIBILITY STUDY 
Figure 11 
Future Directions of the FlOOd Studies Program 
APPLICATION OF INNOVATIONS IN MAPPING TECHNOLOGY 
TO FLOOD INSURANCE STUDIES 
Brian R. Mrazik 
Chief, Risk Studies Division 
Federal Insurance Administration 
Federal Emergency Management Agency 
Introduction 
Technology presently exists for fully automating nearly all of the flood 
insurance study and mapping process. Yet in present application, many flood-
plain mapping processes for flood insurance studies and other purposes remain 
largely manual operations. This brief paper examines the elements of a fully 
automated floodplain mapping system, some of the reasons why greater automation 
is not yet applied, and a possible transition plan for phasing into a fully 
automated process. 
Automated Floodplain Mapping System: 
An Idealized Concept 
Top?graphic Data Collection 
Figure 1 illustrates the components of, an idealized floodplain mapping 
system which are summarized in Table 1 and can be compared to conventional 
flood insurance study approaches. Under the conventional approach, topographic 
data is collected by field surveys or a combination of field surveys and photo-
grammetric methods. Additional topographic data may be obtained by manually 
taking data points off available contour maps. This data is then hand encoded 
and keypunched for input to hydraulic or hydrologic computer models. 
The development of profiling laser ranging systems such as the LIDAR 
(Light Detection and Ranging) system under study by the Corps of Engineers and 
the APTS system (Aerial profiling of Terrain System) under development by the 
United States Geological Survey (USGS), provides opportunity for the rapid 
collection of ground elevation data, in digital map format, which can be 
directly input to computer based Geographic Information Systems (GIS). 
Scanning laser mapping systems have also been proposed that would allow for the 
generation of an entire topographic map in digital format. 
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1. Collection and utilization of topographic data in digital format 
using laser profiling (e.g., LIDAR), laser mapping systems, or 
Analytical Photog ram metric Systems (APS). 
2. Collection and utilization of land cover and cultural data in 
digital format by manual or scanning digitization of existing 
mapping or by purchase of such data generated from satellite or 
photographic imagery. 
3. Utilization of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to develop 
direct input of digital topographic and land cover data into 
hydrologic and hydraulic models. 
4. Utilization of GIS to generate flood plain maps and profiles from 
hydraulic model outputs and to store and revise maps and 
profiles. 
Table 1 
Elements of a Fully Automated 
Flood Insurance Study System 
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Analytical Photogrammetric Systems (APS) rely on conventional aerial 
photography with human interpretation but provide for computer-assisted set up 
and maintenance of the stereo model. In application, ~PS records x, y and z 
coordinate data in digital format. Attributes can be assigned to digitized 
point, line, and polygon features at the same time. The resulting digital data 
base can also be used to create a GIS. 
Planimetric and Land Cover Data 
In addition to topographic data, flood insurance studies utilize other 
map-based information, including land cover and soils data required to deter-
mine runoff coefficients in some hydrologic models. Cultural data and other 
planj.metric information such as roads are usually obtained from existing map 
sources to formulate a base for the floodplain mapping. A fully automated 
floodplain mapping system would utilize land cover, soils, and cultural data in 
digital format. 
Land cover data can be digitized manually from aerial photography using 
ilie APS system. Landsat systems, including the Thematic Mapper and Multi-
Spectral Scanner can also be used to provide digital land cover data at a 
some\~ha t lower resolution. Another al terna ti ve is the manual digi tiza tion of 
land cover data from existing maps such as USGS quadrangles. 
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Planimetric data can be digitized from aerial photography utilizing APS, 
but more frequently it is digitized from existing mapping sources. Planimetric 
line data can also be digitized automatically through the use of various map 
scanning devices such as the sysScan system. 
Interfacing with Hydrologic Models 
Under the conventional approach, topographic and land cover information 
are manually encoded, keypunched ,and utilized as input data to various hydro-
logic and hydraulic models to generate flood discharge-frequency and elevation-
frequency data. This is an iterative process whereby the engineer interprets 
the output, primarily in printout format, and then adjusts various input para-
meters to correct, calibrate, or "fine tune" the model. This can be an expen-
sive and time consuming process because adjustment to the input data, such as 
adding an additional cross section, or subdividing a watershed, requires addi-
tional manual operations. 
Using state-of-the-art digital mapping technology, much of this process 
can be automated, including the interfacing between digital topographic and 
land cover data, and hydrologic and hydraulic models, as well as the computer 
generation of flood profiles and maps. At the heart of this process is the 
computer-based GIS. GIS technology permits the storage and manipulation of map 
data by geographic coordinates such as lati.tude and longi.tude. Many "overlays" 
of attributes such as elevation, land covers, and soils can be assigned to c. 
particular point, line, or polygon defined by various coordinates. 
In application to flOOdplain mapping, digital topographic, cultural, and 
land cover data would be fed into the GIS as separate overlays and registered 
to the same coordinate system. Watershed and sub-basin boundaries would also 
be digitized if hydrologic modeling is to be utilized to obtain flood frequec',cy 
estimates. The GIS can then be used to directly generate input data required 
for the hydrologic and hydraulic modeling. For example, graphic display termi-
nals could permit engineers to select the location and alignment of stream 
cross sections, which the GIS would evaluate and encode for input to the 
hydraulic model. As a second example, GIS overlaying of watershed and sub-
basin boundaries on land cover and soils map information could be used to 
automatically compute runoff curve numbers for sub-basins as input to the SCS 
TR-20 program. 
Real time interfacing of hydrologic and hydraulic models with a GIS in 
conjunction with graphic display terminals can permit the engineer to see 
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almost immediately the impact of a data input decision or calibration adjust-
ment on the final flood profile or floodplain or floodway boundary. Such a 
system could greatly reduce the iterative processing time required to calibrate 
and tune such models to achieve an acceptable result. 
Generation, Storage and Revision of Flood Mapping 
Under the conventional mapping approach, when a satisfactory hydraulic 
result is achieved, computed flood elevations are usually read manually from 
the computer printout and plotted to form flood elevation profiles which are 
incorporated into the flood insurance study text. Elevations from the flood 
profiles are also used in conjunction with a topographic base map to plot the 
floodplain limits in a fully manual process. Floodplain limits are then over-
laid on a planimetric base map to produce a Flood Insurance Rate Map using the 
standard manual cartographic processes. Under a fully automated system, a GIS 
can be used to drive plotters and generate hard copy floodplain maps and pro-
files using the digital topographic and planimetric data in conjunction with 
digital output from the hydraulic model. 
Perhaps the greatest advantage of the GIS is the potential to readily 
revise and update floodplain maps. Because all input data as well as the 
floodplain maps themselves can be stored in digital map format, changes such as 
in watershed land use or floodplain topography can be digitized to update the 
various overlays and input for revised hydrologic and hydraulic analyses. 
Output from the revised analyses is then used by the GIS to generate new flood-
plain maps and store the revised map in digital form. 
Current Limitations 
Topographic Data Collection Systems 
Although the state-of-the-art in computer mapping technology has advanced 
to the point where fully automating the flood insurance study process is 
possible, there are a number of constraints which preclude this being a cost-
effective alternative in the near term (Table 2). 
For topographic data collection, LIDAR is a representative example of 
airborne laser profiling systems. LIDAR is the acronym for Light Detection and 
Ranging and works on a principle similar to RADAR or SONAR. LIDAR systems 
measure distances by measuring the time difference between laser pulse genera-
tion and return of the pulse after reflection by the target. Mounted on air-
craft, LIDAR can be used to collect elevation data by measuring the distance 
172 STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING HIGH RISK AREAS 
1. Vertical elevation accuracy of current laser systems. 
2. Field surveys required for hydraulic structures and underwater 
sections. 
3. Availability and cost of hardware within the private sector. 
4. Existing digital data bases at a usable scale (e.g., 1:24000) are 
very limited. 
5. Creation of digital data bases by manual digltization or even 
scanning digltlzation with manual assignment of attributes Is 
costly and time consuming. 
6. Large study areas are required to achieve cost break-even. 
7. Digital map data from different sources is not in a standardized 
format. 
Table 2 
Factors Currently Limiting Full utilization of 
Automated Insurance study Systems 
between the aircraft and the land surface. This measurement is very accurate, 
wi thin centimeters over miles. However, the overall accuracy of airborne L.i.DAR 
data is a functiun uf how accurately the aircraft position can be determined. 
This accuracy does not yet approach that of aerial photogrammetric or land-
based surveys, although this limitation will probably disappear in the near 
future. Recent and future advances in satellite navigation systems such as the 
NAVSTAR Global Positioning System will provide a capability for precisely 
locating ground station control for airborne laser systems. Inertial naviga-
tion systems aboard the aircraft will also maintain accurate aircraft position 
data to increase the overall accuracy of airborne laser systems. 
A second factor limiting the usefulness of airborne laser mapping systems 
is the continuing need to obtain field surveys of hydraulic structures such as 
bridges and underwater channel cross sections. Thus, the costs of field survey 
efforts are not completely eliminated by this approach, so that they add to the 
cost of the total survey effort. 
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A third key limiting factor is that the availability of hardware and 
software systems as well as operational experience is extremely limited within 
the private sector. This is the result of the large investment which most 
conventional surveying and mapping firms have been unwilling to make at this 
time. As a consequence, although airborne laser systems offer the advantages 
of speed and direct collection of data in digital format, they may only be cost 
effective in situations where large mapping jobs are required in more remote 
areas. These constraints do not presently conform to current flood insurance 
study efforts in which the collection of topographic data is usually limited to 
small reaches of floodplain in developed and developing areas. 
For the near future, the APS offers the greatest promise for reducing 
surveying costs for floodplain mapping studies. Although the basic data ex-
traction techniques remain the same as for conventional aerial photogrammetry 
(i.e., manual interpretation of a stereo image), stereo model development and 
aerotriangulation procedures are performed by computer with the APS system. 
These automated functions may offer up to a 40% time savings over the tradi-
tional photogrammetric methods. Another advantage of APS is that topography, 
cultural line work, and land-use polygons can be digitized and stored to create 
a spatial data base for later computer manipulation by GIS. The primary factor 
limiting the use of APS in floodplain mapping is its limited availability in 
the ~rivate sector. This will probably be a short-term limitation. 
Geographic Information Systems 
computer generation of floodplain maps from digital data likewise has a 
number of limitations that currently preclude its cost-effective use as a 
stanJard production method. The main advantages of GIS cartography are that 
once spatial data have been entered into the data base in the form of a series 
of overlays, computer cartographic software allows the overlays to be analyzed, 
combined, revised, changed in scale, and manipulated in other ways that would 
be extremely time-consuming by hand. The major drawback of GIS cartography at 
present is the lack of available map data in digital format and, therefore, the 
cos~s of establishing digital data bases. 
Existing digital map data at a usable scale (e.g., 1 :24,000 or larger) is 
still quite limited. The USGS has recently established a program to digitize 
its quadrangle maps at the rate of 300 per year. Eventually this type of "off 
the shelf" digital map data will greatly reduce the cost of creating a GIS for 
floodplain mapping purposes. However, immediate implementation of computerized 
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mapping for the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) would require an ex-
tremely heavy investment in digitizing existing base map data. 
Although the encoding of map information through scanning can greatly 
reduce manual digitization efforts, computer analysis of scanned data beyond 
overlay and reproduction is extremely limited. More complex computer analysis 
generally requires manual digitization to assign attributes to particular 
points, lines, and polygons in the data base. This remains a costly and time 
consuming process. 
Another limiting factor in computer generated mapping is the availability 
of hardware and software systems within the engineering community. At present, 
the requirement for production of maps in digital form by study contractors 
would limit the number of contractors capable of performing such studies. One 
option would be to convert studies to digital format at the Technical 
Evaluation Contractor (TEC) stage, but this would be an expensive digitizing 
effort. 
Finally, the development of uniform digital cartographic standards and 
guidelines within the federal sector should probably precede any major effort 
by FEMA to produce floodplain mapping in digital format. In an effort to 
initiate such action, the Office of Management and Budget has created a Federal 
Interagency Coordinating Committee on Digital cartography, in which FEMA is 
represented. This group is headed by the USGS and is engaged in identifying 
the status of digital cartograph~ in the federal sector. After this assessment 
is complete, the committee will move toward the establishment of uniform stan-
dards, which is expected to take several years to complete. 
plans to Incorporate New Mapping Technology 
Table 3 provides a proposed schedule for phasing new mapping technology 
into flood insurance study production. Since essentially all initial flood 
insurance studies will be underway or completed by FY 1987, this technology 
will be applied primarily in the maintenance level restudy program. Because 
the National Flood Insurance Program will not be a major producer of new map-
ping in the maintenance level program, FEMA's efforts will follow the trend set 
by the primary federal mapping agencies (USGS and the Defense Mapping Agency) 
rather than attempt to operate on the fringes of new technology which could be 
considerably more expensive. Therefore, the actual incorporation of new tech-
nology will occur only after a clear benefit-to-cost relationship has been 
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ASCAl 
YEARS TASKS 
84-87 PHASE I: PROOF'()F-CONCEPT 
84 LIOAR demo 
85 LIOAR & APS _. GIS leasIbIllly 
86 LIOAR & APS applications 
87 Conduct GIS Pilot & ...... Technical EvoIuItIon ~ (I'EC) 
Guidelines 
88-90 PHASE II: TEC OPERATIONS 
86 Award high technology TEC controcta 
89 Begin TEC production 01 maps In GIS 'ormat , ..... .-
90 Begin digitizing older studies' convef1lng to GIS 'ormat. PNpore Study 
COntractor Guldollnes ""Iulring study 1UbmIu.t In GIS 'ormat 
91·93 PHASE III: STUOY CONTRACTOR OPERATIONS 
91 Award high technology Study Contractor controcta 
92 Begin receiving ",stud Ie. In GIS 'ormat 
93 Begin fully automated system 
Table 3 
Proposed Timetable for Phasing New Mapping Technology 
into Flood Insurance Studies 
established. FEMA proposed a three phase transition plan: Proof-of-Concept, 
TEC Operations, and Study contractor Operations. 
Phase I--Proof-of-Concept 
During the four-year Proof-of-Concept phase, demonstrations will be used 
to prove the effectiveness of new technology for flood study purposes. In 
particular, LIDAR and APS systems will be tested. GIS's will also be created 
and used to pilot test the production of floodplain mapping. 
During the first year (FY 84) one LIDAR demonstration will be performed. 
FEMA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers have entered into an agreement to 
test airborne LIDAR as part of an ongoing Flood Insurance Study (FIS) for Hays 
County, Texas. The LIDAR data is expected to be collected during september 
1984. FEMA hopes to have thoroughly examined the results of this demonstration 
and have developed conclusions and recommendations by late FY 85. FEMA is also 
exploring the possibility of testing LIDAR in some other locations during 
FY 85. Based on these tests, guidelines for LIDAR use in FIS's will be 
prepared and operational applications may begin as early as FY 86. 
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phase II--TEC Operations 
During the next three-year phase, TEC operations will be geared for the 
production of studies in GIS format. During FY 88, studies for which many 
revision requests are being received will be digitized and used to demonstrate 
efficiencies of computer-assisted revisions and to fully establish operational 
systems. 
During FY 89, full production of flood study mapping in digital form will 
begin for new studies being processed through the TEC contractors. Also in 
FY 89 a conversion priority for communities with older maps in hardcopy will be 
established. The priority a community receives will be based on the number of 
revision requests expected, demographic trends, and other data. Digitizing 
existing studies based on this listing will be initiated in FY 90. 
preparation of study contractor guidelines requiring submittal of studies 
and mapping in GIS format will also be developed in FY 90. 
The first APS demonstration will be conducted during FY 85, to be folloHed 
by further applications in FY 86. Use of the APS will result in the creation 
of a data base for a GIS. Presently, flood maps are not tied to a horizontal 
coordinate system that would facilitate the creation and use of a GIS. As part 
of a GIS feasibility investigation, FEMA will examine the need and requirements 
for horizontal control in floodplain mapping in FY 85 and incorporate such 
requirements in study contractor guidelines in FY 86. Testing lhe use of L!,e 
GIS to produce studies will occur during FY 87 and will inClude processing at 
least one complete pilot FIS in digital format by a TEC. 
During Phase I there will be a need to revise the TEC Guidelines and 
Specifications to require GIS techniques and provide guidance on procedures. 
This effort should be completed by FY 87. The TEC A&E selection criteria for 
new FY 88 contracts would include a requirement for the ability to produce 
flood studies and maps in digital format. This will set the base for phase 
III. 
phase III--Study Contractor Operations 
During Phase III, lasting three years, study contractor operations will be 
shifted to increase automation. Beginning in FY 91, study contractors with 
high technology capabilities will receive preferential treatment during con-
tractor selection and by FY 93 only firms with acceptable technology levels 
will receive contracts. 
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The effort of digitizing older studies will continue through, and perhaps 
beyond, phase III. The time frame for accomplishing this task will depend on 
resource commitment and advances in scanner technology that will minimize the 
resources required. 
Summary and Conclusion 
Technology currently exists to fully automate the flood insurance study 
process. Great strides are being made in digital topographic data collection 
and in the collection and processing of other map data in digital form. 
Advances in computer hardware and software capable of processing map data in 
digital form allow for the creation of Geographic Information Systems with the 
potential to create, revise, store, and transmit map information in far less 
time than conventional cartographic approaches. 
Such systems are not presently used in the standard production of flood-
plain mapping because of current limitations that inhibit their cost-
effectiveness. These limitations include vertical accuracy constraints of 
airborne mapping and profiling systems; limited availability and cost of 
hardware and software systems within the private sector; limited availability 
of existing digital map data bases at usable levels of resolution; the high 
cost of the digitization process required to create digital data bases; and the 
lack of standardized digital mapping specifications among agencies producing 
uigital map data. All of these limitations will be reduced in the future with 
the lmprovement and mass production of the hardware and software systems 
involved. 
FEMA, as a second-level map producer, will follow the lead of the primary 
mapping agencies in the conversion to fully automated cartographic processes. 
It is estimated that this process will take approximately 10 years beginning 
with feasibility studies and demonstration efforts followed by conversion of 
TEe operations and finally by conversion of study contractor operations. 
Transitions will be made at points where benefit and cost considerations 
justify doing so and in a prioritized fashion. The rate of total conversion of 
all community maps to digital format will depend on funding levels designated 
for this purpose. 
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FEMA USE OF AERIAL IMAGERY: 
A LAYMAN'S VIEW 
Timothy E. Maywalt 
FEMA Region VIII 
Background 
since October of 1983, I have been managing a project involving the analy-
sis of aerial imagery applications to FEMA programs. Its purpose is to identi-
fy proven, affordable remote sensing tools that can improve FEMA programs. 
Research and development was neither intended nor performed. The project's 
scope includes only those applications that have been used successfully by 
oiliers. The activities to be reviewed included mapping for flood insurance 
purp~ses; monitoring community implementation of the National Flood Insurance 
Program (NFIP); activities associated with presidentially declared disasters; 
and those associated wi th "other hazards"--unique hazards as defined for the 
purposes of this conference--managing dam breaks, mudflows, lake-rise flooding, 
liquefaction and others. 
The IILayman" 
FEMA did not choose a practitioner of remote sensing, e.g., a photogramme-
trist, to perform this analysis. There seemed to be some concern about the 
objectivity of such practitioners based on previous experiences. FEMA wanted 
reports that were credible (not products of an advocate), understandable (not 
written in the jargon of a practitioner) and persuasive in their objectivity. 
I was selected because of my extensive experience in the fields of floodplain 
management and disaster mitigation, project management, policy analysis and 
program evaluation. As a geographer, I had some familiarity with air photo 
interpretation, but my experience in remote sensing was, in general, quite 
limited. I was assisted throughout the project by a technical advisor, Mr. 
Monte Mingus of the FEMA Region VIII staff, who has had several years' practice 
in air photo interpretation. In studying mapping applications, we were 
assisted by Mr. Daniel Cotter of FEMA's Risk Studies Division, a highly compe-
tent engineer and experienced practitioner of remote sensing, to whom credit 
for much of the success of our project belongs. 
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Method 
Our approach was straightforward. We reviewed the literature, interviewed 
the practitioners, visited their facilities, and evaluated what we read and 
heard. For many applications, our task was easy, since much of what FEMA does 
is also done by other government agencies, most of which are far advanced in 
their reliance on aerial imagery. Several of the applications we reviewed are 
tried and tested and have long since been well-established as routine proce-
dure. As an example, in our literature search we found a document entitled 
"Fifty Years of Aerial Surveys of Floodplains," (Miles, 1979). 
In the case of floodplain mapping, we focused our interviews On Flood 
Insurance Study contractors and their aerial survey subcontractors. We asked 
what they were doing and how; the relative costs of air vs. ground surveys; 
their comparative strengths and weaknesses; the effects of the contractor 
Guidelines' constraints on reliance on air surveys; and what benefits might be 
derived by changing current FEMA procedures. For some applications we per-
formed field tests, for others where we were not equipped for testing, we 
recommended that such tests be performed. 
Findings and Recommendations 
The two applications of interest to participants in this workshop involve 
unique hazards and mapping. Unfortunately, from the standpoint of making 
comments relevant to this conference's overall theme, unique hazards have yet 
to be reviewed. Three recommendations have been made on mapping: 1) modify the 
Flood Insurance Study Contractor Guidelines to expand reliance on air vs. 
ground surveys as a cost-saving technique; 2) test LIDAR or other state-of-the-
art remote sensing tools for elevation data gathering and test computerization 
of study-related data handling, again as cost-saving techniques; and 3) inven-
tory air survey based techniques for performing "limited detail" studies to 
select workable, low-cost methods. Brian Mrazik and the Risk Studies Division 
of FEMA are addressing our second recommendation. That division is also 
arranging to have the Corps of Engineers perform a comprehensive review of 
potential improvements to the FIS Contractor's Guidelines (recommendation 1) 
and to have the U.S. Geological Survey inventory limited-detail study tech-
niques (recommendation 3). 
Our findings on the use of air photos in priority setting are not as 
positive. There appear to be little measurement ~ata suitable for priority 
setting available through air photo interpretation that is superior to existing 
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sources in strength as an indicator of rank, reliability, or accessibility. 
our findings on the use of air photos in monitoring efforts allowed for only a 
subjective assessment to be made because of difficulties in establishing cost 
effectiveness. We stated in the report that the benefits appear to offset the 
costs, but continued evaluation since then has yet to result in an objective 
assessment. We are continuing our review. We have not yet reviewed activities 
associated with presidentially-declared disasters. 
Conclusion 
As a nonpractitioner (I've graduated to slightly beyond the layman level 
after nine months involvement in the project), I can provide an "objective" 
viewpoint. There are practicable, understandable, and affordable ways to 
improve floodplain management, especially mapping, by adding or increasing 
one's current reliance on remote sensing tools. However, as with most tech-
nology, its use has limitations and needs to be pursued with an open, but 
cri ti cal mind. 
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INNOVATIONS IN LAND DATA SYSTEMS 
David A. Tyler 
Surveying Engineering Program 
University of Maine 
Introduction 
Land information used in the regulation and management of high risk flood 
hazard areas is inadequate. One cannot fail to reach this conclusion after 
studying the material provided to participants in this conference and looking 
at the recent history of flood zone administration. Existing mapping and land 
information systems are often of low or unknown quality and accuracy, contain 
inappropriate data, are not easily accessible, and are not in a form or loca-
tion that allows integration with other data sources. 
While this paper will deal primarily with the technical aspects of the 
land information situation, it should be understood that a significant COm-
ponenL of the problem is political, economic, institutional in nature and has 
little to do with technical innovations. Our ability to organize institutions 
to collect, integrate, and disseminate land data and information lags far 
behir,d our development of technological devices. 
In the United States we still tend to think in terms of ad hoc data 
collection and single-purpose mapping. We do not approach the land information 
problem in a systematic manner. This condition is slowly changing and there is 
reason to believe that progress will be made on the political and institutional 
front. Recently, publications by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS, 1983, 
1980) have indicated possible solutions. Innovative people and organizations 
in places such as the Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning Commission are 
showing us examples of what is possible. 
In spite of all this, serious technical problems remain to be solved. 
Surveying and mapping has been and still is a time-consuming and costly 
proposition. This paper will be devoted to recent and projected developments 
and innovations that may reduce the time and cost of mapping operations and 
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allow the presentation of geographic data in a meaningful and useful format. 
Any land data or information system must contain several essential com-
ponents. The following discussion will be organized around the geodetic refer-
ence framework, the base map, and data base management schemes--three of these 
components. 
Reference Framework 
A geodetic reference framework or control system is an essential part of 
any land information or mapping system. In the past, the cost of establishing 
required control has often been a major portion of the total cost of a mapping 
project. In many' cases, time and cost constraints have resulted in the genera-
tion of local maps not tied to a geodetic control network. Such maps and 
information tend to be of minimal use beyond an original narrowly defined 
purpose. A number of recent developments promise to revolutionize the ways in 
which we establish geodetic control. 
Global Positioning System 
The NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS), an array of 18 navigational 
satellites, is expected to be fully operational in the latter half of this 
decade. The system is designed to provide instantaneous three-dimensional, 
all-weather navigation to an accuracy of 200m to civilian users and 16m to U.S. 
government agencies and other authorized users (Heuerman and Senus, 1983). 
Signals recorded over a period of one to three hours can be used by surveyors 
to compute much more accurate positions. Six satellites have been placed in 
orbital planes that provide a "window" of several hours each day when survey,ng 
observations can be made. Several receivers are in the development process, 
and one instrument, the Macrometer, is already in commercial production and 
use. A typical observation with the Macrometer requires occupation of two or 
more survey stations for two to three hours and produces a computed vector 
connecting the occupied stations accurate to 1:1,000,000 in all three com-
ponents. Versions of the Macrometer now in the development process promise to 
be even more accurate than the current generation and more compact and easily 
carried in the field (Leick, 1984). 
The potential of GPS surveying is enormous. It is suddenly conceivable to 
measure relative positions over almost unlimited distances to centimeter 
accuracy in a few hours with no requirement for intervisibility between 
stations. All one needs to see is the sky. with currently available receivers 
costing in excess of $100,000 each, it is already possible to reduce the cost 
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of many control surveying projects. It is anticipated that equipment and 
project costs will be even lower in the near future. 
Airborne Laser Ranging System 
The NASA Goddard Space Flight Center has done research and development on 
a multibeam Airborne Laser Ranging System (ALRS) which measures distances 
simultaneously to six ground-based passive reflectors with centimeter pre-
cision. By flying over a grid of ground reflectors at two altitudes, the 
system can provide reflector positions in latitude, longitude, and elevation 
over an extended area. High altitude aircraft such as the U-2 and RB-S7 can 
potentially survey areas of up to 60,000 square km in one six-hour flight with 
an error growth rate of one cm per 100 km (Degnan, 1982). 
ALRS represents another possible technique that could significantly reduce 
the cost and effort required to establish precise geodetic control. originally 
conceived as a device to monitor crustal deformation and tectonic plate motion, 
the system could have many land information applications. ALRS is at this time 
not heavily supported by NASA. It is not clear if the system will be developed 
to a working prototype in the near future. 
Photogrammetric Triangulation 
Photogrammetric triangulation is a mature and well-documented approach to 
geodetic control establishment and densification. This technique involves 
photographing an area with a block of aerial photographs usually with more than 
the normal amount of forward and side overlap. A few previously established 
ground control points must be available around the perimeter of the area. 
These points, and all new points to be established, are marked with targets 
that will form clear, well-defined images on the photographs. Photo coordi-
nates of the target images are measured with precise comparators or analytic 
plotters. The ground horizontal and vertical positions of the new stations can 
be computed in the same coordinate system as the original control. 
l1any of these techniques have been used routinely to extend existing 
horizontal and vertical ground control used in topographic mapping. A recent 
series of four papers describes an application by the National Geodetic Survey 
(NGS) of photogrammetric triangulation to the densification of a county-wide 
geodetic control network to support large scale mapping (Henriksen, 1984; 
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Gergen, 1984; Perry, 1984; Lucas, 1984). A block of 750 photographs was taken 
at a height of 12,000 feet over a rectangle of 900 square km. Seventeen exist-
ing geodetic control stations and 380 new stations were targeted. The triangu-
lation yielded horizontal positions on the new stations accurate to approxi-
mately 5 cm horizontally and 10 cm vertically. This was accomplished at a 
total cost of $132,000 (in 1979 dollars) or approximately $350 per new station. 
This is certainly a lower cost than one would expect had conventional survey 
techniques been employed. It is not clear if satellite or inertial techniques 
would have been able to compete with this cost. 
Inertial Surveying 
The inertial surveying system is based on an inertial navigation unit 
designed for use in aircraft. A precise inertial platform is oriented in space 
with gyroscopes on three orthogonal axes. The three axes are oriented to the 
local vertical, north, and east. A sensitive accelerometer is attached to each 
axis and defines acceleration in each of the three directions. The accelera-
tions are integrated with respect to time--once to give velocity and again to 
yield distance traveled in each of the three orthogonal directions. The compu-
tations are performed in an on-board computer. 
The inertial platforms employed in aircraft navigation systems have a 
drift rate that is often on the order of one km per hour of flight. This ra.te 
is, of course, totally unacceptable for most surveying applications, but the 
performance can be improved by a factor of several thousand by periodically 
bringing the inertial platform to a complete stop, i.e., stopping the truck or 
helicopter in which the instrument is mounted. During these stops, which are 
called zero-velocity updates, residual velocities attributable to drift are 
sensed and observations can be at least approximately corrected in real time 
with the on-board computer. Based on extensive field tests, accuracies on 
ground stations of 13 cm + 12cm/hour horizontally and 10cm + Bcm/hour can be 
expected (Mancini, 1977). 
The cost of inertial surveying instruments is quite high, with a unit cost 
of several hundred thousand dollars, but these systems can establish control 
positions very quickly, and, when a dense control network is required, the cost 
per point may be quite competitive with other techniques. 
Base Maps 
A base map is the graphic representation at a specified scale of selected 
fundamental map information. It is used as a framework upon which additional 
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data of a specialized nature may be compiled (American Society of photo-
gramme try , 1980). In the context of floodplain mapping, the base map provides 
the primary medium by which the floodplain data can be related to the geodetic 
reference framework and all other land data sets. The base map may be drafted 
on mylar or other drafting material or may be in digital form stored in a 
computer. 
Progress has been made in the technology compilation of base maps in 
recent years, but the progress has not been as dramatic as that described in 
the field of geodetic control surveying. Topographic maps at the scales and 
accuracies usually required for floodplain mapping are still compiled from 
overlapping aerial photographs using stereo plotters with human operators. The 
plotters are more efficient than those used a few years ago, and the computer 
is often more intimately involved in the mapping process than it used to be. 
The output may even be in digital form, but the mapping process is still labor 
intensive and costly. A few promising areas of anticipated progress are 
described below. 
High Al ti tude Photography 
Since 1978, the u.s. Geological Survey (USGS) has been taking both black 
and white panchromatic and color infrared 9-inch by 9-inch photographs from a 
flight al ti tude of 40,000 feet above sea level. The panchromatic photography 
is at a scale of 1 :80,000 with a frame centered on each 7.5 minutes USGS 
quadrangle map. The infrared photography is at a scale of 1:58,000. 
The NASA U-2 aircraft, based at the NASA Ames Research Center, has a 
maximum operating altitude of 70,000 feet above sea level. These planes are 
equipped with a variety of cameras ranging from 100 mm focal length mul ti-
spectral cameras used for remote sensing to 610 mm focal length panoramic 
cameras. At a flying height of 65,000 feet above mean terrain, the panoramic 
camera is capable of a ground resolution of 0.3 m (National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration, 1978). 
Neither of these sources of high altitude imagery has been exploited 
fully. Significant economies would be possible if, for example, panoramic 
photography could be used to compile base maps and floodplain data. This would 
require analytical stereo plotters and the software to handle panoramic 
imagery, but it is reasonable to expect these capabilities to become more 
commonly available in the civilian mapping community in the near future. 
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Satellite Systems 
The principle satellite images available for civilian resource mapping 
applications are those obtained by the NASA Landsat series. These images are 
useful if repeated coverage of an area is important, and they have been used to 
revise maps with as large a scale as 1 :50,000, but they do not provide particu-
larly high resolution and have very limited potential in floodplain mapping. 
Automation 
When first introduced to the photogrammetric map compilation process, 
people often ask why further automation has not been introduced. At first 
glance, the procedure appears to be a natural for automation, and research and 
development work has proceeded with some success for the last twenty years. 
When the compilation process is examined in detail, it is seen to be very 
complex, posing many difficult automation problems. Elevation data and plani-
metric detail, two types of data almost always needed in floodplain mapping 
applications, are two of the types of data extraction least amenable to auto-
mation. 
This is not meant to suggest that automation of the mapping process is 
impossible. A great deal of good research has been done over the last twenty 
years, and much has been learned. Indeed, many of the fundamental problems 
have been identified, and research is now progressing (Horn, 1983; Wood, 1983). 
However, the solutions to these fundamental problems are not around the corner, 
and, at least in the near future, floodplain maps will be compiled by manual 
methods. 
Data Base Management 
Frank has identified three generations of interactive graphics systems 
used to prepare and edit maps (Frank, 1984). The first generation systems were 
graphics editors capable of storing maps that could be graphically edited and 
redrawn. A second generation of systems provided the same capability as the 
first but allowed the user to attach certain types of data to the graphic 
elements. For example, pipes could be labeled with pipe diameters and pipe 
functions. Such systems could also potentially answer questions such as how 
many feet of a particular diameter pipe of a particular age existed within a 
given region. The third generation of systems, which are still in the develop-
ment stage, store internal models of reality. Drawings and reports are simply 
operations to make the internal model visible to the user. 
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These third generation systems will incorporate the principles of database 
management systems in which the data storage is separated from application 
programs by a central database management program. Generalized database 
systems have been developed for a variety of commercial applications, but these 
are probably not fast enough to treat geometric data. The primary advantage in 
the database-oriented systems is their increased capability for structuring 
data. As the internal computer model approaches the external reality, addi-
tional applications become possible. The data can be used not only to create 
maps but also to direct simulation programs such as power flow calculations in 
an electric utility net or flood routing in a drainage basin. 
Research in the third generation systems is relatively new, and many 
possibilities have yet to be explored. Floodplain mapping would seem to be a 
natural area of application for these ideas. 
Conclusion 
A number of technical ideas and developments in the areas of geodetic 
control, map compilation, and database management have been reviewed. It must 
be re-emphasized that in floodplain mapping and many other areas of land in-
formation management, we already have a great deal of technology that is not 
always applied in the most efficient or logical manner. Of course, the techni-
cal developments discussed here will not necessarily lead to good floodplain 
management or even high quality floodplain information. There are, however, 
exciting possibilities in all of these developments that should lead to im-
proved land management decisions. 
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COMPUTER GENERATED MAPs: 
USE OF AUTOMATED DIGITIZING TECHNOLOGY 
IN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
Michael G. Pavlides 
Greenhorne & O'Mara, Inc. 
Resource management requires the assimilation of a multitude of data, much 
of which are derived from or appear on maps. Overlaying maps and identifying 
areas of intersecting or nonintersecting data is a common technique used to 
develop information for proper resource management decision making. When 
multiple overlays are involved, manual procedures become tedious, expensive, 
and prone to a high rate of error. Due to advances in computer processing 
speed and data handling, and to the refinement of the mathematical algorithms 
for spatial analysis, computer mapping is becoming an economical alternative to 
manual overlay analysis. However, the drawback now, particularly when enormous 
quantities of data are involved, is the speed and accuracy of capturing the 
necessary data into the intended computer system. 
Two commonly used terms in data capture are "vector" and "raster," A 
vector-based data capture system encodes data digitally by capturing coordinate 
pairs to describe line geometry. The (x, y) value of each point is input to 
the system--first keyed to a general reference grid such as digitizing table 
(or CRT) units, and then converted in the computer to the real coordinate 
values based on the true geographical position of the points. A third "z" 
value can also be input. It is most often used to describe a third dimension 
(such as elevation) or as a key to an attribute (such as soil type) assigned to 
the digitized feature. A raster scan system captures data in a column/row 
matrix with an intensity value (i.e., grey value) representing the artwork 
assigned to each matrix element. The matrix elements are called "pixels," 
short for picture elements. The raster data is then "vectorized" and each line 
fea ture "tagged" wi th an a ttr ibute. 
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Types of Automated Data Capture Systems 
vector Input and Processing Systems 
Typical data entry devices include manual digitizing tables with hand-held 
cursors; direct keyboard entry; or interactive CRTs. Our Autogis System uses 
this method of data capture. 
Raster Input (with Conversion to vector) 
Typical data entry devices include optical raster scanners, line 
followers, and electro-optical rectification aids with magnification capabili-
ties to assist in manual digitizing. Examples of raster scanners include our 
Kartoscan™ and the Scitex. The Kartoscan™1has a built-in video unit which 
allows the user to view the material through the scanner and select various 
line qualities for calibration. The system measures the grey value intensity 
of the line work being viewed and builds a histogram of the values. By setting 
the level of grey values desired off the histogram, the operator actually 
selects the line work to be scanned. Once scanned, the data can be vectorized, 
edited in vector format, and transferred to other systems (generally in vector 
format). Several software enhancements are available: square corners, smoo~ 
curves, the removal of solid fills and the leaving of boundary polygons. 
Raster Input (without Conversion to vector) 
The data capture devices here are the same except that data need not be 
vectorized. with data remaining in raster format, editing on a color rastpr 
CRT is much faster and more precise. 
System Attributes 
The advantages and disadvantages of each system vary. Vector systems 
basically employ a redrafting process that is subject to human error, dimen-
sional inaccuracies of the source document, and equipment accuracy tolerances 
(typically 3 and 5 mil). Data capture is slow. The principal advantage is 
that a skilled operator can make decisions about the data while digitizing. 
This "intelligence" and decision-making ability is only partially available in 
the newer automated systems and consequently remains an advantage of manual 
digi tizing. 
Automatic raster scanning is highly accurate and extremely fast. Total 
throughput speed to end product (i.e., digital tape) is, however, a function 
of how much data must be tagged with attribute information, and this system 
--rKartoScan is a registered trademark of SyScan,Inc. 
pavlides 193 
can, in cases, be a slower overall process then manual digitizing. Since 
scanning duplicates the original source document, the problem of positional 
versus dimensional accuracy is also prevalent as with manual digitizing. That 
is, if the original document scanned is not dimensionally accurate, then when 
true dimensions are inputted to the document, the output plot will be distorted 
relative to the original. Another major problem with raster scanning is the 
amount of data captured to replicate the original document. Too little data 
(i.e., low resolution) will not reproduce the source document satisfactorily. 
Too much data (i.e., high resolution) increases computer processing time 
dramatically and also causes problems in data transfer between systems. Other 
problems occur due to source document inconsistencies (e.g., feature over-
prints, crossing lines, varying line thickness, etc.). without software post-
processors, a considerable amount of human manipulation is needed. Quality of 
vectorization is no longer a problem with most systems. 
To summarize, data capture by faster scanning becomes economical when the 
maps or documents to be encoded contain large amounts of dense data or when 
throughput is a factor. Manual digitizing of data remains economical if the 
input documents are primarily low in density or mostly straight lines. 
Resource management projects for which our systems have been used 
include: 
State of Colorado, Digital Data Base--all attributes are callable either 
individually or by total topic. 
Fort Leonard Wood, Military Assessment--automated combination of soils, 
slopes, and vegetation overlays to identify helicopter landing zones. 
Thailand GIS--combination of seven overlay maps to determine land suitable 
for agricultural development. 
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A FRAMEWORK FOR THINKING ABOUT MITIGATION 
James Morentz 
Research Alternatives, Inc. 
Natural hazard mitigation is not a program carried out in isolation from 
other activities of government. Quite the contrary, its success will be found 
in an integration with ongoing efforts of governments at all levels. Because 
this study is about how state governments can best contribute to natural hazard 
mitigation, the focus of our framework for thinking about mitigation is on the 
state government. States playa pivotal role in natural hazard mitigation, and 
a strengthened program at the state level could improve the implementation of 
mitigation. 
In thinking about mitigation, we can begin by recognizing that mitigation 
can fit into ongoing efforts of society. These ongoing activities provide an 
opportunity for mitigation to take place within the context of existing pro-
grams and processes. What we are suggesting is that the end product of effec-
tive natural hazard mitigation can be achieved in some measure by finding the 
"right" place and time to intervene in existing programs and processes in order 
to piomote and conduct mitigation. 
Let us consider the programs or processes of society where mitigation 
might find a home. We suggest there are three, each of which represents an 
opportunity for mitigation at the state level. They are: 
• During new development, which offers crucial points of review during which 
the mitigation opportunity can be seized; 
• At any time there are existing risk conditions that are recognized as 
amenable to risk reduction through mitigation; 
• During the immediate postdisaster period during which redevelopment takes 
place, while risk conditions are fresh in the minds of policy makers 
and/or outside programs act to encourage or enforce mitigation. 
These three circumstances offer an opportunity for intervention in the normal 
flow of a jurisdiction's life. 
What kind of risks can be mitigated through some form of intervention in 
~ese processes? We suggest that there are two basic risks--those to people 
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and those to property. In general, mitigating the risk to property implies a 
reduced risk to people. However, a rich body of mitigation experience can be 
found in programs or projects that reduce the risk to people alone. Therefore, 
as we look at the broad areas of 1) new development, 2) existing risk con-
ditions, and 3) postdisaster recovery, we suggest that looking at people and 
property independently offers increased mitigation opportunities. 
Up to this point, we can illustrate the framework for thinking about 
mitigation in the following way: 
PROGRAMS OR PROCESSES RIPE FOR MITIGATION 
NEW DEVELOPMENT EXISTING RISK POST -0 I SASTER 
people property people property people property 
What Have We Observed About Mitigation 
One of the clearest observations about natural hazard mitigation is that 
it is implemented at the local level. While some huge programs have been 
initiated (that is, authorized and funded) at the federal and state levels, the 
actual implementation occurs at the local level. Indeed, we need only look at 
the reverse of the situation, in which a local jurisdiction blocks a state or 
federal mitigation program through nonparticipation, to see the leverage of the 
local government and its citizens. 
In our 1980 study of both natural and technological hazard mitigation, we 
observed this crucial local role in 81 sites across the country. In that 
study, and in FEMA's current (draft) guidance on mitigation ("A Mitigation 
Strategy for the Integra ted Emergency Management System," February 1984), it is 
suggested that mitigation can be accomplished by producing changes in one or 
all of three parts of the hazardous condition. Specifically: 
• Mitigation can act on the hazard to eliminate it or reduce the frequency 
and intensity of its occurrence; 
Morentz 
• Mitigation can change the way a hazard interacts with human systems by 
protecting people and their support systems that come into contact with 
the hazard; and 
• Mitigation can alter the way people live and the systems and societies 
they create in order to avoid or reduce the hazard. 
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Numerous examples of these three classes of mitigation are available and will 
be included in our final publications. NOw, as examples to make certain that 
all reviewers of this concept and guidelines paper are on the same track, let 
us suggest cloud seeding as a way to reduce hail and thunderstorm intensity; 
flood walls, dikes, and levees as people- and system-protecting structures; and 
relocation of people out of flood-prone areas as altering the way people live 
and thus avoiding hazardous impacts. 
Given that the range of mitigation activities is broad and actually can 
accomplish some reduction in risk of hazards and vulnerability of people, then 
the important question is: What is needed at the local level to implement 
mitigation? Here, our 1980 study and the recent FEMA guidance offer some 
concrete examples of the necessary components of a local mitigation program. 
Eleven types of activities were identified as clearly identifiable behavior 
undertaken by one or more government or private sector mitigators. These 
eleven categories of mitigation activities are: 
• Rules • Planning 
• Economics • public participation 
• Influence • Professional Training 
• Monitoring • Research 
• Management • Assessment 
• Structural 
Contained in each of these categories are several subcategories that 
further define the actual tools and techniques employed by the local jurisdic-
tion that has the capability to carry out mitigation activities. 
If we were to graphically depict the implementation of mitigation at the 
local level, it would look something like the following illustration. The 
eleven categories of mitigation activities are employed by a jurisdiction to 
implement mitigation which 1) reduces the hazard itself, 2) protects people, or 
3) alters the way people live to avoid the hazard. 
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This illustration suggestions that a local jurisdiction can select from amo'1g a 
variety of alternative mitigation activities to accomplish hazard reduction or 
avoidance. If we combine this idea with the earlier one that identified three 
social processes in which mitigation seemed most appropriate, we begin to see a 
growing framework for thinking about mitigation. Recall that mitigation seemed 
most promising when incorporated in the processes of a) new development, b) 
existing risk recognition, and c) postdisaster actions. 
Combining the local jurisdiction implement concept with the three 
processes ripe for mitigation, we get a scheme like the one illustrated on the 
following page. 
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OPPORTUNITIES FOR MITIGATION AND LOCAL IMPLEMENTATION 
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This suggests that the combination of mitigation activities, usually 
implemented at the local level, can effectively intervene in the processes of 
new development, existing risk conditions, and postdisaster recovery to produce 
an effect that results in reduced hazards, ,Protected people, or avoided 
hazards. 
Now, it is possible that a state mitigation program could implement miti-
gation by selecting from among the mitigation activities. This is the case, 
for example, on state-owned lands where the state agencies have the authority, 
economic allocations, etc. to carry out state mitigation. Those instances, 
however, represent only a minority of the opportunities that a state has to 
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influence natural hazard mitigation. The following section details how the 
state can contribute to mitigation. 
What Does It Take for the State 
to Seize the Mitigation Opportunity? 
In order to intervene with a mitigation activity in new development, 
existing risk conditions, or postdisaster recovery, there must be certain 
organizational capabilities resident at the state government level. These 
capabilities will combine to produce the state's contribution to mitigation. 
We say "state's contribution" because, generally, only a small part of a state 
mitigation effort is expended in actually carrying out mitigation projects. 
Actual project implementation usually occurs elsewhere. 
In order to be in a position to make contributions, the state must have in 
place a set of mitigation capabilities. There is tremendous variety in the way 
these capabilities are acquired and maintained. But, there is general agree-
ment that, in some form or other, a successful state contribution to mitigation 
requires seven capabilities. These are briefly described below. 
Hazard Analysis 
This term is a general label for the capability to examine the environment 
in a systematic way and establish an estimate of the risk to people and proper-
ty caused by natural hazards. The term includes any type of review of hazard-
ous conditions and their potential impact on people or property, including a 
postdisaster assessment of the consequences of redevelopment on future risk. 
Legal Authority 
Every mitigation effort must have a basis in law. This capability is, at 
the state level, almost an "enabling" capability, without which little else 
can be achieved. Legal authority to mitigate, however, does not necessarily 
have to be explicitly stated. Many laws are available, for example, that speak 
indirectly about the safety of people or the protection of the environment and 
could be expanded in their interpretation to include the objectives of 
mitigation. 
Organization 
Mitigation has an organizational component that must be consciously de-
veloped to be most effective. The models for such organization range from the 
formal designation of a lead agency or a hazard mitigation program or a mitiga-
tion task force to the informal recognition of mitigation as a problem that is 
discussed as part of routine agency coordination. 
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Economics 
The economic aspects of hazard mitigation are, indeed, another of the 
'enabling" conditions. As in the case of laws, however, separate budget line 
items for mitigation may be a bonus rather than a necessary element. The use 
of other program initiatives to reach the goals of mitigation is an effective 
way to minimize costs, although there is no getting around the fact that ob-
taining funds will be essential at some point in every mitigation project. 
Intergovernmental Relations 
state governments must work with both federal governments and their own 
local governments to see mitigation objectives achieved. The state's capabili-
ty to carry out intergovernmental relations in order to assure the smoothest 
possible implementation of mitigation is an important part of success. Enter-
ing into this capability, as well, are intrastate regional organizations that 
have a legal role (usually established by the state) in multijurisdictional 
planning and operations. 
Interest Group Relation~ 
The public at large and various private sector business and industry 
groups have a keen interest in the three processes (new development, existing 
risks, and postdisaster redevelopment) described above. How the state deals 
wi til these interest groups can influence the success of mi tigation implementa-
tion. 
Miti't.~.tion Planning 
Finally, the state benefits from a capability to actually plan and prepare 
for its mitigation contribution. In some cases, this will be in the form of 
formal planning for a mitigation project (on state lands, for example). In 
other cases, this capability might be called upon in the development of techni-
cal information or other products that are indirect contributors to mitigation 
impL,men ta ti on. 
Where Do These State Mitigation 
Capabilities Fit into the Framework? 
The state plays its role in mitigation as an intermediary between the 
'societal processes" of new development, existing risk conditions, and post-
disaster recovery and the actual implementation of mitigation activities to 
carry out risk reduction. Thus, the framework for thinking about mitigation 
that we have been developing now looks like the illustration on the following 
page, with the addition of state mitigation capabilities. 
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The state needs the seven kinds of mitigation capabilities to fully take 
advantage of the opportunities to reduce hazards. These capabilities result in 
what generally could be called the state natural hazard mitigation program. 
This program will span agencies, ongoing programs, and authorities. It will 
draw resources from many different areas. The result of this application of 
mitigation capabilities are products of state mitigation. 
As we have discussed before, these products could be mitigation, itself. 
More likely, from the state level, these products are contributions to mitiga-
tion implementation at the local level. Among the products you can think about 
as examples are: needs assessments for mitigation; mitigation laws; monitoring 
and enforcement programs; funding; technical assistance; planning assistance; 
guidelines for local mitigation plans; public information and education 
materials; information sharing; and coordination of mitigation efforts among 
jurisdictions. While these are only a few general and broad products of state 
mitigation, the reviewer can readily see the important contributory role that 
the state can play in mitigation. 
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SECTION 406 OF P.L. 93-288: 
AN OPPORTUNITY IF YOU KNOCK 
Allan Williams 
Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection 
When severe flooding hit Connecticut in June, 1982, I was in Wisconsin at 
the annual Association of State Floodplain Managers Conference. The term 
"Section 406" had about as much meaning to me as marriage does among movie 
stars; it was something you did in the future, you weren't quite sure why, and 
it was over relatively quickly. 
Months later, when the 180-day hazard mitigation report required by P.L. 
93-288 was due, I still had never seen a copy of 406, nor had I heard any 
scul:tlebut about a report due. 
January of 1983 came and I was approached by a fellow worker. 
"Allan," he said, "I'm really tied up in posthazard recovery processes, 
and I need your help to write an administrative report." 
"Sure," I said naively, "as long as it can be done in a few weeks." 
He didn't respond, setting the wheels of doubt in motion. I did not know 
it y2t, but once a governor accepts disaster assistance, the state must prepare 
a report delineating how it will reduce flood problems. Implied is the re-
quirement that if the plan is not implemented the state might not get disaster 
assis tance the next time around. 
"So when is it due?," I asked. 
"Two weeks ago, n he said. 
"Well • • "I prompted. "Don't worry," he said, "we've already asked for 
an extension. II 
"How come we are doing it?" I asked. 
"Well, the Governor's Office asked the Office of policy and Management to 
do it; and the Office of policy and Management asked the Office of Civil 
Preparedness to do it; and the Office of Civil preparedness asked the Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection to do it; and the Director of Water Resources 
asked me to do it." 
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"And you're asking me to do it," I added, now realizing that this assign-
ment required a bit more than copying two pages from an old report and adding a 
cover. 
I began to wonder if maybe I should pass the baton myself, but, alas, I 
realized that I was the last runner in this race. Besides, I'd feel guilty 
giving it back to my friend in the other unit; after all, he had put in so much 
overtime during the flood, while I had been at a meeting in Wisconsin. 
So, like Tevyeh in Fiddler on the Roof, I said to myself, "if on the other 
hand" writing this report could lead to some changes in our programs, "perhaps 
it's a good thing." 
As fortune would have it, in the very next month, February of 1983, the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency held a special session on 406 at its 
Emmitsburg training center. At that session, the following major points were 
made: 
• FEMA personnel stressed the unfortunate consequences likely to befall a 
state not complying with Section 406. 
• Collectively we all rewrote the outline for reporting 406 to make it more 
amenable to the states, while still reporting on the issues FEMA wanted 
covered. 
• The session was particularly useful to me because I left it with many 
ideas on what and what not to put in our report. 
• FEMA personnel stressed how stringent would be their reviews and how 
seriously they considered the task of preparing and following through on 
Section 406. It had to be done and done right. 
In short, 406 got sized up, FEMA got huffed up, and we, the states, were 
charged up. 
Report Writing 
The report writing began in March, 1983, and the report was signed by the 
Governor in August, 1983, proving such a report could be done in 180 days, even 
if it wasn't the correct 180 days. 
To me and many state agency staff, the process gave us: 
1) An opportunity to look at flooding versus other natural disasters and 
helped convince us of the importance of flood mitigation; 
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2) An opportunity to measure what we had already done; 
3) An opportunity to get attention from other state agencies; 
4) An opportunity to work together and directly with the Governor's Office; 
and 
5) The background and the rationale for supporting our programs with the 
Governor's Office, the state legislature, and with federal funding 
sources. 
i can state categorically that the results of preparing the 406 plan have 
been more successful than anyone would have thought possible. The Section 406 
Hazard Mitigation Implementation Measures report has been the catalyst for 
numerous posi ti ve changes. 
For example, during the writing phase, we were technically doing the job 
for the Governor's Office, and that office carries a lot more weight than any 
indiv:dual agency. Having the attention of the state's executive staff helped 
us de'Jelop a closer relationship wi th them and helped them understand our 
issues. This was not only helpful in getting cooperation from many state 
agen~1es, but it was invaluable when we had to go before the legislature, the 
bonding commission, and the Office of policy and Management. 
8ecause we were doing the job for the Governor's Office, I was able to 
borro" good staff from other programs and able to get cooperation from the 
highest levels. 
~e queried every state agency, asking each for a listing of unaddressed 
problems in flood mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. The 
results produced literally hundreds of program suggestions from dozens of state 
programs. Because we were taking the process seriously, they took the process 
seriou.sly. What we had at the end was a series of 18 first-priority actions 
and 85 second-priority actions. Each action was directly tied to problems 
brought up by one or more programs. Use of the input of others, instead of 
just our own, would be useful in getting new legislation passed, for we had 
made many converts to good flood management ideas. 
Report Approved 
At the end, we had the Governor's signature committing the state to 
attempt each recommendation. Equally important, the Governor's Office took 
full responsibility to see that all 18 first-priority actions would be 
addressed. 
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By the end of the process, we had gained many state agency and executive 
level supports. What we lost was FEMA's attention. FEMA didn't oppose any-
thing we said; they just appeared to lose interest. We received no written 
comments or corrections from FEMA on any of the drafts or on the final edition. 
The only message we did get, repeatedly, was, "Is it done yet?" While I did 
enjoy and appreciate FEMA giving us a free hand, it did seem a bit unusual that 
the FEMA national office, which had shown so much interest at the February 
Emmitsburg meeting, had so little interest in the substance of the report. 
It became clear that flood hazard mitigation per se was not FEMA's issue. 
FEMA's "issue" was only the procedures for which they were directly re-
sponsible, i.e., seeing to it that we report, not what we report. state prob-
lems and needs were just not as relevant as their direct federal responsibili-
ties. I've realized now, that, like parents who vow to be different from their 
own parents, we were, in a way, acting like FEMA when all was said and done, 
realized that we had only been interested in solving problems for which the 
state could do something directly. The Section 406 report did not have much 
municipal input, and that is a shortcoming of our report. 
It must be noted that some comment had been received from FEMA on sections 
in which we had put in work elements for FEMA actions. They did let us knO'o<l 
that some of the issues we brought up for them were being addressed, and I 
think FEMA was really requesting we remove any work items involving them. 
Nevertheless, by their silence after the document was signed, one must 
assume approval of all the action items. If FEMA doesn't do thei r work items, 
it would be unreasonable to expect the state to complete all of its items. 
A quick note on format. We followed the FEMA suggested format throughout 
the text and in the action items and found it to be a good outline. I appreci-
ated, however, FEMA's flexibility in not requiring us to follow the format 
exactly, for this led to a more usable and implementable document. Whethe~ 
that, too, was an act of omission rather than commission, it was nonetheless 
appreciated. 
Implementation 
The threat of loss of federal aid for future disasters is important, 
especially since we had three such disasters in six years (snow, tornado, and 
flood). This threat is implicit in the 406 requirements. It apparently is not 
well-supported though, because FEMA is reluctant to state, categorically and in 
writing, that such a loss of disaster assistance will occur if a state does not 
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comply with the writing and implementation of a 406 report. When going to a 
major political figure, to the legislature, or to some important commission, it 
would be useful for the sponsoring state agency to be able to say we must do 
this because it is a federal requirement, not because it might be a federal 
requirement. Mind you, I'm not asking for a sledge hammer, just a rubber 
mallet to help prod others along. It would be useful if the only handprints on 
your back are not your own. 
~t one critical point during this legislative session, I asked a high 
official in FEMA and several of his staff if they would write some testimony to 
support our position. The response: "Why don't you put something in writing 
to us requesting our testimony?" That's all we needed, a letter from a state 
agency asking a federal agency to intercede for us in the state legislature. 
Hence, we asked for and received no help from FEMA in obtaining funds for 406 
programs or in Obtaining necessary program changes. Again, perhaps it worked 
out best that way. In the absence of FEMA comments, I explained to key legis-
lators and state officials how I thought FEMA could cut off disaster assistance 
if we didn't comply wi th 406. 
'l'he wri ting and acceptance of the Section 406 Hazard Mi tiga tion Imple-
mentations Measures report cannot be credited with having accomplished all the 
gains that have happened since the June, 1982, floods, but it surely did help. 
Actiun items in the repoL~t that hdve been accomplished include: 
• Funding a new statewide flood warning system to be initiated this summer 
and fall; 
• Fassing new legislation regulating all state actions in the 100-, and in 
some cases, 500-year flood zone; requiring all state agency regulatory 
programs like the wetlands and encroachment line programs to require 100-
year protection for any application (private or public); and requiring the 
state to build any flood control project to be at least at the 100-year 
protection level; 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Holding a commercial and industrial floodproofing conference; 
Holding a dam safety conference for owners of private dams; 
Implementing recommendations of a special dam safety report, including 
obtaining six new staff members for the dam safety program and obtaining 
Qoney to repair 15 state-owned dams; 
Studying, designing, or completing about two dozen flood control 
projects; 
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• Obtaining approval for a small 1362 project; and 
• Revising the Emergency Operations plans for several towns and state 
agencies. 
These items, and there are more, have all been done in about a year and a half, 
that is, since we began working on the 406 report. 
Making It Better 
I am, as you might have guessed, a believer in 406. There are a few 
changes, however, which could benefit the process. 
1) It is not the intent of the present 406 process to mitigate the concerns 
of municipal flood management issues. Perhaps the process could be re-
formatted and the requirements changed so we bring the towns into the 
process and hence into the solutions. 
2) We didn't start 406 until one year after the floods. I would encourage 
faster action, and this would result in an easier time with implementa-
tion. When it rains, make gains; when it's dry, they only ask why. 
3) FEMA is too sensitive about their own programs. Why not have FEMA pro-
grams reviewed by and with the states and localities as part of the 406 
process? By agreeing to a few changes itself, FEMA can be seen as more of 
a cooperating agency and less of a distant partner. To that end, it would 
be useful if FEMA, as well as the governor of a particular state, signad 
the document. 
4) I think it would be more helpful to the states if FEMA had an active Tnle 
in reviewing the drafts and giving encouragement and assurance to states 
trying to do a job well. A pat on the back and some positive publicity by 
FEMA would help. 
5) It would be helpful if FEMA had some funds available after the 406 report 
was signed. Funds are needed for the staff assistance required to 
initiate and oversee implementation of recommendations. 
Some Last Words 
Approach the 406 process with a purpose and with seriousness. Be slightly 
evangelical--but not messianic--and willing to spend a lot of time and staff on 
the report. Don't be discouraged by setbacks. After all, as serious and 
difficult as we see the flooding issue, we must keep our perspective. We are 
fighting something easier than injustice, more controllable than the flu, and 
less pervasive than promises in a political year. Understand that 406 is a 
chance to change things and a golden opportunity to build a new foundation for 
state flood management programs for years to come. 
HAZARD MITIGATION IN BROWNWOOD SUBDIVISION 
Robert C. Freitag 
Federal Emergency Management Agency 
Seattle Regional Office 
Background 
On August 18, 1983, Hurricane Alicia made landfall over the western tip of 
Galveston Island. The next day, the President declared a federal disaster. 
Brownwood, a subdivision in the City of Baytown, Texas, was hit by a 13-foot 
storm surge. Almost all of the 300 homes in Brownwood were either totally 
destroyed or substantially damaged. within ten days of the hurricane a buyout 
program was presented to the residents of Brownwood and approved by the City of 
Bayto>m. 
This paper is an account of the events that occurred in the 15 days 
between the hurricane and the completion of the Interagency Hazard Mitigation 
Team Report. These events culminated in a successful buyout program. The 
paper suggests ways to quickly identify future postdisaster mitigation projects 
and r"di rf!ct our predi.saster emphasis. Thi s event has led me to believe that 
after any flood, even one as devastating as this one, there is resistance to 
change. This resistance can be overcome, but only when there is a realization 
of the hazard, the damage is significant, a quick response is initiated, tools 
are available, and the residents have discussed mitigation alternatives before 
the dlsaster. 
Reali:-:ation of a Hazard 
In order to overcome the resistance to change, there needs to be an 
acknowledgment of the hazard. Residents must believe that the event will occur 
again. In the Brownwood subdivision, the residents knew and accepted the high 
frequency of flooding. The si te was only one to two feet above high tide. 
When built, the subdivision was as much as 12 feet above high tide, but through 
subsidence the land had become extremely flood-prone. Some homes flooded 
annually, and all homes had flooded within the past five years. 
Burton, Michigan, offers a similar example of an area that has an extreme-
ly high frequency of flooding, but with only minimal damage. Until these 15 
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homes were purchased through the Section 1362 program, they experienced flood-
ing two or three times a year but only to a depth of 16 inches. Little perma-
nent damage occurred with anyone event, but the aggregate damage was great. 
For these property owners, frequency of the event was the key factor in over-
coming resistance to change. 
The importance of frequency was also demonstrated by the Kauai disaster. 
Hurricane Iwa hit poipu Beach on the island of Kauai with a force that com-
pletely destroyed at least 100 structures. The local city government was 
willing to undertake a wide range of mitigation efforts providing such a storm 
would occur with significant frequency. A board of scientists was assembled, 
and no member was willing to state that the storm was anything but a freak 
event--something greater in magnitude than a SOO-year storm. Because of this, 
no one was willing to initiate any mitigation efforts. 
Significant Damage 
It is almost axiomatic that the greater the damage, the larger the number 
of mitigation opportunities. We all know of major planning and rebuilding that 
followed the Chicago fire, San Francisco earthquake, and needless to say, 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Extensive damage is not the only significant variable. 
In the Brownwood subdivision, many homes were totally destroyed, and all but a 
few had substantial damage. Even so, the residents began to rebuild immediate-
ly, even when water covered much of the subdivision. Even though the struc-
tures had been severely damaged, the infrastructure and land tenure pattern was 
intact." This reinforced a conservative attitude toward relocation after the 
disaster. Reconstruction was only stopped when the city placed a moratorium on 
all rebuilding in the subdivision. 
QUick Response 
French Wetmore of the Illinois Water Resources Department has repeatedly 
argued that unless real opportunities are presented before reconstruction 
begins to occur, the chances for mitigation will disappear. He has stated that 
this period lasts about five days. The Brownwood experience supports this 
conclusion. 
Reoccupation of the Brownwood subdivision began before the water had 
disappeared. I personally helped a mother and her six-year-old child leave 
their reoccupied home seven days after the disaster. Stagnant water was stand-
ing in the building, there was no sewer, no power, and the residents of the 
area had been warned to watch out for snakes. She had reoccupied the home in 
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order to begin repairing the second story. She left only after being evicted 
by the police. 
Available Tools 
Incentives are needed to overcome resistance to change. These tools may 
be in the form of money, legislation, or legal advice. The Brownwood sub-
division package of tools included: 
• The availability of loans under the SBA Involuntary Relocation package; 
• Assistance to the city to clear the damaged homes from the site; 
• Funds through the Section 1362 program that were dedicated and set aside 
to purchase all insured properties; 
• Flood insurance claim assistance; 
• Individual Family Grant funds to qualified applicants; and 
• The possibility of HUD CPD&G and jobs bill funds to purchase uninsured 
property. 
Concurrently with and in support of the city's effort to discourage re-
occup~tion, the city residents were told that if the package was not accepted, 
the following would occur: 
• FEMA would deny all requests for permanent public assistance work tarqeted 
for the subdivision under an Executive Order 11988 no-action alternative; 
• The city would inform all other federal funding sources of Executive Order 
11988 and encourage a no-action alternative by other agencies; 
• FEMA would limit eligibility to debris removal only, and only to that 
which was absolutely necessary to ensure health and safety; 
• FEMA would ensure that the minimum NFIP requirements were adhered to for 
all substantially damaged structures; that is, structures would have to be 
elevated on site up to 16 feet above existing grade, and FEMA would use 
claim data as one index for substantial improvement; 
• Onsite demolition costs and debris removal, estimated to be about $5,000 
per property, would be the responsibility of the property owner, and no 
direct or indirect involvement by the federal government would be forth-
coming; and 
• EPA and other agencies would demand that new and substantially improved 
water and sewer lines located in the saturated soil zone be built to the 
same specifications as water crossings; i.e., encasement water lines, 
special joints, special bedding, etc. would be required. 
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The NFIP was key to the ultimate success of the program but should not be 
thought of as the only tool. The NFIP claims may total $20 million and will 
undoubtedly comprise the major source of funds used to purchase the homes. 
This is because all but a few of the homes were insured, and their replacement 
value was in excess of their fair market value. Also, the amount of money 
needed from the Section 1362 budget was minimal, approaching only $1,000 to 
$2,000 per property. However, without the other program, discussion of alter-
native mitigation tools before the disaster, and the speed with which these 
tools were offered, it is doubtful that the subdivision would now be free from 
flood damage. 
Predisaster Planning 
The success of any mitigation effort--whether it results in elevation, 
abandonment, or relocation--depends upon the attention given to the problem 
before the disaster occurred. This does not have to be a formal plan of 
action, but having an acceptable strategy in advance surely helped counter 
resistance to change in Baytown. The postdisaster period is no time to present 
new ideas. Residents need to return to normalcy after a disaster. 
The residents of the Brownwood subdivision organized themselves into ~'ne 
Brownwood Civic Association many years before Hurricane Alicia. The Associa-
tion actively lobbied for a buyout program. Several years earlier, the Associ-
a tion and the ci ty secured funds from the Corps of Engineers to purchase ho"es 
within the subdivision. The program failed only because the city was unwilling 
to provide its local share of the expense, not because of the lack of SUppcKt 
within the subdivision. 
It is important to note that even though every resident had analyzed the 
possibili ty of relocation and already had come to a conclusion about it, imme-
diately after the hurricane the subdivision residents wanted to move back to 
their homes. When the city tried to prevent this, local politicians and a 
large vocal group of residents threatened the city with a lawsuit. This was at 
a time when the subdivision did not have water, sewer, or power; and only the 
shells of a majority of buildings were left standing. The residents were 
apparently striving for normalcy. Only because the Interagency Hazard Mitiga-
tion Team could offer a realistic package quickly did the city capture the 
support needed to prevent the reoccupation of the subdivision. 
One of the most significant activities of the Brownwood Civic Association 
was to promote the sale of flood insurance. The almost total coverage of flood 
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insurance provided the key tool used to purchase the homes and, indeed, to 
remove the hazard. 
Future Direction 
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Mitigation should be thought of as change. Change is resisted unless a 
set of conditions are met that provides the force to overcome the inertia. If 
we think of these conditions as frequency, significant damage, response time, 
tools, and predisaster planning, we can come up with new directions in each of 
these five areas, and increase our chances of future successful mitigation 
efforts. 
The frequency of a hazard, like resulting damage, is largely out of our 
control. However, we could expand our effort to identify and publicize dangers 
in high risk areas. For example, under the NFIP the majority of 100-year 
floodplains in the country has been mapped. The enabling legislation also 
requires lenders to give notice. However, all action is directed to the 100-
year floodplain, and this is a frequency many people are willing to live with. 
Since the program has also identified those developed areas falling within a 
ten or 20-year floodplain, ways to use this information and to explore and 
identify mitigation opportunities should be explored. 
Naturally, we cannot increase or decrease the amount of damage resulting 
from any event. On the other hand, we can make restoration easier. We could 
develop tools that would make it easier to minimize potential damage to exist-
ing homes, elevate structures, reassemble land or build new infrastructures. 
The interagency teams have been increasing their ability to respond quick-
ly after a disaster. Realistic opportunities are being identified earlier, and 
we are starting to create a set of tools capable of supporting local mitigation 
efforts. Just a few years ago the use of debris clearance, temporary housing, 
IFG grant money for minimization, SBA loans, and temporary housing assistance 
would not have been so readily available as part of a complete mitigation 
package as used in Baytown. The set of tools used in Baytown should be ex-
panded and research into other possibilities encouraged. 
As an agency, FEMA is beginning to devote attention to predisaster plan-
ning. Much more could be done. Herein lies a real opportunity. The Inte-
grated Emergency Management System could provide a key tool in helping states 
and communities identify mitigation opportunities before the disaster occurs. 
Like Burton, Michigan, many regions have targeted future Section 1362 possi-
bilities. They have talked to the property owners, encouraged them to purchase 
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flood insurance, and have begun the discussion of relocation within the com-
munity. When a disaster occurs in these areas, the residents will not be so 
apt to want to return to the predisaster conditions. Similarly, through the 
SAP program, states like Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin have worked with 
communities to develop preparedness and predisaster mitigation plans, many 
elements of which will be activated or will become opportunities after 
disaster. 
Conclusion 
We can learn much from the Brownwood subdivision mitigation project. It 
is to be hoped that this will be only one of many analyses. Often we devote 
our evaluation efforts to failed projects. The Brownwood project was clearly a 
success. Each of the five conditions presented in this paper contributed to 
that success. The sum of these created the force needed to counter the resi-
dents' natural, spontaneous response to reoccupy their homes in the flood-
plain. 
In analyzing the Brownwood experience in light of other mitigation 
efforts, I have concluded that each condition is needed if postdisaster miti-
gation opportunities are to be achieved. The relative importance of each 
condition may vary but all five conditions must be addressed to some degree. 
Not only must each condition be present, but as the importance of one de-
creases, others must increase. In the Burton, Michigan, example, the amount of 
damage for any single event was extremely small. Yet on balance, the high 
frequency of occurrence provided the force needed for mitigation. Understand-
ing the issues involved in flood mitigation can help us identify realistic 
postdisaster mitigation opportunities early enough to take advantage of them. 
This understanding can also help us redirect our predisaster planning effocts. 
THE BAYTOWN, TEXAS EXPERIENCE 
HAZARDS MITIGATION LESSONS FROM HURRICANE ALICIA 
Randall B. Strong 
City Attorney 
City of Baytown, Texas 
Baytown, Texas and the Brownwood Subdivision 
Baytown is located on the north end of Galveston Bay, adjacent to the 
mouth of the San Jacinto River. The Brownwood Subdivision is located on the 
west side of the city on a peninsula of land jutting into small bays off the 
San Jacinto River. It contained some 300 homes, all of which were built in the 
19508 before a hazard was recognized. Recognition came with Hurricane Carla in 
1981, during which rising water covered the entire peninsula and put at least 
eight feet of water in every home. 
since then, Brownwood and in fact the entire Baytown/East Harris County 
area, have suffered from another hazard--subsidence. The Brownwood Subdivision 
has subsided approximately five feet since 1963, and an estimated nine feet 
since 1915. Although the subsidence has been halted by the conversion to use 
of surface water rather than groundwater, the effects are permanent, and have 
resulted in the Brownwood area being just above sea level and subject to 
periodic tidal flooding. In the last six years the city has had to deal wi th 
numerous flood alerts in Brownwood due to high tides, and has supervised the 
evacuation of homes in the area numerous times. In 1979, for instance, there 
were five flood alerts in Brownwood and four evacuations. The Brownwood resi-
dents formed an active civic association, the main function of which was to 
maintain their high tide alert system. When high tides threatened, they noti-
fied all residents in order to speed evacuation. The residents of the worst 
areas would evacuate; others would merely elevate their furniture, pullout 
their carpets, and ride out the flooding. The city had installed several high 
speed pumps to help drain the low interior bowl of Brownwood in an effort to 
minimize flooding. 
Although most of the residents had experienced tidal flooding, 23 years 
without a hurricane had encouraged most of them to view hurricanes as remote 
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threats, although the city continually warned its residents that the average 
occurrence frequency for the area is one hurricane every ten years, and that 
they were therefore 13 years "overdue." 
A Corps of Engineers project to purchase the entire peninsula fell through 
in 1979 when the citizens of Baytown failed to approve a $7 million bond pro-
gram to finance the city's share of the proposed $35 million buyout. This 
would have been, of course, the best possible predisaster mitigation strategy. 
This program was significant, however, in that the residents had been exposed 
to, and preconditioned to think in terms of relocation. 
Hurricane Alicia 
with the arrival of Hurricane Alicia, Baytown was no longer overdue. 
Twelve to 13-foot tides and 125 mph winds caused city-wide damage. Over 600 
housing units within the city were destroyed and many more than that damaged. 
Approximately 300 of the destroyed housing units were in Brownwood. Although 
the high tide from Alicia was lower than than that from Carla, the subsidence 
during the intervening years resulted in a much higher water level in 
Brownwood. Most homes had 10 feet of water or more in them. More damaging was 
the wave action, which had not been a factor in Carla. Many homes were C01,,-
pletely swept away by ,,raves, leaving only a concrete slab. This was an aspect 
of hurricanes for which most people were unprepared. Residents who had been 
through Carla, or had stayed in their homes during numerous tidal floodinyb, 
thought they could ride out Alicia only to find their homes being battered and 
destroyed around them. Rescue crews picked numerous people out of trees or 
from the roofs of remaining structures. 
One failure of past flood hazard regulations has been their failure to 
address wave action and other storm results besides those from rising water. 
Simply providing for flood protection to the 100-year flood level is not 
enough. I doubt that structures elevated to heights above the floodplain in 
Brownwood would have survived the wave action. Any flood hazard planning 
should take wave action into account. 
Lessons from Brownwood 
Predisaster Thinking 
Some predisaster thinking or planning aids any mitigation effort. Many of 
the residents of Brownwood were already predisposed towards a buyout, and 
welcomed the Section 1362 program FEMA offered. In retrospect, some additional 
strong 221 
predisaster planning by the city might have been useful. The city had not con-
sidered the section 1362 program as a vehicle for a large-scale buyout, and we 
had not familiarized ourselves with the program. Other communities want to 
look at their flood hazard problems to see if section 1362 can aid them in the 
event of a disaster. Some thought should be given to problems that may arise. 
Advance planning could assist in dealing with some of the problems Baytown en-
countered: 
Opportunists--Some people saw the disaster in Brownwood as an opportunity 
to make a few dollars. Numerous rumors were started concerning what FEMA 
would or would not do under Section 1362 and what the city was going to do 
with the area. These rumors were of course untrue and used to encourage 
property owners to sell to the opportunists rather than to FEMA. Some 
people were convinced the city was going to take the lots we received and 
sell them to Exxon for a huge profit. No one could tell me, however, what 
Exxon planned to do with the flood-prone property that would be restricted 
to open space use. A clear understanding of the Section 1362 program and 
publicity concerning the program aided in dealing with opportunists, but 
new rumors still surfaced occasionally. 
Die-hards--A few Brownwood residents wished to return and rebuild regard-
less of the risk or cost, stating that the area was their home and they 
did not want to give it up for any reason. While some of the die-hards 
had other motives, and some spoke from emotion created by their forced 
removal, a small minority sincerely wanted to move back. while Baytown 
has not found a method to convince these people that the best thing to do 
is relocate, other mitigation planners should recognize that there will 
always be people who want to remain in a hazard area, regardless of the 
risk. 
Profiteers--Some Brownwood property owners resisted mitigation efforts 
because they had learned to make a profit from flood insurance. These 
property owners recovered flood insurance numerous times, made minor 
repairs and pocketed the insurance benefits. Some of these owners no 
longer lived in the homes, but rented them to unfortunates who suffered 
through the various floods while receiving no aid. One property owner 
reportedly stated that he counted on at least one good flood a year in 
order to improve his cash flow (through flood insurance claims). 
Another aspect of predisaster thinking is the publicizing of hazard areas. 
Despite Brownwood's long history of flooding, some residents stated after 
Alicia that they had bought their houses only within the last year or two and 
had not realized it was in a flood-prone area. Although a common sense look at 
the subdivision height in relation to the surrounding bays should have fore-
warned anyone, a few residents were genuinely shocked that they got flooded. 
Many of these surprised residents were newcomers to the community and may have 
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been unaware of Brownwood's problems. I would advise communities with similar 
known hazard areas to continue to publicize the hazards and not to assume that 
"everyone knows about Brownwood." 
Quick Response 
A quick response to disaster is necessary for effective mitigation. The 
residents of Brownwood lost everything they owned in Alicia, and had no place 
to stay except for emergency shelters. Their immediate concern was "what are 
you going to do to help me?" The quicker answers can be given to victims to 
allay their fears about the future, the more likely they will agree to mitiga-
tion efforts. Although FEMA was at the disaster immediately afterwards and 
presented its plans within a matter of days, the victims' primary concern was 
when implementation would begin. Many owners were prepared to sell their 
property the minute the program was announced. The several months it took to 
get the Section 1362 program to the purchase stage allowed some to change their 
minds. The delay also allowed the spread of rumors and misconceptions about 
the program. It is obvious that it takes time to implement any program, parti-
cularly for a large area such as that involved in Baytown, but anything that 
can shorten the implementation time will aid the mitigation effort. 
After FEMA decided to implement a section 1362 program for Brownwood, the 
city convinced FEMA to open a local office in Baytown, since FEMA's main office 
was in Houston, some 25 miles away. It was difficult for victims to travel 
into Houston; they also had trouble telephoning, due to the large volume of 
calls the Houston office received. By opening an office in Baytown, FEMA was 
able t.o deal more quickly with disaster victims. I believe the opening of the 
local office helped facilitate the mitigation efforts more than any other 
single act. Victims were able to go to that office and have their questions 
answered--questions about the program which, if not answered, might have caused 
them not to participate. The local office also made it easier for city offi-
cials to work with FEMA on the buyout. 
Judging by the questions asked at the public sessions, any mitigation 
effort should include a means to clearly describe how the mitigation program 
works, with examples of how it will affect individual situations. A general-
ized description of a program will not suffice. The victims need to have a 
clear enough understanding of the mitigation program to determine how it will 
affect them. While the mitigation workers cannot address every variable, an 
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attempt should be made to provide several examples of how the mitigation pro-
gram will operate. The victims are anxious for definite answers to their 
problems, not vague possibilities. 
city Regulation of Brownwood 
As part of the mitigation effort, the City of Baytown took special action 
after the hurricane. Alicia destroyed the numerous lift stations in the sub-
division, making it impossible to pump sewage from the area. Raw sewage was 
evident in the water left in the subdivision. Power lines were down throughout 
the area. The water system was out, making it impossible to provide fire 
protection. Debris and fallen trees were everywhere. The fact that the sub-
division was obviously unsafe and a health hazard prompted the City Council to 
pass an ordinance banning the occupancy or repair of any structure within the 
Bro;;nwood Subdivision. property owners with proper identification were allowed 
in the area only during daylight hours in order to retrieve what few valuables 
might remain. This ordinance was intended to prevent anyone from being injured 
and to prevent the possible spread of disease, and had the added benefit of 
keeping homeowners from going back and secretly doing repair work that might be 
prohibited by the floodplain building provisions. 
This action carried some risk, however. A few property owners filed suit 
against the city alleging a taking of their property without just compensation. 
The C1. ty asserted that such action was wi thin its police powers to protect the 
health, safety, and welfare of its citizens, and that it is simply a limitation 
in tne use of the property, not a taking of it. As of this date, the lawsui t 
is still pending, the court having rejected plaintiff's request for a temporary 
injunction to stop enforcement of the ordinance. While the final outcome of 
this lawsuit cannot be predicted, even if the city loses, the loss will not be 
catastrophic. The city can simply rescind the ordinance and pay damages, which 
shadd be limited to the rental value of the properties during the period the 
ordinance was in effect. As the rental value of the property is minimal, the 
exposure in dollars is small. Meanwhile, FEMA will have completed its Section 
1362 program, allowing those who wish to leave to do so. City Council was made 
aware of the risk at the time the ordinance was passed, but considered it 
acceptable in view of the need to protect and help the citizens of Baytown. 
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Frequency of Events 
While I agree that the frequency of the event is a key factor in overcom-
ing resistance to change, I believe this issue should be refocused by flood-
plain managers. Brownwood's major disaster was a slow moving one--Subsidence. 
It was Brownwood's elevation and location that were hazardous, and these were 
the issues that needed to be addressed by mitigation. Residents of such an 
area should be shown and reminded that the hazard lies with the property they 
own, not the hurricane that may corne. Stressing this may help overcome resist-
ance to change. 
Conclusion 
Some of the problems encountered in Baytown may be instructive to those 
involved in mitigation planning. Quick response is essential to an effective 
mitigation plan. In known hazard areas, mitigation efforts should actually 
start before the disaster with attempts to predispose the residents towards a 
mitigation plan. Alicia demonstrated that planning based on simple flood 
levels, without recognizing wave action, will not anticipate total possible 
damage. Finally, communities should be imaginative in developing plans for 
assisting mitigation efforts. Baytown's declaration of Brownwood as a hazard 
area carried with it some risk, but so far the benefits have outweighed the 
risks. While a city's powers are not without limit, the law does recognize a 
governmental entity's right to take action that may be detrimental to the few, 
if such action benefits the public as a whole. Although our mitigation efforts 
have been opposed by a few, the majority support our efforts. On that basis we 
stand by our actions and would repeat them in a similar situation. 
PART THREE 
STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING HIGH RISK AREAS: 
Protecting Existing Buildings 
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A PROPOSAL TO REDUCE FEDERAL FLOOD DISASTERS 
Neil R. Fulton 
Illinois Department of Transportation 
Division of Water Resources 
Background 
In the United States there are 6.8 million buildings subject to flooding 
with average annual damages of $1-1/2 to $2 billion. In Illinois, which can be 
considered to have a representative sample of the nation's riverine flood 
problems, there are approximately 140,000 buildings currently exposed to 
flooding in the 100-year floodplain. Of these, approximately 21,500, or only 
15%, will be protected over the next ten years by structural flood control 
projects. 
We cannot expect structural flood control measures to take a substantial 
bitR out of the remaining 120,000 flood-prone buildings. Given the requirement 
that structural projects be cost effective, such projects can only be justified 
where large numbers of flood-prone buildings are concentrated. In addition to 
the environmental problems and the tremendous costs for structural projects, 
the ~reas left to be protected are dispersed in rural areas or in long, narrow 
floodplains. Therefore, it will be increasingly difficult to justify struc-
tural projects to protect the remaining flood-prone buildings. 
Nor can we expect the floodplain management requirements of the National 
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) to effectively reduce the number of flood-prone 
buildings. The NFIP's regulations say that if a building is damaged to 50% of 
its value, it must be rebuilt protected from the 100-year flood. This 50% 
threshold is based on an examination of court experience with similar zoning 
requirements. It is likely that a tougher national standard would be over-
turned as a "taking" of property without adequate justification. 
In Illinois, slow moving and shallow riverine flooding does not create 
substantial damage to a building. The average flood insurance claim in 
Illinois has been less than $4,000. This confirms our field experience that 
~e vast majority of flood damages will never be enough to result in mandatory 
flood protection measures being taken. 
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Therefore, we must realize that the vast majority of the 120,000 flood-
prone buildings in Illinois will continue to be exposed to flood damage. 
Assuming that there are 6 to 8 million flood-prone buildings in the nation and 
that only 15% of them will be protected by structural projects, there will be 
5.1 to 6.8 million buildings that will continue to be exposed to flood damage 
throughout the country. 
The Subsidy 
The federal government has assumed a role of assisting flood victims. 
Some of this assistance is in the form of repayable low interest loans and is 
therefore not counted as a "subsidy". Neither are structural flood control 
projects, because they are only built where they are shown to have a net eco-
nomic benefit. Therefore the cost figures in this proposal actually estimate 
flooding's drain on the federal treasury. 
The federal government's subsidy comes in the form of two programs for 
flood victims--disaster assistance and flood insurance--both of which are 
administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Over the last 
10 years, disaster assistance payments for flood damages have averaged $225 
million annually. 
Over the last five years the National Flood Insurance Program has spent an 
average of $300 million annually for claims and administrative expenses. When 
insurance premiums are subtracted, the net cost to the Treasury has "v"ragp~ 
$135 million. These figures add up to $525 million in average annual payments 
to flood victims, of which $360 million is a direct federal subsidy. 
Since 1979, Illinois has received over $85 million in disaster assistance 
and flood insurance claims from FEMA. In return for these payments, floodplain 
residents paid approximately $25 million in flood insurance premiums. In oilier 
words, for every dollar that is paid by Illinois floodplain residents, approxi-
mately $3.40 is returned to pay for flood damages. The federal government is 
therefore subsidizing 70% of the cost of rebuilding after a flood. This per-
centage holds true for the nation as a whole. 
This tremendous subsidy would make sense if there were reason to believe 
that the payments are used to reduce flood damages. This is not happening. 
Not only are there no strings attached to flood insurance claims payments or 
disaster assistance to require recipients to protect themselves from future 
floods, but also most of the disaster assistance programs prohibit use of the 
funds to improve or otherwise protect the property. 
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One solution: Emergency Preparedness 
What can be done to protect existing buildings and thereby reduce this 
federal subsidy? There are two types of programs that will have an effect on 
these buildings: local emergency preparedness programs and protection of indi-
vidual buildings. Local emergency preparedness programs have two facets to 
reduce property damage: flood warning and flood fighting. Simply warning 
property owners in advance of a flood has been shown to reduce flood damages by 
10-30%. When a warning is coupled with a flood response such as sandbagging, 
emergency protective measures, and other flood fighting efforts, damages can be 
decreased even more. 
The Other Solution: Protecting Buildings 
There are two ways to protect individual buildings from flood damage: 
removing the building entirely and retrofitting. Removing the building through 
demolition or relocation to a flood-free site has been tried successfully by 
various local, state, and federal agencies. Its use by state and federal flood 
control agencies, however, has been limited to areas subject to very destruc-
tive or very frequent flooding, where it is obviously cost effective to elimi-
nate damages. The only federal program specifically authorized for acquisition 
of flood-prone properties, FEMA's Section 1362, now has requests for funding 
equal to three times the amount available. There are four ways to retrofit a 
huilding so that it stays on the flood-prone site but will not be damaged by 
floodwaters. These are listed in order of increasing cost: 
o Wet floodproofing the building by relocating utilities and other hard-to-
move items permanently and moving damageable contents after a flood 
warning; 
• Dry floodproofing the building by waterproofing the walls and floor and 
closing openings so that shallow floodwaters will not enter the building; 
• Constructing a small levee or floodwall around one or more buildings; and 
• Elevating the building on fill, stilts, or walls above the flood level. 
To the federal government, retrofitting is the newest and most untried 
solution. However, these measures have been used in many instances by property 
owners, and they have been proven to reduce or eliminate damages. Furthermore, 
FEMA and the Corps of Engineers are funding additional research to refine the 
technology so that it can be viewed with the same trust as flood control struc-
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tures. However, other than Section 1362, there is presently no federal program 
to assist property owners to protect their buildings. 
The Cost of protecting Buildings 
According to FEMA's recent assessment of Section 1362, it costs approxi-
mately $40,000 per building to remove a structure from the path of flooding. 
This number is consistent with the findings of recent research and work done by 
the Illinois Division of water Resources reviewing actual retrofitting projects 
with local contractors. We calculated the approximate cost of each of the six 
nonstructural building protection methods and estimated how many could be 
protected by these methods: 
Technique 
Demolition 
Relocation 
Elevation 
Levee or Wall 
Dry Floodproofing 
Wet Floodproofing 
Average Cost 
$50,000 
$25,000 
$15,000 
$10,000 
$ 5,000 
$ 2,000 
Number of Buildings 
7.4 
11.4 
17.0 
11.4 
52.8 
(not considered) 
100% 
Based on the number of buildings to be protected, we calculated that the 
average cost of protecting the remaining flood-prone buildings with the first 
five nonstructural measures is $10,700 per building. 
If the cost of protecting individual buildings is so low, why hasn't it 
been done more? It has not been done by individual property owners to any 
great extent because people are people. They may not be aware of these prctec-
tion measures, but, more likely, they do not make their decisions based on p'Jre 
economic calculations of benefits versus costs. Many of them do not expect to 
be flooded, and those that have been flooded often cannot afford any more 
expenses. 
probably the greatest reason is that for the last 50 years floodplain 
property owners have expected the federal government to protect them. Many 
residertts hold out hope for a structural flood control project, and, because it 
takes many years to decide whether one will be built, they defer taking any 
measures on their own. More recently, floodplain residents have come to expect 
disaster assistance and federally subsidized flood insurance to bail them out. 
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As a result, private individuals' actual out-of-pocket costs to protect them-
selves are much larger than the cost of rebuilding after a flood. 
Flood insurance and disaster assistance neither eliminate the aggravation 
nor pay for all flood expenses. For example, Illinois River residents have 
been subjected to three severe floods within the last five years. As stated by 
one resident, "We were married to the river, but after it entered our living 
room three times, we decided it was time for a divorce." 
Implementing These Solutions 
To effectively reduce the $360 million flood subsidy, the federal govern-
ment must support flood emergency preparedness and building protection measures 
on a scale approaching its support for flood control, insurance, and disaster 
assistance. While this may sound like a tall order, we have four recommenda-
tions that could be implemented relatively easily: 
1) Change some of the existing rules for federal assistance programs to 
permit and promote building protection. 
2) Change the NFIP insurance rating system to recognize and encourage local 
emergency preparedness and building protection programs. 
3) Create a flood hazard mitigation fund to support state and local emergency 
preparedness and building protection programs. 
4) Continue the research and public information programs on floodproofing and 
other protection measures. 
The first three recommendations deserve more discussion: 
Recommended Changes to the Federal Assistance Programs 
A detailed review of seven major federal assistance programs was recently 
conducted for and is available from the Division of Water Resources. The 
report reviews three types of federal assistance programs: community develop-
ment assistance, disaster assistance, and structural flood protection. 
Community development programs such as HUD's block grants do permit relo-
cation and retrofitting of flood-prone buildings. The CDBG has had a signifi-
cant impact on mitigation work in some hard hit communities. However, recent 
program changes mean that flood victims must compete with economic development 
and low-income housing criteria. Because of this, not many nonentitlement 
communi ties have been able to obtain funding. 
The disaster assistance programs of FEMA, the Small Business Administra-
tion and Farmers Home Administration have the advantages of moving quickly and 
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being able to assist floodplain property owners when they are most open to 
thinking about reducing future damages. However these programs suffer from a 
common problem in that they do not allow funding of improvements to the proper-
ties unless required by local law. Because most flood damages in Illinois are 
not severe enough to warrant mandated retrofitting, most flood victims are not 
eligible for extra funding. These programs should be amended to permit funding 
of mitigation activities. 
The beginnings of such an amendment have been proposed in Senate Bill 
2517, Amendments to the Disaster Relief Act of 1974. This bill proposes that 
an amount equal to 2.5% of the total disaster assistance for public facilities 
be made available at a 50/50 cost share for local mitigation projects. While 
we support this arrangement, the formula only provides a limited amount of 
funding, and the funds would only be available to areas after a disastrous 
flood. 
The flood control programs of the Corps of Engineers and the Soil Conser-
vation Service suffer from a different common ailment. Each project must be 
justified with a favorable benefit/cost ratio. This is difficult to do for 
relocation because there is little benefit gained by vacating land. It is 
difficult to do for retrofitting buildings, because the techniques have not 
been generally accepted by the funding agencies and because calculating bene--
fits and costs on individual buildings is time consuming and problematic. 
We therefore recommend that FEMA or the Corps of Engineers continue their 
floodproofing research to identify where individual retrofitting techniques are 
shown to be generally cost effective on certain categories of buildings. For 
example, research has shown that most masonry buildings on slabs can be econom-
ically dry floodproofed if flood depths are less than two feet. As part of the 
project planning, the Corps and the SCS should review nonstructural alterna-
tives by checking these building categories and flood hazard parameters rather 
than conducting house-by-house detail benefit/cost analyses. 
Recommended Changes in the NFIP Rating System 
The NFIP can encourage flood protection measures by recognizing them iE 
its rating system. This is a common practice in the private insurance industry 
as shown by these examples: 
• Fire insurance rates are lower in communities with better fire departments 
and water systems and in buildings with smoke alarms; 
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• Jewelry stores have reduced rates for a variety of strategies such as 
alarms, extra locks, and removing valuable items from show windows; and 
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• Safe drivers and nondrinkers can receive reduced automobile insurance cost 
premiums. 
A community rating system has been proposed by FEMA. This system would 
provide lower rates for all policies in those communities that implement flood 
damage reduction activities such as a flood warning system. We strongly 
support creation of such a community rating system. 
The NFIP rating system should also provide reduced rates for individual 
buildings that are protected from flood damage. Currently, the system does 
recognize relocation and elevation by providing lower rates. However, it 
discourages small levees, floodwalls, and floodproofing of residences by not 
recognizing these techniques. We therefore recommend that the NFIP follow the 
lead of the private insurance industry and offer reduced rates for these other 
loss reduction measures. A detailed report on this recommendation is available 
from the Divison of Water Resources. 
A Flood Hazard Mitigation Fund 
The Illinois Division of Water Resources proposes that a new program be 
created to establish a flood hazard mitigation fund. The program would be a 
joinr. federal, state, local, and private effort similar to and built on the 
NFIP. The federal government would provide the basic funding, the states would 
provide guidance and technical assistance, and local governments would work 
with private property owners and lending institutions to protect buildings. 
In return for mitigation funds a state would establish a new mitigation 
assi,tance program, seek statutory authority if needed, conduct training, and 
provi.de technical assistance to local programs. The state's program would set 
minimum standards for building protection measures, identify where they should 
or s~,ould not be used, and train building officials and engineers in these 
techniques. The state would also promote mi tiga tion and the sale of flood 
insurance. 
The state would pass the funds through to local governments willing to 
initiate flood hazard mitigation programs that would include the following 
elements: 
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• participation in the National Flood Insurance program 
• Development of a flood warning and flood fighting program meeting minimum 
criteria set by the state emergency management agency 
• Development of a floodplain redevelopment plan that identifies the most 
appropriate protection measures for existing buildings and plans for reuse 
of any vacated sites 
• Administration of the mitigation fund for low interest loans or other cost 
sharing to property owners willing to retrofit or relocate their 
properties. 
The staff needed for planning and financial management is already avail.-
able in many community development departments. Small communities without such 
staffing could obtain help through intergovernmental cooperative agreements, or 
the program could be run at the county or multicounty level. 
Property owners could be required to protect their property to higher than 
the base flood elevation where feasible. For example, if a building is appro-
priate for elevation and the 500-year flood is only one or two feet above t~e 
100-year flood (a common occurrence in Illinois), then the building could be 
elevated above the 500-year flood. The property owner would also be requir~d 
to buy a flood insurance policy to cover the property for damages higher than 
the protection level. 
Operation of the Hazard Mitigation Fund 
The most appropriate source of the federal share of the fund would be a 
percentage of the NFIP premiums paid from a state. This arrangement autoIDil Cl-
cally allocates the money where the federal subsidy is greatest. It also 
provides an incentive for states to promote the sale of insurance, one of 
FEMA's goals. 
We recommend that 20% of the flood insurance premiums be returned to ~ach 
state for a flood hazard mitigation fund. While 20% of the premiums may so>md 
like a large contribution, in fact it represents only 5% of FEMA's flood re.lief 
expenses. This percentage is also below similar percentages used by the pri-
vate insurance industry. Specialty companies such as Factory Mutual or Fa('tory 
Insurance Association spend 7% to 8% on engineering services. Boiler and 
machinery specialty writers allocate a substantially higher percentage of their 
premiums to safety inspections. 
In comparison with this effort in private industry, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency spends an average of $525 million for flood insurance and 
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disaster assistance. In addition to these payments, FEMA spends 10% of this 
amount for technical studies and assistance to prevent future development from 
increasing the loss potential. However it spends only 1% for loss reduction to 
existing buildings (the $5 million for section 1362). Given the predictable 
nature of flooding and the technology available to prevent and reduce damages, 
this percentage is surprisingly low. 
FEMA is also the logical agency to implement a flood hazard mitigation 
fund for other reasons. First, the flood subsidy is being paid by its National 
Flood Insurance and disaster assistance programs. Second, FEMA has the organi-
zation and the experienced staff to administer a program that would pay for 
flood protection in those communities that adopt a mitigation program. 
Finally, the fund would complement one of FEMA's major efforts: to reduce 
the NFIP's subsidy by making the program self-sufficient. The current 
approach, to raise rates and cut coverage, has reached the point of no return. 
As a result of this approach, Congress has told FEMA to temporarily stop rate 
increases, and many policy holders have dropped their policies. 
The real problem with FEMA's approach to date is that it does little to 
eliminate the cause of the subsidy--raising rates and cutting coverage do not 
prctect existing buildings that are and will continue to be flooded and 
damaged. The proposal for a mitigation fund and local mitigation programs will 
do that. 
The exact mix of loans and grants from the fund would depend on criteria 
such as owner's income and cos t of the proj ect. The low interes t loan is the 
preferred approach for two reasons: the mitigation fund would be reimbursed by 
the borrowers, and fund money can be augmented with local funds. For example, 
with an assumed average project cost of $10,700 and 5% as the low interest 
rat~, total interest payments over a 10-year loan would be $3,300. At an 
assumed local mortgage revenue bond interest rate of 11 %, $3,300 would be the 
interest accrued by a 10-year loan of $4,300. 
The fund could provide $6,400, and the community could loan the $4,300 
balance needed for a $10,700 loan. Both the fund and the community would be 
paid their share of the principal, but the community would receive all the 
interest payments to retire its bonds. This arrangement results in $150 in 
financial assistance for every $100 from the mitigation fund. 
Illinois residents are currently paying $5 million in annual flood insur-
ance premiums. If 20% of this amount, $1 million, were put into a low interest 
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loan program according to the above-described federal 2/3 local 1/3 cost share, 
$1,500,000 would be available for mitigation projects. At an average cost of 
$10,700 per project, this fund would be able to assist 156 properties in the 
first year. 
The amount of money available would increase each year as borrowers from 
the previous years repay the principal and as flood insurance coverage in-
creases. If the number of policies doubles in five years (FEMA's target), 
after ten years a total of 4,300 projects would be funded for a total federal 
cost of $19 million. This arrangement compares very favorably with Section 
1362. At its current funding level, 1362 will cost $46 million over the next 
ten years and will protect 1,150 properties at $40,000 each. 
Such an expense is appropriate because Section 1362 will assist the worst 
flood problems, and it has been shown to have an early impact on the flood 
insurance fund. On the other hand, the federal funds under this proposal can 
help nine families for everyone protected by Section 1362. If the federal 
government is willing to fund 1362 to the tune of $40,000 per property, it 
should be willing to complement its current financial assistance arrangement, 
help more property owners, and reduce the drain on the flood insurance fund. 
Summary 
We must recognize that the federal government's $360 million flood subsidy 
will not- be substantially reduced by current approaches. The existing fedcrCll 
programs to reduce flood damages, structural flood control projects, disaster 
assistance and subsidized insurance, and local regulations, cannot be expected 
to remove more than 15-20% of the buildings exposed to flood damage. 
What is needed are new federal incentives for local emergency preparedness 
programs and nonstructural building protection. We have recommended four ways 
to do this: 
1) Change some of the existing rules for federal assistance programs to 
permit and promote building protection. without such changes federal 
funds will continue to be poured into existing buildings--to repair them 
in order to be flooded again--and continue to drain the National Flood 
Insurance Fund. 
2) Change the NFIP insurance rating system to recognize and encourage local 
emergency preparedness and building protection programs. A rating system 
that reflects flood protection measures taken by the community and by each 
property owner will make the NFIP more consistent with private industry. 
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3) Create a flood hazard mitigation fund to support state and local emergency 
preparedness and building protection programs. By using the fund for low 
interest loans, federal dollars can be matched and the fund can be re-
plenished, bringing much greater returns than section 1362. 
4) Continue the research and public information programs on floodproofing and 
other protection measures. 
In its enabling statutes, the NFIP was designed to be re-examined as ex-
perience was gained in this new federal initiative. At first, the NFIP focused 
on obtaining data on flood hazards and having local governments enact minimum 
regulations to ensure that future development would not be subject to flood 
damages. By having the majority of the flood-prone communities studied and 
converted to the regular program, FEMA has successfully accomplished this first 
step. 
The second effort of the NFIP was to ensure effective local floodplain 
management programs. This, too, has been successfully addressed through the 
CAPE process and the state Assistance Program. 
FEMA's current effort is to make the program self-sufficient by 1988. Its 
approach to this has gone about as far as it can, and it still does little to 
address the cause of the federal subsidy or the concerns of most flood victims: 
damages to existing flood-prone buildings. This proposal will do that, and it 
can be implemented with the existing organization at only a slight cost to the 
insurance fund. The benefits gained will be well worth the cost. 
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FORT WAYNE/ALLEN COUNTY FLOOD PROTECTION PLAN 
Norman A. Abbott 
Community Development and Planning 
Fort Wayne, Indiana 
Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to present and explain the local perspective 
of what happens after a presidentially declared flood disaster. I will try to 
provide the local perspective through 1) a brief description of the flood; 2) 
a discussion of the Fort Wayne/Allen County Flood Protection Plan--its content, 
citizen and agency input, and implementation; and 3) lessons learned. 
What I hope to leave you with is an understanding of 1) the importance of 
the development of a local plan; 2) the idea that the plan should be completed 
rapidly; 3) the need for much citizen and agency input; 4) the need (when 
complete) to carve off a first-phase implementation work program; 5) the need 
to tap mUltiple funding sources; and 6) the need to have an undying commitment 
to the plan and to the cause of flood protection. (The work takes an in-
credible amount of time and tenaci ty) • 
The Flood 
Fort Wayne, Indiana, experienced a severe flood in March, 1982, and was 
declared a Presidential Disaster Area. The flood crested near the 100-year 
elevation and remained over flood stage for approximately one week. Although 
the city initiated a flood fight with 35,000 volunteers, filled a million 
sandbags, and saved 1,860 properties, the flood water damaged 1,760 residential 
structures and approximately 260 businesses. The total cost of the 1982 flood 
was over $53 million. The cost would have been over $80 million if the areas 
saved had been lost. 
After the crest, Fort Wayne established three task forces to deal with the 
flood and to plan for the future. The task forces reported to a policy 
committee so that they could be directed along a similar path. One task force 
dealt with evaluating the flood fighting effort and the Emergency Operation 
Center. The second dealt with recovery from the disaster. This involved 
examining all aspects of getting people back into their homes after the flood--
including cleanup, temporary housing, assistance programs, housing inspections, 
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and security against looting. The third task force was given the responsibili-
ty of developing a flood protection plan. The plan, put together after 30 days 
of city/county effort, is published in its entirety in a document called the 
Fort Wayne/Allen County Flood Protection Plan, and is also published in 
abstract form. 
Fort wayne/Allen County Flood Protection Plan 
Documentation of Flooding History and Cost 
The plan spends considerable time documenting the history of flooding and 
the cost of flooding in Fort Wayne. This is important in order to establish 
the record and thereby insure that people do not forget the events of the past. 
It was found that Fort wayne is often flooded. In fact, one damaging flood has 
occurred, on the average, every five years throughout the 1800s and 1900s. In 
addition, it was found that Fort Wayne was declared a Presidential Flood 
Disaster Area in 1959, 1978, and 1982. The plan documented that there had been 
a series of studies drafted after the major floods--in 1913, 1943, 1959, and 
1976. It was determined that very little comprehensive implementation of those 
studies had taken place, although incremental dike improvement and other 
miscellaneous flood protection activities had been carried out. The plan also 
documented the 'extent of flooding in 1982. This was done with slides as well 
as graphics, and identified the residential, institutional, industrial, and 
commercial areas that were inundated by flood waters in 1982. 
Finally, the plan documented the cost of the flood of 1982. It is very 
important that this cost data be based upon a sound methodology because it must 
stand the scrutiny of FEMA, which is also putting together cost data. It also 
has to stand the ongoing test of the Corps of Engineers, because they use cost 
data in their cost/benefit analysis. 
The plan based the cost data upon private, as well as, public costs in 
terms of the emergency itself, the primary impact area, the secondary impact 
area (not flooded but affected by truck traffic and other associated problems), 
and the costs for the potential impact area (that area saved). It is important 
to have "worst case" data to explain what could have happened. (It was close 
to a miracle that Fort wayne was able to get the volunteers, sandbags, and 
weather conditions necessary to avoid suffering additional damages). 
Alternative Solutions 
The plan studied nine solutions to the flooding problem in Fort 
Wayne/Allen County based upon six alternative concepts. The concept~ included 
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diversion channels, evacuation of the floodplain, floodproofing, dams and 
reservoirs, river channel improvements, and massive dike building. The cost 
for these alternatives ranged from $10S million to $232 million. The alterna-
tives were evaluated on social, economic, and natural environment character-
istics as well as effectiveness, reliability, and public acceptance. A solu-
tion containing both short-range and long-range plans was selected. The short-
range plan consisted of many improvements including diking, channel improve-
ments, tide gates, acquisition, pumping stations, etc., that could be started 
immediately. The long-range project called for a major diversion channel to be 
constructed that would not be possible to implement without Corps of Engineers 
involvement. 
Citizen and Agency Input 
During the development of the plan (as well as after it was drafted) our 
staff worked hand in hand with the Indiana Department of Natural Resources, 
Corps of Engineers, and FEMA to assure that our plans and efforts were well 
coordinated. We traveled to Washington, D.C., twice, once immediately after 
the flood, and once after the plan was completed. In these sessions we dis-
cussed with our senators, representatives, and the Corps of Engineers the 
aspects of the flood in Fort Wayne. At home we conducted some 45 public meet-
ings and involved over 3,000 people. In addition, the staff testified in front 
of the State Natural Resources Commission and provided testimony to the State 
legislature. In the final analysis, the plan was adopted by the Fort Wayne 
Common Council. 
Implementing the plan 
The 1S-Month Work Program 
The entire plan outlined in the document would cost somewhere in the 
neighborhood of $120 million to implement. Therefore, it was essential to 
divide that plan into some manageable increments that could be funded. This 
was accomplished through the development of an 18-Month Work Program. I am 
pleased to report that the 1S-Month Work Program, which included $11 million 
;,orth of work, is nearly completely accomplished. The Work Program involved 
eight different funding sources. They were the u.S. Geological Survey, the 
State Department of Natural Resources, Community Development Block Grant funds, 
FEMA, the City budget, the Corps of Engineers (Public Law 84-99), a Park Bond, 
and finally the Fort wayne City Utilities. I would also like to point out that 
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it is important to make maximum use of the funds available through the Damage 
Survey Reports. 
A diversity of projects were undertaken in the 18-Month Work Program. 
River gauges, a flood hazard early warning system, and a floodproofing program 
were funded. Minor repairs were made to dikes, major dike repair using Public 
Law 84-99 was accomplished, the height of certain dikes was increased, and new 
dikes were installed to protect certain public improvements. In addition, 
backwater gates have been installed, certain channel improvements were imple-
mented, and the City has acquired 24 houses and removed them from the flood-
plain. Finally, the Work Program calls for the restoration of two major pump-
ing stations. 
It should be pointed out that local government is required to come up wi~h 
25% of the costs associated with projects covered by the Damage Survey Reports. 
In Fort Wayne's case that was nearly $1.7 million. All DSR work was included 
in the IS-Month Work Program. 
Other Implementation Measures 
Four additional elements outside the Work Program are important to imple-
!IIlentation. One is the development of an Emergency Action plan. The Emergency 
,,"etian Plan is designed to clearly identify the items that need to be done 
before and during the flood. It identifies a time frame to be repeated each 
year to prepare neighborhoods that are subject to flooding and to prepare the 
city through internal meetings. It addresses sandbag storage and various other 
ite!lllsassociated with being prepared for the possibility of a flood. The 
ED'er''lIency Action plan outlines all of the processes that are necessary for 
_na'lling a flood, including dike building, dike patrol, media involvement, 
solicitation and maximum use of volunteers, and the management of food and 
transportation problems. 
Secondly, it is absolutely essential that some entity be established 
outside local government to implement flood protection. This entity needs to 
have the foll,owing characteristics: the power to work across jurisdictional 
boundaries, the primary responsibility for flood control, the ability to be 
isolated from political change, and the ability to raise funds. In Fort Wayne 
we are still working to accomplish this objective. We are pursuing a law that 
is on the Indiana books that allows for the creation of a Conservancy District. 
The process is very long and frustrating, but we are pursuing it with vigor. 
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In addition, implementation is assisted by making necessary revisions in 
the floodplain zoning ordinance. We are making improvements to the zoning 
ordinance to bring it in compliance with the National Flood Insurance Program. 
Among other changes, we are taking steps necessary to insure that floodway 
develop.ent is prohibi tea in the future. 
Finally, the success of any major flood protection program is dependent 
upon the involvement of the Corps of Engineers. Fort Wayne recognized that 
fact froll the start and worked closely with the Corps of Engineers in t.he 
development of the Fort wayne/Allen County Flood Protection Plan. The Corps is 
currently finishing a reconnaissance study that may lead to the next step--a 
feasibili ty study of Fort Wayne/Allen County watershed--and ultimately to the 
involvement of the Corps of Engineers in constructing the improvements that are 
necessary in Fort Wayne. 
Conclusion 
There are several lessons to be learned by floodplain managers from Fort 
Wayne's experience: 
1) Target planning efforts before the flood occurs. Promote flood insurance, 
floodproofing, and wise land use planning through floodplain zoning. In 
extremely hazardous areas, consider relocation as early as possible. 
2) Create a mitigation planning team immediately. Because of the pressing 
recovery work that needs attention, there is a temptation to defer plan-
ning until later and thereby miss opportunities. 
3) Develop a local plan quickly. In order to be in control of your own 
destiny, it is necessary to develop a local plan. The local planning 
process must spawn an understanding of the problem, a thorough examination 
of alternative solutions, and a commitment to implementation. The plan 
must be used to communicate locally, to the state, as well as to the 
federal government. 
4) Coordinate state and federal plans. The Federal Emergency Management 
Agency and the state natural resources department are mandated to develop 
hazard mitigation plans. These plans must be coordinated with local 
planners. 
5) Seek assistance. You are not alone in dealing with the disaster. A 
number of organizations, reading materials, and private consultants can 
help--including, of course, the Association of State Floodplain Managers. 
6) Coordinate and organize. The need for coordination and organization 
cannot be overemphasized. support from local citizens, FEMA, the state, 
the Corps, your senators and representatives, and leadership from your 
local executive branch are absolutely necessary to success of a plan. 
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7) Develop an undying commitment to the cause. In Fort Wayne, the 1982 flood 
is still a large consumer of staff resources. within the past three 
months the staff has participated in two conservancy district hearings--
one convened by a district court judge and one conducted by the Department 
of Natural Resources. In both of those cases, the staff had to come fully 
prepared to discuss the flood and all the associated data that had been 
gathered as part of the Flood Protection Plan. In addition, the Corps of 
Engineers has just left Fort Wayne with the cost data that they needed for 
the reconnaissance study. Finally, the ongoing request for funding, the 
ongoing public presentations, and in some cases lawsuits, require a con-
tinued commitment. It can be somewhat frustrating to present (again and 
again) information that was developed some time ago, but it is necessary 
to have the fortitude and the professionalism to keep the project moving. 
PART THREE 
STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING HIGH RISK AREAS: 
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CRITICAL HURRICANE EVACUATION PROBLEMS: 
THE NEED FOR INNOVATIVE EVACUATION PLANNING 
David A. Griffith 
Tampa Bay Regional Planning Council 
Introduction 
------
In the last five years, the availability of new quantitative hurricane 
hazard analysis tools and a planning method linking transportation, demo-
graphic, and behavioral evacuation analysis has allowed comprehensive studies 
to answer critical questions on a given area's hurricane vulnerability. The 
two major, previously unanswered, questions were 1) what specific geographic 
areas must be evacuated in advance of the approaching hurricane? and 2) how 
long would such a prestorm relocation of vulnerable residents take (evacuation 
time)? 
In 1978, a hurricane evacuation planning effort for Lee County, Florida, 
yielded an analytical method, combining all quantifiable factors of local 
hurricane vulnerability, to calculate county evacuation times. The limited 
geographical scope of the study (it only addressed Lee County) did not allow 
the examination of how cuncurrent adjacent county evacuation would affect Lee 
County's evacuation time. Since a hurricane will demand the evacuation of 
several contiguous counties, merging evacuees from neighboring counties will 
increase a given county's evacuation time. Hence, a conclusion of the Lee 
County effort was that quantitative evacuation planning must be multicounty or 
regional in scope, yet the resulting plan must be able to be implemented at the 
local level. 
In 1980, the Lee County Evacuation plan methodology was utilized to formu-
late a four-county evacuation plan for the Tampa Bay region. The Tampa Bay 
Plan not only was the nation's first regional comprehensive hurricane evacua-
tion study, but also was the first effort to utilize the newly-developed SLOSH 
numerical storm surge model as its primary hazard analysis tool. For the first 
time, the computerized SLOSH (sea, lake, and overland surges from hurricanes) 
model made it possible for planners to identify land areas predicted to be 
inundated by overland hurricane storm surge based on several factors beyond 
simple land elevation (offshore bathymetry, track of storm, hydrologic 
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friction, etc.) The use of the SLOSH model resulted in answers to the ques-
tions of which specific geographic areas would have to be evacuated due to 
various intensities of hurricanes. In addition, the SLOSH results were com-
bined with population/vehicle data, a behavioral survey, and computerized 
transportation modeling to calculate the time necessary to evacuate those areas 
before the hurricane made landfall (evacuation time). Indeed, the findings of 
the Tampa Bay Region Hurricane Evacuation plan Technical Data Report quanti-
tatively answered the two major questions of local hurricane vulnerability. 
The report was also adopted by the four counties of the region as the basis for 
their individual hurricane evacuation operations plans. However, the answers 
to those two questions presented a sobering picture of potential loss of life 
given the traditional response to an approaching hurricane. 1) The geographic 
areas of the region that would have to be evacuated from the direct strike of a 
hurricane would mean the relocation of bebleen 200,000 and 800,000 coastal 
residents from the four counties, depending upon the intensity and track of the 
hurricane. 2) The amount of time necessary to evacuate those residents to safe 
shelter before hurricane landfall ranged between 12 and 18 hours, again depend-
ing upon the intensity and track of the hurricane. 
The magnitude of these population figures and evacuation times now makes 
one thing evident: the traditional response to an approaching hurricane will 
not prevent large-scale loss of life. The reasons for this are evidenced by 
the critical hurricane evacuation problems defined and discussed below. 
Evacuation Time vs. Warning Time 
The paramount problem in hurricane evacuation recently confirmed by the 
above quantitative studies is that there are indeed some coastal regions of 
Florida that need more evacuation time than the National Hurricane Center can 
currently provide in the form of confident warning time. For example, as noted 
above, the Tampa Bay Region requires from 12 to 18 hours prior to hurricane 
landfall to successfully evacuate all vulnerable residents; the National Hurri·· 
cane Center currently strives to provide confident predictions that a hurricane 
can actually be expected to strike a particular area 12 hours in advance. The 
problem is quite clear, especially when other regions (Southwest Florida and 
the Florida Keys) have been found to have even higher evacuation times. 
Does this mean that it is impossible to conduct successful evacuations 
from these areas? Does it mean that evacuation plans that have quantified 
evacuation times longer than 12 hours are unworkable? The answer to both of 
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these questions is no. To explain this answer, one must first go back and 
examine why we are "all of a sudden" confronted with this problem and who is 
responsible for preventing loss of life from hurricanes. 
First, although we have, just in the past couple of years, confirmed the 
problem through quantification of evacuation times, the evacuation time/warning 
time differential has probably existed for over a decade in some urban coastal 
areas. Its evolution is simple: coastal residential development has gradually 
increased to such density that the roadway systems can no longer accommodate an 
emergency mass exodus inland in under 12 hours. Fortunately, a major hurricane 
has not struck one of these areas in Florida since the coastal population 
explosion. If one had, a disaster more catastrophic than the 6,000 deaths in 
the 1900 Galveston hurricane would probably have occurred. If state-of-the-art 
hurricane forecasting could keep pace with the increase in coastal population, 
the problem could be mitigated. Unfortunately, that is not the case. A major 
breakthrough in hurricane forecasting and prediction, based on a new techno-
logical advance, is not expected in the near future, yet the coastal population 
continues to grow, pushing evacuation times even higher. 
Legally, the responsibility for protecting people from an approaching 
hurricane rests with the state and local elected officials of the jurisdiction 
in which they reside. The responsibility to advise those officials of such an 
impending meteorological threat ultimately rests with NOAA's National Hurricane 
Center. This distinction in responsibility is a key to the immediate remedy of 
the evacuation time vs. warning time problem. So what is the immediate remedy? 
First, some ancillary problems uncovered by the quantitative evacuation studies 
are examined below. 
Shelter capacity 
Another alarming problem identified by analyzing the amount of population 
shown by the SLOSH model to be hurricane-vulnerable is that most coastal areas 
are greatly lacking in the amount of public shelter capacity they can provide 
for an evacuation. Traditionally, in various parts of the U.S., only a small 
percentage (10-20%) of hurricane evacuees have sought public (usually Red Cross 
managed) shelters as their evacuation destination before a hurricane. However, 
recent behavioral surveys of the Tampa Bay study and other studies in Florida 
indicate that as many as 40% could seek such public shelter in a future hurri-
cane. Florida's high percentage may be explained by the large elderly popula-
tion often detached from northern relatives (homes of relatives are a local 
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alternative to a public shelter) and thus more dependent on public facilities. 
Comparative analyses of public shelter demand vs. actual existing capacity have 
revealed substantial shortfalls for evacuation planning. Such analyses have 
spurred increased efforts for new public shelter searches, designation, and 
staffing. However, these efforts may not be taking place fast enough. 
Maintaining Florida's Comprehensive 
Regional Hurricane Evacuation plans 
Identifying and taking the first step in solving the "evacuation time vs. 
warning time" problem occurred when a pilot regional evacuation plan for the 
Tampa Bay region quantified the evacuation time for those four urban coastal 
counties. For how can a local emergency official successfully order a hurri-
cane evacuation when he/she does not know how long it will take? Comprehensive 
and quantitative hurricane evacuation studies have been conducted for the Tampa 
Bay Region and the Southwest Florida Region. A similar effort is currently 
underway along the Southeast coast. It is hoped that funding will also be made 
available to develop a comprehensive evacuation plan for Florida's hurricane-
vulnerable panhandle coastline. Fortunately, the SLOSH model, almost a pre-
requisite for conducting a comprehensive/quantitative evacuation study, is 
being developed for the remainder of the urban coastal regions of the state. 
Although Florida has taken a giant step forward in hurricane preparedness 
as a result of the comprehensive/quantitative regional evacuation plans, the 
fact that those efforts were "pilot" studies has left us with the huge problem 
of how to keep those plans up-to-date and accurate enough to save lives. 
Because so many elements of the plans are quantitative, Florida's rapid coastal 
population growth renders critical factors, such as evacuation time, inaccurate 
in one to two years. No one can question the cost-effectiveness of these 
efforts given the constant threat to Florida from hurricanes. But the question 
becomes, "Who will provide the resources necessary to maintain comprehensive 
regional plans all along Florida's vulnerable coast?" 
Alternative Solutions to 
Florida's Hurricane Evacuation Problems 
The evacuation time vs. warning time problem has two basic alternative 
solutions. Unfortunately, neither is attainable without substantial costs in 
the form of money, inconvenience, and/or political credibility. 
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Early Evacuation Orders 
The first solution, probably better defined as an immediate remedy, is the 
issuing of early evacuation orders by local and/or state elected officials. 
Rather than wait for a confident warning from hurricane forecasters with as 
little as 12 hours lead time, local officials must be guided by the pre-
quantified evacuation times of their comprehensive evacuation plans. Such 
times might demand that the local officials order evacuation as early as 24 
hours in advance of potential landfall--a point at which the state-of-the-art 
of hurricane forecasting cannot provide a confident prediction that the storm 
will actually strike that locality. In fact, such early evacuation orders 
will, in most instances, evacuate thousands of coastal residents unnecessarily, 
as the hurricane eventually does not strike that local area. 
What has been created by this situation is what can be called a "cry wolf" 
dilemma. It is a dilemma of emergency decision making caused by the potential 
for causing inconvenience, financial losses, and loss of governmental/political 
credibility by issuing an early but ultimately.unnecessary evacuation order. 
But the cost of not issuing such an early evacuation order upon the approach of 
a large hurricane are much, much higher: the loss of thousands of lives. 
The immediate remedy to the evacuation time/warning time differential 
problem through early evacuation orders described above requires three major 
"lements. The first is a very close and mutually understanding relationship 
between hurricane forecasters and local/state emergency officials. This rela-
tionship must itself be based on a constantly accessible communication system 
between both entities. Each entity must realize that all evacuation concerns 
dre not necessarily meteorological concerns, and vice versa. Again, the local 
coastal areas must be able to secure all the emergency meteorological informa-
· ... ion they need to implement their quanti tati ve evacuation plans. 
The second element is a clear integration of the evacuation-ordering 
iluthori ty that is delegated to both county and municipal senior elected offi-
cials by state law. This is critical to the coordination necessary between 
counties and municipalities as they implement regional hurricane evacuation 
plans. For example, a municipal evacuation order, if not coordinated with the 
county or surrounding cities, could compound an already congested emergency 
situation. Similarly, any county should order evacuation only in coordination 
with its constituent cities. unfortunately, the current state statute is very 
vague on county vs. municipal evacuation ordering authority. 
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The third needed element is an understanding by the public that there is a 
high probability of an ultimately unnecessary evacuation based on an early 
evacuation order. The "cry wolf" situation must be viewed by the public not as 
a mistake in judgment by emergency officials, but as the safest way that 
officials can guard against large-scale loss of life from a relatively unpre-
dictable natural phenomenon. Hurricane-vulnerable coastal residents must begin 
to accept the fact that for every three, four, or even five times they might be 
ordered to evacuate their home due to a hurricane over the next 20 years, that 
only one of those trips may ultimately be necessary. But the price of not 
evacuating everyone of those times could be much, much higher than the cost of 
a trip inland to a public shelter or the home of a friend or relative on high 
ground. 
So the immediate remedy to the evacuation time vs. warning time problem in 
a given area is the acceptance by state/local officials of the responsibility 
for issuing an early evacuation order without a confident warning from the 
nationa'l Hurricane Center that the hurricane will actually strike their area. 
For this immediate remedy to be effective, the hurricane forecaster must recog-
nize and be sensitive to the prequantified evacuation times of a local area's 
comprehensive evacuation plan. In addition, evacuation orders must be careful-
ly and completely coordinated between county and municipal decision makers. 
And finally, the vulnerable resident must respond and evacuate immediately, 
even with full knowledge that the trip may ultimately be unnecessary. 
Lowering Evacuation Times: Vertical Evacuation 
The second alternative solution to the evacuation time vs. warning time 
problem is to lower evacuation times by planning and implementing the vertical 
evacuation of vulnerable coastal residents. Vertical evacuation is the reloca-
tion of residents into the higher floors of multistory structures--either their 
structure of residence or a nearby structure. The ultimate advantage of this 
type of evacuation movement is that it should take less time for such reloca-
tion to be carried out since those "upward" evacuation trips would be much 
shorter in distance than a horizontal trip inland. In addition, many vertical 
evacuation trips might not require the use of an automobile, somewhat miti-
gating time-consuming traffic congestion and backups and thus lowering evacua-
tion time. This type of evacuation could also substantially aid in solving the 
problem of limited public shelter capacity. 
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The concept of vertical evacuation appears to be a local solution to the 
evacuation time vs. warning time problem if it indeed can lower evacuation 
times. However, the reality of implementing this type of evacuation is bur-
dened with many unknown factors, many of which could be life threatening in 
themselves. For example, how can an existing coastal high-rise structure be 
determined to be suitably constructed to withstand hurricane conditions? Even 
if building design specifications point toward such structural worthiness, 
poststorm examinations of structures after Hurricane Eloise on the Florida 
panhandle have shown that design specifications are not always incorporated 
into the actual construction of a building. An even bigger question is who 
will "certify" a structure as hurricane-resistant, to be used as a vertical 
evacuation shelter? Who will accept the potential liability accompanying such 
certification? Who should accept such liability? Another unknown factor is 
which geographic areas are appropriate for vertical evacuation. Is it prudent 
to direct residents of barrier islands (even the inland sides of barrier 
islands) to vertically evacuate from an approaching Category 4 or 5 hurricane? 
Is it prudent to direct thousands of residents upward on a barrier island that, 
even if it survived the hurricane, would be isolated from life sustaining 
resources such as food, water, and electricity? Neither a consensus of the 
structural/hydrologic engineering community nor the actual experience of that 
situation exists to answer these questions. 
The key to any hurricane evacuation plan is a sound and understandable 
system of public information. Incorporating vertical evacuation into local 
plans will raise a whole new set of questions in the minds of coastal resi-
dents: Should I evacuate vertically or inland? How high must I go in the 
building? If I escape from the surge, will I also be safe from the high 
'~linds? 
Although the concept of vertical evacuation is rapidly becoming one of the 
only alternatives to high evacuation times, it is becoming quite evident that 
the incorporation of a vertical element into local evacuation plans cannot 
safely be done unless local preparedness authorities obtain answers to the 
above questions. Many of these questions are so complex that they would 
require legislation to address potential liability and structural certification 
issues. vertical evacuation is a concept whose time has come as a potential 
solution to the evacuation time vs. warning time problem. Unfortunately, the 
local emergency management community is neither equipped nor ready to implement 
it. 
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Long-Range Solutions 
There will probably come a time when even an early evacuation order of 30 
hours before hurricane landfall will not be sufficient to permit the success-
ful horizontal evacuation of the dense coastal population. Also, there will 
probably come a time when there will not even be enough multistory structures 
to serve as vertical evacuation shelters for the dense coastal populations of 
the future. Unfortunately, there will probably never come a time when hurri-
canes will cease to threaten the Gulf and Atlantic coasts of the U.S. In the 
future, the pressure to develop our coastline residentially will continue for 
the same aesthetic, recreational, and economic reasons that it now exists. The 
only real long-range solution to ever-increasing evacuation times is hurricane-
conscious land use decisions in our remaining undeveloped hurricane-prone 
coastal areas. How high will the evacuation times rise? That question can 
only be answered by the same entity that is faced with issuing an early evacu-
ation order, directing vertical evacuation, and making the day-to-day land use 
decisions that make the former two decisions so difficult--the local government 
official. 
Conclusion 
It is possible to evacuate people of any U.S. coastal area from an 
approaching hurricane. Any number of people can be successfully evacuated--if 
the process is initiated early enough. The basic problem is that "early 
enough" in many coastal areas is too early for a confident warning from the 
hurricane forecaster, too early for a doubt-free evacuation order from a local 
elected official, and too early for every evacuation trip by the public to be 
an ultimately necessary one. The problem demands that each of these three 
entities--the hurricane forecaster, the local elected official, and the 
public--do their part to avoid loss of life. 
The hurricane forecaster must recognize and be sensitive to the fact that 
local areas with evacuation times higher than 12 hours need a "somewhat less 
than confident" warning of actual hurricane landfall. Evacuation times over 12 
hours do not render an evacuation plan unworkable. But a workable plan demands 
work from the hurricane forecaster as well as the local emergency officials and 
general public. Until vertical evacuation can be safely implemented, we must 
deal with the reality of high evacuation times. 
The local (or state) elected officials must be willing to accept a poten-
tial loss of credibility if they "cry wolf" by issuing an unneeded early evacu-
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ation order. They must recognize that the first and foremost responsibility of 
their position is to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of 
their jurisdiction. 
Finally, the general public must realize and understand that the evacua-
tion order they receive is based on the best possible information and judgment 
by meteorologists and emergency management experts. The public must also 
recognize that, when dealing with a force of nature such as a hurricane, its 
relative unpredictability will cause evacuation "false alarms" in areas of 
dense coastal population. It must be realized that the best way of surviving a 
hurricane is to listen to and follow the instructions of local emergency 
authorities. However, unless those local emergency authorities are assisted in 
solving the evacuation problems described in this paper--through both the 
provision of resources and the establishment of a firm legislative base--the 
potential for large-scale loss of life will continue to increase. 
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THE LEACHATE OF POOR FLOOD CONTROL 
Allan N. Williams 
principal Environmental Analyst 
Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection 
Filling in banks 
So perceptively slow 
paving Forests 
Flood Heights grow 
Cartons, cars, scraps 
of us all 
Bonded by bricks 
In back of the 
mall 
Nobody's happy 
An eyesore 
It's Fate 
The Seasonal Floods 
The object of hate 
Come boxed and 
walled channels 
Those Coffins of 
Streams 
All sit by 
The discarding of 
dreams 
The sidewalls will 
stabilize 
And conduit will 
Rule 
While abutments replace 
The meandering pool 
This floodplain is broken 
How sad is the soul 
Witness this leachate 
of Poor Flood Control. 
As I travel throughout this nation by air, train, raft, foot, and horse-
back, I see large, undeveloped floodplains like those of the Missouri and 
Mississippi, Columbia and Colorado whose need for protection is not only obvi-
ous but imperative. I also notice a constituency of professionals and private 
citizens who seek to protect such areas. 
In sharp contrast, I see thousands of small streams badly bruised by the 
construction of boxed or walled channels. For these streams, the needs of 
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individual property owners, the ambivalence of government, and the pressing 
political demands for flood control seem to set floodplain protection into the 
unenviable position of being a minority without representation in the decision-
making process. 
I focus this presentation on the issue of incremental loss of stream 
habitat due to the construction of boxed or walled channels for flood control. 
As flood control or drainage projects, these are the smaller, less noticed 
projects that generally involve only a few thousand feet of stream at a time. 
The channel work occurs in areas often considered high hazard--not in terms of 
floods over large areas, but in terms of concentrated damage potential in very 
small areas. It is often the case that, over time, many such small projects 
spell the demise of larger areas of streams. Mind you, I am not talking about 
the larger federal projects but those done by state and local governments. 
In the case of one watershed near my home, I see the results of such 
incremental damage. The 79-square mile Park River drainage basin is replete 
with sterile trapezoidal channels, 900 walled channels with flat bottoms, 
dozens of small tributaries that do not appear above ground, and finally a main 
stem, itself enclosed in twin pressure conduits. Why did this happen and who 
was responsible? 
Was it the famous Samuel Colt, who in 1851 constructed the first dikes on 
the river's banks to protect his munitions factory? Was it the farmers of the 
1880s who dumped slaughterhouse wastes into it? Was it the 1910 tenement owner 
who literally built to the water's edge? Was it the tripling of population in 
the basin from 1868 to 1978? Was it the first government flood control project 
in 1940 that cut off this stream from its natural outlet to the Connecticut 
River? Was it the trapezoidal, flat-bottomed, shadeless channels constructed 
in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s to minimize channel width during highway construc-
tion? 
The fact is that there never was any particular development, anyone 
factor, any single road crossing about which one could say, "This destroyed our 
river. 11 
What role did the flood managers have in the process? Were they just 
doing their job when they designed and built the various conduits and channels? 
Or were they, in fact, making some societal assumptions that their job was more 
than flood control; that it also included helping property owners to develop 
Williams 
these "useless swamps and debris laden streams," and to put the land to some 
"productive use?" 
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It is ironic that many of the problems that so severely degraded the Park 
River--water pollution, aesthetic nuisances, etc.--have now been corrected, but 
that the flood control projects pre-empt recovery of the stream habitat. 
We have come a long way these past ten years or so in integrating environ-
mental concerns into our flood projects. But how many of our agencies and how 
many of our towns are still putting streams in boxed or walled channels or 
putting them underground altogether? 
One might say it is not our job to consider the environmental consequences 
of a flood project. Other people, other programs are supposed to do that. 
Despite having passed through the "environmental decade," we are still depend-
ing on the regulatory or review process to make our projects "fit" environ-
mentally. 
I believe we are attempting to protect stream habitat from the effects of 
a flood control project by using regulatory measures. I also believe this is a 
superficial and inadequate treatment of the problem. 
The problem with this process is similar to the problem of retrofitting a 
house for solar heating. You add insulation, upgrade heat transfer materials, 
and seal doors and windows; but in the end, if the house is in a shadowy ravine 
and its roof not facing south, then all the changes just cannot bring more of 
the sun's energy into the home. We cannot make an intrinsically environmental-
ly unfit channel design acceptable just by addressing the peripherals: erosion 
control, a few plantings, or a stone wall here or there. 
Why are environmental concerns still peripheral and retrofitted to small 
projects instead of being designed into the projects from the beginning? 
What are some of the constraints making it difficult to integrate flood 
management and natural resource protection into small projects? 
1) In designing a flood control structure, it is almost always more costly to 
do it environmentally correctly. The tendency is always to try to keep finan-
cial costs down and development opportunities up. Compounding the problem is 
the fact that environmental values are difficult to estimate in dollars, so 
they often are not considered at all. In some ways, environmental values are 
often measured in PFD--"people Flak Dollars," i.e., the more people watching 
and concerned, the more important the environmental values become. 
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2) By the time a flood control project is needed, the outcry--usually made by 
a specific group lobbying for a solution to their immediate needs for water-
free property--often overshadows other issues. There arises a political force 
lobbying for a flood control project, and it is only concerned with getting 
something done fast. From the beginning, then, the designers of a flood 
control project are under the gun to do something quickly, to solve a single-
purpose problem with a single-purpose project. The project is designed and 
submitted for regulatory review, leaving the environmental concerns limited to 
output controls, instead of input controls. 
By this time in the process, there is considerable time, money, and staff 
interest involved. Add existing political and economic forces to this, along 
with the professional pride of the design engineers, and those involved in the 
regulatory process may feel that they have no constituency--that there is 
little they can do, or that it would be too costly to change anything. In this 
position, the regulators often see themselves as "roadblocks." By now, they 
are not willing to go out on a limb to protect stream habitat. Another reach 
of river is discarded. 
What can be done to prevent this, to prevent the constant loss of small 
stream habitat due to small flood control projects? 
Among the first choices for relief must be the development of basin-wide 
stormwater management standards and, in turn, stormwater management plans 
intended not merely to improve the efficiency of flows but also to guarantee 
the existence of viable stream corridors. It has taken so long to get flood-
plain regulations adopted in this nation, to implement controls outside the 
floodplain may seem like too much for municipalities to bear, but it must be 
done. 
Second, those responsible for flood control projects must have written 
policy to promote interdisciplinary predesign studies of alternatives. Before 
the first calculations or the first lines on a blue print are made, it is 
critical that the ecological professionals visit the site with the design 
engineers, that they discuss and develop alternatives together. 
Third, there is a need to increase cross-professional training of engi-
neers, ecologists, soil scientists, and others for the purpose of increasing 
their understanding about each other's duties and constraints. 
Fourth, there is a need to develop written guidelines for approval of 
state or local flood control projects. These guidelines should delineate a 
williams 
process that requires environmental concerns to be built into a project, not 
tacked on after design. 
I would like to close with the following words about the Park River. 
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Mark Twain wrote most of his famous novels, including Tom ?awyer and 
Huckleberry Finn at his Hartford home, called Nook Farm, which was on a hill 
overlooking the Park River. There is now no evidence that a river ever existed 
on the property, as in the past two years the last stage of a flood control 
project put the last pieces of the river underground. 
Perhaps we all owe an apology to Mark Twain, Samuel Clemens, and his 
daughter, Clara. 
An Apology to Mark Twain 
Her banks willow, maple, and grass 
When Huck, Tom, and that Becky Lass 
But that was then; now it's dark 
Deep in the bowels of the River Park. 
In soaking springs, most usual years 
Water on yards, yet very few tears 
Sediments and stone hardly perturbed 
They alone, to be annually disturbed. 
Public officials, lacking reproach 
Did not comprehend, to encroach 
Bank to bank, row by row 
We slowly watch, the buildings grow. 
Came '55, a flood of wrath 
Sweeping over the now-occupied path 
Voices rose that triggered the end--
"Eliminate it, eliminate every last bend!" 
Twin pressure conduits soon replaced 
The peaceful view Nook Farm had faced. 
Where Clara and father skated to shore 
parking and steel mechanically roar. 
So substitute for clam shells and trout 
By counting the miles of masonry grout; 
In greying water cast your concern 
Lest from river to sewer all must learn. 
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WETLAND AND FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT: 
A SUMMARY 
Alexandra D. Dawson 
Director, Resources Management and Administration Program 
Antioch New England 
Wetlands Protection and Floodplain Management: A Co~rison 
Land Use Controls 
Wetlands protection and floodplain management are aspects of land use 
planning. This is still principally a legal power of the states, exercised at 
the local level through zoning, SUbdivision, and health controls and at the 
state level through state wetlands laws, scenic rivers programs, and coastal 
zone management strategies. 
General Legal principle~ 
Courts have been supportive of the right of states and localities to ban 
the use of high-hazard floodplains. The leading case is Turnpike Realty Co. 
vs. Town of Dedham, 362 Mass. 221 (1972). The principle involved is that 
prevention of public hazard outweighs the right of private landowners to de-
velop their land. The hazard can include danger to persons occupying the 
floodplain, danger to upstream and downstream owners, and even (according to 
two Massachusetts cases) the "hazard" of increased public expenditure due to 
unwise choices in land development. 
Courts have been more conservative in upholding bans on the use of pri-
vately owned wetlands, probably because the hazards of their destruction are 
more remote and speculative. In one Massachusetts case, however, a ban on 
filling of wetlands was upheld because there was some evidence that the fill 
might damage the quality of groundwater which was a potential (but not current) 
drinking water supply (Lovequist vs. Conservation Commission of Dennis, 1979 
Mass. Ad. Sh. 2210). 
Because of the "public trust" and special public interest in coastal 
wetlands, a ban on destruction of productive saltmarshes may be upheld (see 
Sibson vs. NH, 115 N.H. 124). Thus, on common law (decisional) grounds, it may 
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be legally feasible to ban development in a wetland or a floodplain, especially 
the latter. 
A contrary result may be reached by statutory regulation, however. In 
Massachusetts, under the new Wetland Protection Act regulations effective in 
1983 (310 Code of Mass. Regulation 10.00, interpreting Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 131, 
s. 40), floodplains may be given less protection than vegetated wetlands bor-
dering surface waters. For these "BVWs", a special waiver from the Commission-
er of DEQE is now required for more than minimal fill. These wetlands are 
presumed valuable for public or private water supply, groundwater supply, flood 
control, storm damage prevention, prevention of pollution, and protection of 
fisheries/shellfish; whereas floodplains are presumed valuable only to flood 
control, storm damage prevention, and, sometimes, groundwater and may often be 
filled if compensatory storage is provided. 
Engineering solutions of this sort for development of floodplains provide 
interesting legal questions. If state or local regulations provide that a 
developer may come forward with plans for compensatory storage, fill, pilings, 
breakaway fronts, or floodproofing, and the reviewing authority nevertheless 
rejects an application to develop, the burden of proof will shift to the regu-
lating body to prove why it rejected these solutions. Nevertheless, the state 
of the art is not such that a court is likely to require a regulatory body to 
accept such solutions if the regulation is properly drafted. The regulations 
should thus begin with a presumption that development of high risk floodplains 
is undesirable because such development is presumed to result in serious public 
hazards. It may then allow the developer to submit technical solutions for 
such development with the understanding that the solution will be rejected 
unless the developer convinces the regulating body of the proven workability of 
the solution. This approach will help keep the burden of proof on the 
applicant. 
l'ihen regulating wetlands, on the other hand, the regulating body's 
language should emphasize the proven values of wetlands and any hazards con-
current with their destruction. Mitigation efforts such as creation of sub-
stitute new wetlands should be given low priority. 
Regulations for both kinds of development should emphasize the residual 
economic uses of the land which may benefit the landowner: farming, forestry, 
recreation, plus the accessory value of the land in making up lot sizes, pro-
viding value to adjacent uplands, etc., which has been recognized in one 
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Massachusetts appeal court case (S. Kemble Fischer Realty Trust vs. Board of 
Appeals of Concord, 1980 Mass. App. Adv. Sh. 637). Mere diminution of value 
will not generally invalidate a restriction on the use of land validly adopted 
under the state or local "police power," provided the landowner is left with 
some kind of economic use of the property. One should avoid references to uses 
that are really public uses of public lands (e.g., flood storage areas, water 
supply, public recreation), as this suggests to courts that, by regulation, 
public benefits are being sought which should be accomplished by purchase of 
the property. 
Coordinating Protective Efforts at the Local Level 
Municipalities and counties are still the main controllers of land use 
outside LURC areas of Maine. Many different local bodies can be made interest-
ed in protecting floodplains and wetlands, e.g., 
• Birders, schools, and people who like outdoor recreation 
• Farmers, foresters, hunters, and fisherpeople 
• Fiscal conservatives who fear need of future public expenditures for 
sewers, schools, dikes, dams 
• People who just think the community is growing too fast 
The coalition aim should be to review the present picture of local control 
of land use with a view towards removing the "magnet effect," and encouraging 
compatible uses of floodplains. 
The magnet effect is achieved when the community actually, although often 
unintentionally, points development into the floodplain by inappropriate zoning 
and/or development of public infrastructure. Many New England towns were built 
around mills in floodplains and have continued this pattern by industrial/ 
commercial zoning and the building of roads, sewage treatment plants, parking 
areas, and airports, not to mention trailer parks. Sewage treatment plants are 
particularly problematic since engineering practice tends towards building them 
on the floodplain; it is then legally difficult to prevent access to the pipe. 
Road building has similar effects, although few think beyond the immediate 
impact of road building (the flood insurance program attempts no ban on road 
building in floodplains). 
Communities should therefore adopt public infrastructure policies, review 
zoning codes, and also review local health laws: both floodplains and wetlands 
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are generally poor places for either individual septic systems or public sewer 
lines. 
The community should eschew the one-foot rise permitted, but not encour-
aged, by FEMA regulations in setting the floodway; this will effectively make 
the 100-year floodplain the regulatory floodway, and the flood insurance prohi-
bitions against fill will give force to local bans. 
Compatible uses for wetlands and floodplains include: 
• Public ownership as parks. 
• Public restrictions purchased from landowners preventing development and 
allowing at least educational access. Consequent reduction in real estate 
taxes on undeveloped land will generally be minimal. 
• Farming and forestry--compatible in floodplains, but not always in 
wetlands. 
• Modest recreational facilities. One should avoid a general "use as of 
right" for "water dependent activities" such as boating, but rather 
require a special permit for control of size and placement. 
• Accessory uses such as the "toes" of large lots. 
In downzoning areas for protection one should emphasize good mapping, 
public hazards, residual uses and avoid the implication that regulation is 
being used as a cheap substitute for purchase by the public. 
Coordinating Protective Eff~rts at the State Level 
Efforts that may be mounted by state officials with local support 
include: 
• States should adopt executive orders similar to federal EO 11988 and EO 
11990 banning use of public funds for floodplain/wetland destruction 
unless specially justified. These executive orders should include all 
federal funds and all high risk floodplains, whether privately or 
publicly owned. 
• CZM plans should be reviewed to make sure protection is maximized and 
impact funds are not available for counterproductive activity, and 
controls on roads, sewers, airports, and utilities should be checked. 
Officials should emphasize use of CZM public access funds for access to 
beaches and rivers. 
• States may give preference to floodplains/wetlands in grants for ground-
water protection, agricultural preservation restriction purchase--depend-
ing on the regulations. 
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• State scenic rivers programs should be reviewed. Is the setback 
adequate? 
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• State health codes for septic systems, sewer construction and dumps should 
be reviewed for adequacy--many are outdated. 
• States should resist delegation of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
section 404 wetlands program, as well as the Corps' "nationwide permits." 
• States could do more in pushing for more funding of FEMA's Section 1362 
acquisition program for frequently flooded areas. 
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PART THREE 
STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING HIGH RISK AREAS: 
Training and Education 
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TRAINING AND EDUCATION NEEDS FOR THE PRACTITIONER 
William L. Trakimas 
Indiana Department of Natural Resources 
Training and Education Needs 
In Indiana, we have ·found that training and education must provide local 
officials with information and data that is pertinent to their way of life. 
This requires data from other Indiana experiences, not data from events or 
situations from other states. If this is not possible, then the out-of-state 
experiences must be those from a similar type of community. It is very impor-
tant that, if you go into a small rural community tucked away in the mountains, 
your data be those of a similar community in a similar locational setting. 
Credibility is very important. The story of the relocation of $100,000 homes 
in Minnesota will not enlighten those situated in $10,000 homes in a mining 
camp. 
For years we have provided training tools, seminars, etc., on federal 
regulations, state laws, and agency responsibility. However, in many cases the 
data have been overly complex (Federal Register, state laws) and not keyed to 
the local lifestyle. It is very hard to discuss the development of grandiose 
mitigation plans with a community with no budget for mitigation, particularly 
when you are offering no financial assistance yourself. Through the State 
Assistance Program (SAP), Indiana has finally begun to provide the necessary 
management tools to help local officials and floodplain managers. 
The development of handbooks written in language easy to understand, 
highlighting the major issues and regulations that a local official needs, has 
been a big plus for our agency. These handbooks have gone a long way in 
assisting the local community to understand the maze of federal and state 
regulations on floodplain management and disaster response. In addition, our 
agency has developed a floodproofing slide show illustrating examples of 
Indiana experiences in floodproofing. The cost of undertaking the floodproof-
ing measures is also illustrated. The depiction of costs is a major element in 
achieving credibility with the local community. 
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As our agency becomes aware of more examples of Indiana floodproofing 
experiences, we are acquiring slides to update our slide show. This will make 
the presentation flexible, thereby allowing us to provide examples that closely 
resemble the types of communities where we are providing the training. In this 
way we hope to establish better credibility for our programs, thereby leading 
to increased activity at the local level. 
Meeting Training and Education Needs 
At present, our agency provides funding for staff to attend public meet-
ings and provide technical assistance to meet local community needs. Through 
the SAP we now have an excellent information base (management tools) with which 
to assist local communities. Our agency has no problem with setting up local 
workshops and/or seminars and providing staffing to conduct these training and 
education programs. The only problems we encounter are with the scheduling of 
our staff, since we do not have staff assigned solely for training and educa-
tion, and with reproducing handbooks and manuals. Currently, our budget is not 
flexible enough to handle mass reproduction of large manuals. In the future, 
this may not be a problem, but until then, we must conserve our resources. We 
are able to conduct small workshops that require limited amounts of material 
reproduction. As a result, our training efforts have been in response to 
requests by local communities versus an organized effort initiated by our 
agency. 
Funding Tra~ning and Education 
Additional funds, therefore, are needed for travel and material reproduc-
tion. Once in a while our in-state travel funds become depleted thereby re-
ducing staff's ability to conduct normal business. Therefore, additional 
traveling associated with training exercises would be out of the question. 
However, if funds become available to cover these travel costs, it would be no 
problem to have our existing staff conduct meetings. It should be noted that 
our staff scheduling problem would not be a problem if normal travel funds were 
scarce, since more of our staff would be in the office. 
In the case of material reproductions, additional funds would be greatly 
appreciated. Our current budget does not allow for large sums to be applied to 
manual/handbook production. This is one reason why the SAP has been such a 
tremendous plus to our program. (For example, the Handbook for Local planners 
costs $1,600 for 500 copies. This only allows one copy for each community in 
Indiana. This is in no way sufficient for adequate training and education). 
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In terms of cooperative arrangements, something could be worked out with 
the FEMA Regional Office and the State Civil Defense through their training and 
education contracts. The agreement might be for the FEMA Regional Office to 
supply a staff person to work with our agency and have a program like SAP 
provide funds for travel and material reproductions. Another possibility might 
be for our agency to use the Civil Defense training and education contract 
(Public Officials Conferences) to set up meetings and draw the local partici-
pants. With funding from FEMA for material reproduction, our agency could 
conduct training seminars. 
Benefits 
providing training and education on the NFIP, floodplain management and 
disaster preparedness to local officials/communities, along with providing 
mitigation, would go a long way towards the establishment of effective local 
floodplain management programs in Indiana. Experience has shown that when 
people understand a program, they are willing to abide by the rules. It is the 
complexity and uncertainty of programs that causes confusion at the local level 
thereby leading to poor administration. We hope that, through our efforts to 
simplify floodplain management, we will begin to see better administration and 
implementation. 
The Floodplain Management Handbook for Local planners is a good example of 
how we have tried to simplify floodplain management. This handbook is an 
excellent reference tool that locals can use to answer questions as they arise. 
Previously, communities were left with a pile of materials, a lot of which were 
written in terms foreign to them. As a result, when questions arose, they had 
:00 place to go to find the answers. The handbook, we hope, provides that 
single source to meet their needs. In addition, the handbook contains a list 
of places to contact for assistance, broken down by topic or issue. 
Unlike other parts of the country, Indiana does not usually suffer from 
floods that cause total destruction. Due to the relatively flat terrain, most 
of our flooding is the slow rising type. Therefore, our losses are not as 
great as in some other parts of the country. Bad floodplain management de-
cisions therefore cause damages, but not of monumental proportion. Thus, the 
reduction in flood damages caused by sound land use decisions will not be as 
noticeable in Indiana as other states, but nevertheless it would be 
noticeable. 
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A real key to what will be accomplished will be the efforts our agency 
expends in two areas: 
1) providing data/information to locals who already have a detailed FIS, but 
lack adequate training to understand the data; and 
2) Enforcing our laws against violators, many of whom undertake their activi-
ties as a result of a lack of understanding or knowledge of the law. 
With better local floodplain managers, we feel we will see a reduction in 
our agency's efforts to handle these latter activities. As a result, our 
agency can spend more time in providing data to communities where adequate data 
does not exist. It is in these areas that we can improve our efficiency to 
respond to local requests and thereby dramatically reduce future flood losses. 
We have found that with timely responses to local requests, we see more 
communities willing to seek advice for future construction in flood-prone 
areas. Once the response time drags out, especially in the building season, 
communities tend to develop according to their instincts, without regard for 
the regulations. 
NFIP TRAINING AND EDUCATION IN REGION III 
Martin J. Frengs 
Federal Emergency Management Agency 
The jurisdiction of FEMA Region III includes Delaware, Maryland, 
pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia. The 
training and education of local officials and building professionals in the 
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) within Region III has historically been 
in the form of final meetings, Community Assistance and Program Evaluation 
(CAPE) meetings, FEMA/State Coordinating Agency workshops and conferences, and 
presentations at meetings sponsored by professional organizations. 
Final Meetings 
In these meetings--usually the first FEMA contact with a community 
official--detailed floodplain data are presented and the NFIP "Regular program" 
rules and regulations are discussed. 
Costs 
The costs of these meetings vary depending on the distance the FEMA staff 
person must travel. Minimum, maximum, and average estimates are presented 
below. Naturally these costs could be higher if they included the travel and 
salary for the state coordinator. Salary estimates include overhead at 100% of 
the hourly rate and include the time it takes to set up, travel to, and conduct 
the meeting. 
Minimum 
Travel (rented auto plus gas) (one day) 
salary (5 hours) 
Maximum 
Travel (2 days) 
Air Fare 
Auto Rental 
Per Diem 
salary (20 hours) 
say 
Three meetings per trip, say 
Average 
$ 35.00 
160.00 
$ 200.00 
$ 300.00 
80.00 
100.00 
640.00 
$ 1120.00 
$ 380.00 
3/5 x (380-200) 110 + 200 $310 per community 
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Advantages 
• Person to person, one on one contact where specific community problems and 
situations can be discussed. 
Disadvantages 
• Relatively high cost per community. 
• Many, if not most, community officials do not express an interest in the 
maps and the ordinance at this early stage of the conversion process. 
• Many times the meeting does not include the best community officials, 
e.g., the mayor vs. the code enforcement officer. 
• Many community officials, along with code enforcement officers, leave 
office between the final meeting and the effective date of the ordinance 
and maps. 
CAPE Meetings 
While viewed by Region III as primarily a community "audit" to determine 
if new development is compliant with the minimum NFIP regulations, experience 
shows that roughly 50% of the these visits result in a refresher course in the 
relationship between the maps, the Floodway Data Table, and the flood profiles. 
This does not include the (roughly) 5-10% of the cases in which no one knows 
where the Flood Insurance Study (FIS) and ordinance are filed. 
Costs 
Again, a range and an average estimate are provided depending on the time 
of travel; the costs would be higher if the state coordinator was included. 
While most CAPEs exceed final meetings in length, the minimum CAPE meeting 
would compare with a final meeting. 
Minimum 
Same as a final meeting 
Maximum 
Travel (3 days) 
Air Fare 
Auto Rental 
Per Diem 
Salary (28 hours) 
Two meetings per trip, say 
Average 
375-x-T730 - 200) $320 + 200 
$ 200.00 
$ 300.00 
110.00 
150.00 
900.00 
$ 1460.00 
$ 730.00 
$520 per community 
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Advantages 
• Person to person, one on one contact where specific community problems and 
permits are discussed and evaluated. 
• Meeting is usually held with the proper community official who is now 
interested because the maps and ordinance are now effective. 
• By reviewing individual permits, the code enforcement officer's ability 
can be evaluated. This is a big advantage over workshops .for which 
attendance is voluntary and which this individual may therefore choose not 
to attend. 
Disadvantages 
• Very time consuming and expensive for the amount of training provided. 
• 1,711 communities in Region III (about 55%) are on the Regular Program. 
Five staff members doing 20 CAPEs a year would need 17 years to visit each 
community once. This is significantly short of FEMA's original goal of 
having at least one CAPE meeting per community every five years. 
DCA Workshops 
These are one-day floodplain management workshops for community code 
enforcement officers sponsored by the Pennsylvania Department of Community 
Affairs (DCA). A FEMA staff person participated in these workshops as one of 
the presenters. 
Cost 
The cost estimates presented were provided by DCA and represent the 
average cost experienced for all their workshops. 
Advantages 
Travel (state employees) 
Salaries (state employees) 
FEMA (travel and salary) 
Conference Room ($50 to $100) 
Lunch ($10/person, 20-30 people) say 
Flyer (printing and mailing) 
Subtract Fee ($20/person) say 
Total Cost 
Cost per Community (assuming 20 our of 25 
are from different communities) 
$ 375.00 
1,700.00 
300.00 
75.00 
250.00 
200.00 
$ 2,900.00 
500.00 
$ 2,400.00 
$ 120.00 
• TWenty to thirty code enforcement officers, who may represent 20 to 25 
communities, can be trained at a relatively low cost. 
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• participants can benefit from problems and solutions experienced in other 
communities. 
• Usually the proper community official attends and is interested in 
learning. 
Disadvantages 
• Much state staff time is spent to set up and organize each workshop. 
• The Code Enforcement Officer who cannot afford (in either time or money) 
to attend or is not interested in learning about the NFIP regulations is 
eliminated from this process. 
• During the last two years, ten of these workshops have been held averaging 
20 communities per workshop. Therefore, only about 200 communities out of 
the 2600 communities in pennsylvania have felt the need to send a repre-
sentative. Experience indicates that many community officials, other than 
those volunteering to attend these workshops, need training 
Meetings with Professional Organizations 
These meetings are arranged with local chapters of professional organiza-
tions involved in the building profession (builders, architects, real estate 
agents, engineers, etc.) to discuss a specific NFIP topic. In this particular 
case, coastal construction presentations were held at the normal monthly meet-
ings of local chapters of the national Association of Home Builders. 
Costs 
Because the time to prepare and conduct one of these presentations is 
similar to that of a final meeting, the average cost of one of these meetings 
is roughly $300. The cost per community benefited is difficult to determine. 
If the builders at the workshop account for 10% of the construction in the 
region, then 10% of the communities in the region are assumed to benefit. 
~dvantages 
• Staff time and effort to organize the meeting is minimized. The local 
chapter reserves the space and provides the refreshments and invites the 
audience. 
• Dealing directly with the people who are most affected by the NFIP regula-
tions eliminates the community officials as the go-between. 
• If the builders comply with the requirements in the design stage, the 
community review time is reduced and changes in design are minimized. 
• If the requirements are exceeded, flood insurance premiums decrease, 
increasing the structure's marketability. 
Frengs 
Disadvantages 
• The meeting schedule is dictated by the sponsor; dates and times may 
conflict with other work. 
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• The length of the presentation and, therefore, possibly the content, is 
limited by the sponsor. Thirty to 45 minutes seems to be the maximum that 
most people care to pay attention. 
Conclusion 
Given the existing options within the present FEMA/State Coordinator 
structure for the training and education of local code enforcement officers, it 
is evident that changes must be made if FEMA's goal of reducing flood damage 
susceptibility to new development is to be met. While the DCA workshop is the 
most cost effective option presently underway for training local officials and 
should continue to operate, most communities are not voluntarily participating, 
and, therefore, most of the code enforcement officers who need this training 
are not receiving it. With the number of staff available to perform CAPE 
meetings in Region III being reduced by 50% during the last three years, CAPEs 
can no longer be considered a significant training and education option. Given 
the present CAPE return period per Regular Program community of one meeting 
every 17 years, and given the high turnover rate of local code enforcement 
officers and local elected officials, FEMA would be meeting with every third or 
fourth community permit officer at best. Along with Final Meetings, CAPE 
meetings are too expensive for the amount of training and education provided. 
This leaves us with the option which makes the most sense, given our 
limited resources. The whole spectrum of the building profession, from the 
real estate agent, through the designer, and up to the builder, most be 
educated to the benefits of not only complying with the minimum NFIP and state 
related requirements, but exceeding these requirements. This training and 
education option, along with complimentary actions such as requiring state 
sertification of all code enforcement officers as in New Jersey and amending 
National Building Codes to include some of the basic NFIP regulations, should 
be a significant, if not the major job element of each FEMA and state employee 
involved in floodplain management. Naturally, the techniques and methods used 
to inform these professionals can and should be altered depending on need and 
individual preference. 
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TRAINING: WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN'T 
Janie Douglass 
Kentucky Flood Control Advisory Commission 
The Perspective From the Bottom of the Totem Pole 
One of the keys in determining the training and education needs of the 
local practitioner is to take a closer look at exactly who this local practi-
tioner is. Is he the mayor's brother-in-law who needs a job to keep him out of 
trouble? Perhaps he or she is the underpaid city engineer who is disgruntled 
at the additional work load foisted on the office by the National Flood 
Insurance Program (NFIP). Maybe he or she's a highly motivated citizen dedi-
cated to community service. However, more than likely, you'll recognize the 
local practitioners by the many different hats they wear as the city's building 
code inspector, fire inspector, plumbing inspector, flood insurance coordinator 
--maybe even the dog catcher. 
So the "local practitioners," as we are calling them, could be anyone from 
those who "just barely made it through high school" to very specialized 
professionals--hopefully in a field that meets the needs of the NFIP. 
With this in mind, the basic consideration is one of selling the flood 
insurance program. These are some of the more frequently mentioned selling 
points: 
1) The community needs to maintain eligibility for flood insurance (which is 
often the only game in town) by enacting a flood damage prevention ordi-
nance, implementing a floodplain management program, and enforcing the 
permitting requirements. 
2) A community faces certain questions of' liability with regard to its 
enforcement or lack of enforcement of such an ordinance. 
3) Current federal disaster policy requires a 75/25% split of recovery costs 
for public facilities, which would place additional strain on already 
drained local governments to meet the match requirements. 
4) No matter what kind of state and federal assistance is available after a 
disaster, there are still other costs associated with flooding, which 
further drain the community's resources. 
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5) Most importantly and most frequently overlooked is the fact that in addi-
tion to avoiding the costs of recovery, local governments can benefit from 
implementing floodplain management techniques by obtaining the optimal use 
of the floodplain. The most obvious reason behind the ordinance is the 
protection of life and property from the danger of floods. 
Once the local practitioners are sold on the NFIP and its requirements, 
they will need some tools to do their own selling job to the people who are 
going to be most affected--the floodplain residents. In Kentucky, the Soil 
Conservation Service (SCS) provides field personnel with a Dale Carnegie-type 
course on selling conservation programs. Besides the technical aspects of 
floodplain management, sessions should be included to address the human/psycho-
logical aspects--salesmanship if you will. The local practitioners need to be 
able to maintain an ongoing dialogue with the community and its residents to 
promote an informed citizenry that will accept the program based on its merits, 
not just because the "Feds say we have to do it this way" if we want flood 
insurance and disaster recovery assistance. 
Federal agency personnel must be more easily accessible. Most important-
ly, they need to speak the vernacular and accept the local practitioner as a 
valid partner in this venture. 
Training Tools 
There are only a few tools that translate the technical information into 
lay language, though more are becoming available. Still fewer provide all the 
essentials needed under one cover. A good example of a working tool is the 
recently completed manual developed by the Kentucky Flood Control Advisory 
Commission designed to serve as a local practitioner's field guidebook. The 
Kentucky Model Flood Damage Prevention Ordinance takes the local practitioners 
by the hand, explaining the need for the ordinance and the ordinance itself 
with a running commentary which translates legal terms into everyday terms. It 
provides a job description and a diagram showing the permitting process and 
includes sample letters covering situations that could develop, public hearing 
notices, and a step-by-step permit form. 
Public Relations 
In turn, the local practitioner needs to have the necessary tools to pass 
this information on to the pubic. Public relations campaign material for all 
forms of media dissemination should be available in the vernacular. These 
materials should include, but not be limited to, the regulations and the 
reasons behind them, with emphasis on how individual actions impact on others 
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and how the program benefits individuals. 
The public relations campaign should not be limited to the more tradi-
tional media outlets such as radio, TV, and newspaper public service announce-
ments. Other avenues should be explored to broaden the basic communications 
network. For example, the free classified papers that are so popular now are a 
highly visible and easily accessible form for disseminating public service 
announcements. 
The use of already existing groups at all levels is essential to a perva-
sive public relations campaign. Conservation districts, state extension agen-
cies, and public libraries span the nation. Such groups often need information 
themselves and would be interested in disseminating useful information on 
floodplain management as well as other integrated emergency management 
concepts. 
The District is currently working with SCS to sponsor a floodplain tour to 
introduce people to flood hazards on a local basis by showing flood-prone areas 
that are undeveloped, high water marks on existing developments in the flood-
plain, areas that are being considered for development and their relationship 
to flood hazards. The occasion can be a successful way to develop an awareness 
of flood-conscious development. Such a program should be geared to the 
audience and conducted for several different target audiences, i.e., realtors, 
developers, insurers, bankers, consumers, and local units of government. 
State extension agents often have daily talk shows and/or newsletters, and 
might be willing to develop a series on the basics of floodplain management, 
flood insurance, evacuation and warning, floodproofing and other related 
issues. 
Public libraries are a great place to build up a reference section on 
floodplain management as well as to disseminate brochures. 
Such professional associations as the home builders, real estate agents, 
and insurers may be willing to assist in providing and disseminating informa-
tion. They routinely hold national, regional, and state conventions, and 
issues of community interest such as the NFIP would be a welcome addition to 
their agenda. Such groups also have a variety of publications that are 
valuable vehicles. A brochure published by a national appraisers' group was 
placed in the deed room of a local county clerk's office to highlight what to 
look for when buying property, but no mention was made about a determination of 
whether the property was hazard-prone. This was an opportunity lost. 
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County fairs, folk festivals and other community events offer excellent 
opportunities to distribute information. Local service groups such as Jaycees, 
Kiwanis, and automobile clubs have established credibility within the community 
and serve as willing volunteers to help with public information programs. 
In Harlan, we worked with a small community group called the Fellowship 
Center to establish a landmark program. From the information gathered by 
volunteers at the Center, we not only made the residents aware of procedures to 
follow during an emergency situation, but also established high water marks in 
the area. We coordinated this information with the flood insurance study for 
the area and, with the aid of SCS, transferred the high water marks to all the 
telephone poles in the flood-prone area by simply spray painting the water mark 
at the correct height on the pole. Such activities need continuous maintenance 
and follow-up with bulletins showing how water marks coincide with weather 
warning announcements for evacuation purposes. As with any education program 
or public relations campaign, to be successful it has to be an ongoing 
process. 
Technical Assistance 
Some technical assistance programs are simple approaches requiring a 
minimum of financial expenditures. Others require technical assistance from 
the various state and federal agencies. This can take any number of forms: 
• Development of a do-it-yourself book on floodproofing. A specialty 
publishing house such as Sunset Books or Time-Life could do a popular 
rendition of principles and techniques of all of the IEMS concepts. 
• Development of working scale models for a floodmobile (much like the 
various Smithsonian vans) to travel with models to show the impact of fill 
in a floodplain, the difference in uncontrolled and controlled development 
in a floodplain, how to build a shield for picture windows or sliding 
glass doors. The vehicle could also disseminate literature and present 
slide shows. 
• Curriculum development for an adult continuing education course or 
vocational education courses that include full-semester courses covering a 
variety of concepts and techniques for hazard mitigation as well as a 
short one-day course on how to anchor a propane tank. 
These and other types of technical assistance could have far-reaching 
impacts in developing a self-help ethic among residents living in hazard-prone 
areas who have become too reliant on the federal dollar to solve their prob-
lems. 
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Agency Coordination 
These kinds of approaches can and should be developed, but the various 
state and federal agencies need to talk to each other. For example, the USDA 
Forest Service has a series called Investigate Your Environment, which is 
designed to teach teachers how to teach environmental concerns. The course was 
really very good, but in one role-playing activity concerning land use planning 
there was no mention in the printed fact situation that the land was flood-
prone--and no one thought it necessary to add this fact to future printings of 
the material. 
At the state level, there are frequent problems deciding who has what 
authority in dealing with disaster and emergency services groups and the 
natural resources groups. Agencies tend to shy away from cooperating with each 
other because of these "turf battles," and thus a valuable resource and frame 
of reference has been lost. 
Another problem is the failure of federal and state policy decisions to 
trickle down to the planners and implementers in the agency. Staff people are 
still following traditional authorities, while the policy makers and theorists 
are exploring new possibilities with new implications for old plans still on 
the drawing board. Perhaps miniregional conferences are needed for the middle 
levels of bureaucracy and the field personnel. Do state and federal agencies 
really take advantage of Emergency Management Institute courses and if not, why 
not? 
The final key to implementation is local involvement in the decision-
making process. Why don't the states conduct conferences (like the annual NFIP 
coordinators' conference) for the local and regional planners to pass on the 
knowledge they have acquired? Why is there no representation from local 
government and regional planners at the annual coordinators' conference? 
Perhaps agencies could set up working advisory groups with a broad cross-
section of individuals to include citizens (the eventual benefactors) and such 
professionals as architects, engineers, educators, and planners. Such an 
~dvisory group could also be set up to examine EMI course needs and content. 
The bottom line to training and educating the local practitioner is to 
nake sure the local practitioner is involved in the process. 
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THE RAPID GROWTH OF COMMUNITY FLOOD WARNING SYSTEMS 
Curtis B. Barrett 
NOAA/National Weather Service 
The NWS is currently experiencing a substantial demand by communities for 
technical support for local flood warning systems. This demand is occurring 
because federal, state, county, and local governments are becoming more aware 
of the benefits of operating local flood warning systems. This trend will 
probably continue as flood damages continue to increase and as the NWS and 
other agencies assist communities to solve their flood problems. This paper 
deals with the present and future role of the NWS in working with communities 
in operating local flood warning systems. 
Present Approaches to Identify High Risk Areas 
In 1975 the NWS contracted with the University of Texas to evaluate the 
flash flood potential of the entire nation. This study used a magnitude of 
flash flooding index, flash floou frequency index, and a flash flood warning 
time index to evaluate flash flood potential. However, it only provided the 
NWS with a partial solution in the definition of high risk flash flood areas. 
FEMA has identified 20,000 locations in the U.S. that are vulnerable to 
the occurrence of floods and flash floods. This "data base," which contains 
useful information for each community, is another source to help identify "high 
risk" areas subject to floods. Other factors that need to be considered are 
the population located in the floodplain, present level of warning service, 
location of dams in the river basin, and the general level of awareness and 
enthusiasm of community officials regarding solving their flood problems. 
The NWS does not, in general, market local flood warning systems but 
rather responds to requests from communities for technical support. The NWS 
does not have the resources to provide a sustained marketing effort to communi-
ties located in high risk areas. 
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Classification of Communities for Assistance 
Communities are not classified for receiving assistance. Instead, the NWS 
policy (Draft chapter E-OB. WSOM) for supporting communities needs is that: 
1) The NWS will provide technical assistance to requesting communities as 
resources permit. 
2) Communities are responsible for the purchase, installation, maintenance, 
and cooperation of local flood warning systems. 
Other federal agencies such as the Corps of Engineers, the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, and the USDA Soil Conservation Service have pro-
vided cost-sharing financial support to high-risk communities. 
New Approaches 
The design, development, and implementation of local flood warning systems 
is an evolutionary process. As technology advances, so will our capability to 
enhance flood warning services. 
in particular, the capabilities of automated local flood warning systems 
will continue to expand. In the present versions of ALERT and IFLOWS, the 
hydrometeorological analysis and modeling is limited. Development is now 
underway to 1) display and process multimeteorologic sensor data, 2) include 
hydrologic routing techniques, 3) model snow melt, and 4) develop a coastal 
surge/riverine interface model. Dam break procedures are planned. Automated 
flood warning systems will eventually evolve into a system of hydrometeorologi-
cal models and techniques that will meet the many needs of communities. 
Future Role of the Systems 
The human element will always be the critical one in the warning process. 
Local flood warning systems are simply tools to be used by those individuals 
responsible for preserving human life and property. Because of this fact, the 
NWS designs forecast and warning systems that are interactive. Since there are 
no perfect hydrologic models, and since data scarcity is the greatest source of 
error in river and flood forecasting, manual and automated system performance 
can only provide "guidance" to the forecaster. Of course, the more accurate 
and timely the objective guidance, the more warning time and accuracy we can 
provide communities to prepare for floods. 
In all cases, automated or manual, the key individual (flash flood coordi-
nator) must assimilate data, guidance, and information; interpret the "system" 
results; and make decisions about the appropriate actions. 
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warning Systems and Floodplain Management 
Warning systems are one nonstructural approach to mitigating flood losses. 
Basically, a warning system provides lead time for response actions, flood 
magnitude, and location of flooding. In order for a local flood warning system 
to be effective, an emergency action plan must be available. other structural 
and nonstructural methods can be linked with a flood warning system to further 
reduce flood losses. For example, floodproofing linked with a manual flood 
warning system in Lycoming County, Pennsylvania, is credited with reducing 
flood losses by 90%. 
In order for warning systems to become more effective, forecasts generated 
for river gauges must be related to the area inundated by the flood. This 
translation from a point forecast to an area forecast would greatly enhance 
flood response actions. Also, it is desirable for automated flood warning 
systems to include the community emergency action plan as part of the forecast 
system. Thus, forecasts would automatically be translated to actions. 
In general, the important point to note here for floodplain managers is 
that flood warning systems are usually not the sole solution but rather one 
solution among many in an overall floodplain management effort. 
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FLOOD FIGHTING IN THE CHICAGO METROPOLITAN AREA 
James M. Considine 
Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission 
Background 
The Chicago metropolitan area or Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area is 
composed of six counties and 261 municipalities with a population of over seven 
million people. All six counties are in the regular phase of the National 
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). Two hundred twenty municipalities are in the 
regular phase and ten are in the emergency phase of the NFIP. Chicago is the 
largest municipality, with a population of over three and one half million. 
Overland flooding problems in Chicago are minimal, although sewer back-up 
problems are quite common. The heavily populated suburbs have severe overland 
as well as sewer back-up flooding problems. 
Overland flooding in Northeastern Illinois is generally shallow, with low 
velocities, and is of a short duration. Floods at the same location are 
usually infrequent, although some areas do have annual flood problems. The 
Chicago SMSA is so large that heavy rainstorms can cause severe flooding in one 
area and only minimal problems several miles away. 
The damage from floods can be quite extensive because of the large number 
of structures located in the floodplains of northeast Illinois. In 1981, flood 
damage in the southern part of the metropolitan area amounted to $84 million, 
and in 1982 one northern suburb had over $8 million in damage. Average annual 
overland flood damages in the suburbs of the Chicago area have been estimated 
at $12.4 million. 
Flood fighting problems in the metropolitan area are compounded because 
the flood-prone areas are occupied by numerous small municipalities that lack 
the capability and expertise to adequately handle flooding situations. These 
small municipalities lack the proper staff, have a shortage of equipment and 
supplies, and have no lead time when it comes to flood warning. 
It is difficult to convince the municipalities that a flood response plan 
is needed. Though flooding can affect many structures and cause much damage, 
the percentage of structures that are flooded is very small in relation to the 
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total number of structures in the metropolitan area. While many of the munici-
palities have witnessed a 50-year or greater flood within the last 20 years, 
there are still many other municipalities that have not. There is a general 
feeling that a severe flood will not occur again, that a structural project 
will handle the problem, or that the problem is better left ignored. For these 
reasons, flood fighting is a very low priority item for most municipalities. 
Planning for flood fighting is almost nonexistent. Flood fighting 
decisions are normally made "on the spot" by administrators who often have 
neither witnessed a flood nor had flood fighting training. Some municipalities 
have Emergency Services and Disaster Agency emergency response plans, but these 
"all-emergency" plans normally do not provide the necessary answers for flood 
fighting. While most of the municipalities have capable staffs, the rapid 
onset of the flooding, the last-minute decisions, the lack of trained 
personnel, and the frantic search for equipment and supplies can cause severe 
strains on the municipal staff and leave the public with many questions about 
the capabilities of their municipal personnel. 
Evaluating the Problem 
During December, 1982, floods inundated various locations throughout the 
metropolitan area. Eyewitness accounts by several representatives from the 
Illinois Division of water Resources led to a general belief that the flood 
fighting capabilities of the municipalities were lacking. 
Because of this, the Division of Water Resources conducted a flood fight-
ing conference in March, 1983, attended by over 250 representatives of local 
police departments, fire departments, public works departments, building and 
zoning departments, ESDA coordinators, and elected officials. The purpose of 
the conference was to explain to municipal officials what flood fighting and 
floodplain management services were provided by the various state and federal 
government agencies. 
At the end of the conference a feedback session was held to determine what 
federal and state governments could do to improve local flood fighting capabil-
ities. Approximately seventy of the conference attendees participated in the 
community feedback session. They were asked, "Based on your experience, what 
assistance could be provided by the state and federal governments and neighbor-
ing communities to help you before, during, or after a flood?" Based upon 
their decisions, a rank order of the assistance that state and federal govern-
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ments could provide was developed. The following kinds of assistance were 
considered the most important (in order of decreasing importance): 
1) Guidance and assistance in preparing flood response plans; 
2) Aid in establishing local or watershed flood warning systems; 
3) Better coordination and tougher enforcement of regulations on floodplain 
development, channel obstructions, and stormwater management; 
4) More information on how to fight floods and what assistance and resources 
are available; and 
5) Better coordination to provide mutual aid and share equipment among 
communities in the same area or watershed. 
After the conference a flood fighting coordination committee was formed to 
discuss the outcome of the community feedback session and how it should be 
addressed. The committee was composed of representatives from the u.s. Army 
Corps of Engineers Chicago District, the Illinois Division of Water Resources, 
the National Weather Service, the Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster 
Agency, the regional planning commission, and selected municipal and county 
representatives. 
Flood Fighting Manual 
The main outcome of the flood fighting coordination meeting was to develop 
a flood fighting manual that could be used by local municipalities to prepare 
flood response plans. It was felt that such a manual could address many of the 
concerns raised by the local government officials at the feedback session. The 
manual was funded mainly by the State of Illinois but also partially by the 
State Assistance Program of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The flood 
fighting manual is still in the draft stage, and some municipalities have 
already expressed an interest in working with the state to develop a flood 
response plan, using the manual as a guideline. 
The flood fighting manual is a "how-to" guide that provides instructions 
on systematically designing a flood fighting program through a planning 
process. The process is similar to the planning process in the Integrated 
Emergency Management System (IEMS) developed by the Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency. The flood fighting chapters of the manual are: 
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• Chapter 1, "Flood Hazard Analysis"--explains that different types of 
floods demand different responses. Flood data must be collected and 
analyzed. A flood stage forecast map is needed to determine the flood 
hazard impact and to set priorities for emergency response needs. 
• Chapter 2, "capability Assessment"--shows how a municipality should make 
an inventory and assessment of the three types of resources--personnel, 
equipment, and facilities--that would be needed to fight a flood, and how 
to obtain assistance from state and federal agencies. 
• Chapter 3, "Flood warning"--explains different types of warning systems 
and how the warnings should be disseminated. 
• Chapter 4, "Flood Fighting Plan"--provides an overview of everything that 
should be done immediately after a flood warning is issued. 
Practical Application 
The manual would have been of little benefit unless it could be applied to 
a practical situation. About the same time that the flood fighting committee 
was formed, a drainage district questioned what they could do to control flood-
ing. It was suggested that they consider developing a flood warning system. 
Flood warning systems on a watershed level have not been developed in the 
Chicago metropolitan area. with the encouragement of the State of Illinois' 
Division of water Resources, four communities within the watershed of the west 
Fork Branch of the Chicago River have almost completed the preparatory work for 
a manually operated flood warning sy,,;tem, with the nec.:e";";dry tec.:hnical exper-
tise being provided by the U.S. National Weather Service. 
The precipitation and streams gauges are read by police departments, fire 
departments, public works and volunteer ESDA officials from the four municipal-
ities. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Chicago District, has agreed to 
develop a flood stage forecast map. Once the flood stage mapping is complete, 
the Illinois Division of Water Resources and the Emergency Services and 
Disaster Agency intend to assemble the municipalities to develop a flood fight-
ing plan based upon the flood fighting manual. 
The process has been very slow. It was initiated almost one year ago and 
the flood stage mapping has yet to be prepared. It was expected that it would 
take time to develop a flood warning system and response plan, since this is 
the first time that it has been done on a watershed basis in the metropolitan 
area. However, a shortage of state and federal personnel who can devote time 
to the project has greatly hindered its completion. Those personnel assigned 
to work on the project have other responsibilities that take priority. Because 
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of this, the flood response plan for the North Branch of the Chicago River 
watershed remains undone, and many other watersheds need assistance on flood 
warning systems and response plans. 
Conclusion 
~9 
The capability and the willingness of municipalities to prepare flood 
warning systems and flood response plans is evident. Their desires are even 
more pronounced after flood events. Intergovernmental cooperation is a diffi-
cult task that has to be worked out, but is not a major obstacle.' The big 
challenge lies in making the proper people available to the local municipali-
ties, and this includes for planning as well as technical assistance. 
The lack of assistance is not a result of the capabilities of the people 
in the state and federal agencies, but rather of the lack of time that can be 
devoted to such efforts. More emphasis needs to be placed on assistance by 
those agencies with the staff to provide it to the local municipalities. This 
includes the u.s. National Weather Service, the u.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 
the Illinois Department of Transportation Division of water Resources, the 
Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency, and the Illinois State Water 
Survey. 
The Division of Water Resources has made great strides in showing munici-
palities how they can develop a flood response plan with the flood fighting 
manual. Many municipalities that had not thought about developing such pro-
cedures now have something to help them visualize how it can be done. However, 
technical and planning assistance is still needed. None of the suburban 
municipalities or the counties have a hydrologist who can develop flood 
forecasting procedures. Of the municipalities with an engineering staff, many 
do not have the time, or for that matter, the expertise to properly prepare 
flood forecast maps. These are the kinds of things that can be done by the 
U,S. National Weather service, the u.s. Army Corps of Engineers, and the state 
of Illinois. The expertise is there, but time must be allocated. 
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UTAH FLOODS--1983-84 
James D. Harvey 
Utah Division of Comprehensive Emergency Management 
Department of Public safety 
The settlement of Utah and the West dates back to 1776 with the expedition 
of Father Escalante, followed by exploration by early mountaineers, fur 
trappers, and the John C. Freemont expedition. In 1847, the first of many 
Mormon pioneers entered the Salt Lake Valley. These people were the first to 
maintain records of the fluctuations of the Great Salt Lake. The lake's fre-
quent flooding of vast areas of land caused the early settlers many problems. 
According to historical records, the Great Salt Lake reached its highest 
elevation of 4,212 feet during the years 1872-1874. For a period of ten years 
(1868-1878) the lake was above the 4,209-foot level. In 1963, the lake 
declined to its lower elevation of 4,191.5 feet. During this time, the utah 
Legislature passed a resolution that set forth the idea that the lake should be 
maintained at the 4,200-foot level. In spite of the efforts of the utah 
Legislature, the lake today is at an elevation of 4,209 feet. Drawing from 
past as well as from present facts, we can reasonably expect more flooding from 
the lake. 
Today, industry, developers, engineers, and others have a difficult time 
trying to determine the fluctuations of the lake. This scenario holds true for 
much of the state as we attempt to deal with the lakes and rivers of Utah. 
This is because Utah is a land of contrasts. For example, the Great Salt Lake 
Basin receives an average of 5.3 inches of rain annually whereas the ski resort 
at Alta receives an average of 100 inches per year. (This year, Alta received 
197 inches of rain.) Normally, Utah is a desert state, with only Nevada being 
drier. However, past and present records indicate that flooding is a common 
problem. 
Utah experiences three types of flooding: two types of snow melt flood-
ing, and short-lived summer torrential downpours associated with cloudbursts 
and thunderstorms. The first snow melt floods take place during the months of 
January and February while the ground is frozen. These floods are difficult to 
control because corrective measures are hampered by winter weather. The second 
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snow melt occurs during the last week of April and continues through May. The 
runoff is often increased by rain. The salt Lake area was affected by such 
floods in 1922, 1952, and again in 1983-84. (It is of interest to note that 
the floods of 1922 and of 1952 did not have the highest volume of total runoff, 
but that the floods resulted because of above average spring temperatures.) 
The flooding of 1983-84 is, we believe, a repeat of the high water that 
was experienced by the Mormon pioneers of 95 years ago. Could this be a true 
100-year event? We believe that it is. As a result of rising waters, the 
following events have occurred: 
1) Interstate 80 from Salt Lake City west to Nevada was damaged and required 
reconstructive work. 
2) The Great Salt Lake Mineral company went out of business, resulting in the 
loss of 240 jobs. 
3) Saltair Entertainment Park also went out of business, resulting in 20 to 
50 lost jobs. 
4) Many agricultural operations were flooded, resulting in the loss of 
millions of agricultural dollars. 
5) Additional diking of Rose Park (northwest of Salt Lake City) was 
required. 
It must be noted that the jobs lost because of the lake's flooding are to 
some extent offset by the new jobs generated in the fighting of the flood. 
Loss of income has also been experienced by all of the major hotels of the 
state as a direct result of the news coverage of the floods of 1983 and 1984. 
Based upon our experiences during the flood fight of 1983-84, our most 
serious problems were those dealing with unknown factors such as mud/landslides 
and dam failures, coupled with the fact that homeowners and small business 
people were unwilling to accept even minimal losses from flooding. As a result 
some dwellings were saved only at great public expense. 
Another thing that caused some confusion was the practice of county offi-
cials contacting the Governor's and the U.S. Senators' offices directly instead 
of working through the proper channels. Because of this, some emergency equip-
ment was misappropriated. We are taking measures to better inform local offi-
cials on the procedures to follow in the case of an emergency. 
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As a result of the extensive damages Utah experienced in the last few 
years, we are taking preventive measures. For example, many debris basins are 
being constructed. River banks are being riprapped to prevent excess bank 
erosion. To counter mudslides, landslides, and extensive hillside erosion, we 
are installing electronic instrumentation for early warnings. These stations 
provide up to 30 minutes of lead time. One worry that we do have concerning 
these stations is that too many false alerts may condition property owners not 
to heed the warnings. Also, a new area for lawsuits could arise if people seek 
recourse for disasters that may have been avoided if adequate warning had been 
given. 
Would predisaster plans be practical for a state such as Utah? Yes, we 
believe any planning to be practical. In many instances, county/city crews 
were able to predict the extent of a flood enabling them to fortify stream 
banks and reduce possible losses. However, it must be noted that all of the 
mud/landslides that have occurred in Utah these past two years were in areas 
thought not to be subject to land movement. Areas of greatest concern did not 
move. 
Agencies that were a part of the flood fight of 1984 were: 
Federal Agencies 
Federal Emergency Management Agency 
Federal Highway Administration 
National Weather Service 
Small Business Administration 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
USDA Soil Conservation Services 
USDA Agriculture Stabilization Services 
USDA Forest Service 
U.S. Geological Survey 
State Agencies 
Department of Agriculture 
Department of community and Economic Development 
Department of Health 
Department of Insurance 
Department of Natural Resources and Energy 
Department of Transportation 
Utah National Guard 
The following recommendations are offered for future flood mitigation: 
1) Have the Army Corps of Engineers combine mudflow and flood-zone data onto 
one FEMA map. This is being done for Davis county. 
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2) Propose legislation requiring that owners of dams have liability 
insurance. 
3) Where possible, swap lands between federal agencies and local communities 
in areas in which debris basins and flood control measures are to be 
constructed. 
4) Further define the role of the state engineer to include regulating 
storage reservoirs. 
5) During disasters, arrange fro property owners to receive their flood 
insurance payments from their individual insurance agents. 
6) Provide for the payment of flood insurance for structures rendered un-
usable as well as for those destroyed. 
Utah has and will continue to experience floods. We hope that our present 
mitigation efforts (both regulatory and structural), coupled with past experi-
ence will reduce the severity of that flooding. 
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